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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation, I look at the changing praxes of contemporary art and culture
vis-à-vis neoliberalism. With examples from the Americas, the Middle East, and Eastern
Europe, I acknowledge, but trespass the visible effects and outcomes of globalization
with regard to art and culture. In current literature they often are interpreted as
straightforward and homogeneous developments, but in this dissertation, I show the
complexity, heterogeneity and inequality of new social, political, and cultural
relationships wrought by and against the neoliberal ideology and processes that affect all
corners of the world. My main focus is on the dialectics of contemporary art and
neoliberalism: Are pluralization and dissemination of contemporary art an indication of a
new democratic consciousness or the outcome of a rapidly expanding neoliberal market?
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In postmodernist theory, the political dimension of the aesthetic experience has
been the key to understanding contemporary forms of art. I argue that, at present, in this
era of global revolt, the aesthetic dimension of the political experience is the key to
understanding contemporary society, as well as radical politics. I offer a novel approach
to understanding the relationship between aesthetics and politics that challenges greatly
what is accepted as political in society and what is accepted as aesthetics in art. My aim is
to bring the art history discipline closer to radical politics by showing how
contemporary cultural, artistic, and activist activities are entangled in forming a new
politics of resistance that envisions renewed forms of democratic life.
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INTRODUCTION
It is urgent to ask for freedom!
It is important to question about those who are absent!
It is time to talk about those who are always wrong!
It is time to talk about Democracy!
Song from the opening scene of
Tony Gatlif’s film Exils1
In this dissertation, I analyze the interplay between contemporary art and the
dramatic expansion of neoliberal globalization that has taken place since 1989.
Employing an interdisciplinary approach, this study examines the two sides of the
relationship. On one side, the increasingly corporatist art market and the art world have
defined, measured, and organized contemporary art in art institutions through the prism
of commodity value and institutional discourse. On the other side, some emergent art
practices have become more and more embedded in an anti-systemic resistance that
defies all types of institutional power and neoliberal corporatism.
My contribution to art history lies in my attempt to challenge the perspective of
what art can say about politics, and reframe that question as what art can and cannot do
as politics. Out of the struggle against the system, and those who run it in this era of
globalized revolt, new forms of political participation and democracy have been
emerging. I focus on political communities and art communities that are constitutive of
one another in order to understand the construction of new forms of subjectivities and
thus the new forms of democracy arising from the concurrence of these communities,
which constitute the core of the current agenda of radical politics. I also contribute to the
field of social research by defining culture not only as a space for social interaction but
also as a space for political intervention.
1

Manifest, Exils, feature film, directed by Tony Gatlif (France: Home Vision Entertainment, 2004).
1

Debates over the art world’s expansion through new biennials, museums, art fairs,
and commercial art galleries, as well as the extension of the scope of art criticism to
include emerging financial markets in the neoliberal economy, such as India, China,
Russia and the United Arab Emirates, tend to dominate current discussions of art and
globalization. However, these debates obscure the far more important issue of art’s
power, which stems from its ability to ignite change. Nonetheless, in this study, I do not
repeat exhausted questions, such as whether contemporary art can be an impetus for
social change, or how much contemporary art is involved in politics. Instead, drawing
from a variety of aesthetic expressions within and beyond the art world, I address the
ways in which art, since the neoliberal turn has merged with rebellious and subversive
political formations, has become a part of the constitution of a new understanding of
political participation and radical democracy.2 I analyze contemporary art’s critical power
to establish democratic spaces in and out of the institutions of art. However, instead of
focusing on what a democratic art can or cannot be, I focus on what democracy is to art.

“Radical democracy” is a term used to refer to post-Marxist and autonomist Marxist criticism of the
consensus making mechanism of representative democracy. Instead of liberal attempts to build
consciousness, the core of radical democracy is dissent and antagonism. Since 1985, Chantal Mouffe and
Ernesto Laclau’s book has been considered the core text in contemporary political and social theory on
radical democracy. Mouffe and Laclau suggest radical democracy is the extension of democratic
relationships to a wide range of social relations, and the generalization of the equivalential-egalitarian
logic.French philosopher Jacques Rancière refers to this as “true politics,” while defining politics as a form
of aesthetic action. Rancière introduces the concept of dissensus (disagreement/dissent) as disruption of the
normal order (a police order) of the politics (distribution of the sensible). Similar to Rancière, Stanley
Aronowitz, in Radical Democracy: Identity, Citizenship and the State, claims that radical democracy is a
form of social organization in which each individual possesses the capacity for speech and exercises it.
Examples of radical democracy can be seen in autonomous movements in Latin America, such as the
landless workers’ movement in Brazil, the unemployed workers’ movement in Argentina (known as
Piquetero) the KCK (Korna Civaken Kurdistan) United Communities in Kurdistan, which is a Kurdish
liberation movement that is active in Turkey and Syria; and EZLN-Zapatista Army of National Liberation
in Chiapas, Mexico. For more on the theory of radical democracy, see Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau,
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, trans. Winston Moore and Paul
Cammack (London and New York: Verso, 1985); David Trend, eds., Radical Democracy: Identity,
Citizenship and the State (New York: Routledge, 1996); and Rebecca Abers, Inventing Local Democracy:
Grassroots Politics in Brazil (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
2

2

Immediately before and after the dramatic political changes in Central and
Eastern Europe that culminated in the demolition of the Berlin Wall in 1989, liberal
democracy and market capitalism triumphed, allowing Francis Fukuyama’s proclamation
of “the end of history”—meaning the end of ideological conflicts—to reverberate
throughout the world.3 The era celebrated a new kind of political and economic
liberalism, proclaiming the dictatorship of the market and a minimal state as the only
road for capital and disallowing alternatives.4 For the past four decades, neoliberalism has
come to define the economic project of a particular political philosophy–namely the
product of a discursive combination of the logic of liberal democracy with the
dictatorship of the market. Neoliberalism’s relationship with culture has largely been
described in terms of the networked society, information age, and technological era, as
well as border crossings and multicultural societies.5 From that angle, in this relationship,
neoliberalism appears as an unchallengeable force with no alternatives. On the other
hand, we have been witnessing a global revolt against neoliberalism that engages
resistance through culture to spur action toward a systemic change.6
Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History” (originally published in International Interest) in The
Geopolitics Reader, ed., Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, Paul Routledge (London: Routlege, 1998).
4
For example, “There is no alternative,” also known as TINA, is a catch phrase famously used by the
former Prime Minister of Britain, Margaret Thatcher, in her attack on political alternatives.
5
See especially Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000)
and Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1996).
6
What I mean by “resistance through culture” does not entail cultural resistance or a culture of resistance; it
entails the aesthetic sphere of the politics of resistance. For a comprehensive study on the movements
against neoliberalism from the protests of Seattle to the recent occupy protests around the globe see Amory
Starr, Global Revolt: A Guide to the Movements against Globalization (London: Zed Books, 2005); for an
analysis of the activist practice of new political subjectivity in those movements see Geoffrey Pleyers and
Alain Touraine, Alter-globalization: Becoming Actors in the Global Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010);
for a radical take on the theory of the paradoxical aspects of the disperse movements that make up the
global revolt, see Peter Lenco, Deleuze and World Politics: Alter-Globalizations and Nomad Science (New
York: Routledge: 2013); and Raphael Schlembach, Against Old Europe: Critical Theory and AlterGlobalization Movements (Farnham: Ashgate Pub., 2014); also for discussions on these movements’
challenges to democracy see Naom Chomsy and David Barsamean, Power Systems: Conversations on
Global Democratic Uprisings and the New Challenges to U.S (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2013).
3

3

In the last three decades, massive movements that target the neoliberal system
have emerged all around the world. These movements range from the Zapatista
Movement in the Chiapas Mountains to the workers’ movement (Piqueteros) in
Argentina, from the teachers’ insurgence in Oaxaca to the peasants’ resistance in Central
India, from the Tahrir Square uprising to the Occupy Movement, and from massive antigovernment protests in Spain, Greece and Brazil to the Gezi uprising in Turkey. We have
found ourselves participating in “the rebirth of history” as Alain Badiou has framed it.7
Badiou examines these movements in a framework of emancipatory universalism–the
return of the masses onto the stage of history to confront the neoliberal ruling class.8
According to Badiou, although the aftermath of these riots and uprisings have been the
increasing repression of the state, what is different now is that those who have not been
counted in their political situation as subjects, now enter the stage of history. This, for
Badiou, is the coming to visibility of the “inexistent subjects” of history and a shift in the
breakage of the order of the political space, which signals an opening of possibility for an
alternative social organization. For Badiou, this openness to possibility is the necessary
epoch, which he defines as an “intervallic period” that prepares the stage for a new figure
7 Alain Badiou, The Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and Uprisings, trans. Gregory Elliott (London and
New York: Verso, 2012).
8
Ibid. Badiou analyses the recent uprisings, riots and revolts from the riots in France, in 2005, to the Gezi
Uprising in Turkey, in 2013. His theory of “the rebirth of history” is in a direct confrontation with Francis
Fukuyama’s take on the “end of history,” and to the line of thought that followed Fukuyama on the death of
radical subjects. A post-Marxist dialectician, Badiou takes history as a breakage in the causal order of
things as opposed to history as a series of events. It is with his take on the principle of “event” and its role
in the making of history that he diverges from the philosophy of Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan and Gilles
Deleuze, among others. His take on revolutionary politics finds resonance in activist circles and in far left
political texts such as The Coming Insurrection –a book that has been very influential on the anarchist
movement and other radical leftists in general. (This text is a publication/manifesto by anonymous leftist
philosophers signed with the pen name, “The Invisible Committee.” First published in French in 2007, the
book rejects the official Left’s reformist agenda and aligns itself with the new forms of resistance that have
emerged in recent riots, general strikes and uprisings across Europe and around the world). This significant
publication connects the Zapatista Movement to the banlieue riots in Paris with a take on “resonance
politics” and decentralized revolution. See Comité invisible, The Coming Insurrection (Los Angeles, CA:
Semioetext (e), 2009).
4

of politics.9 I agree with Badiou that although horizontality and spontaneity is central to
the “historical riot” in the aftermath of events, the political program of the riots and
uprisings should be organized in a way that confronts the contradiction between the
internal democracy of the movements and the authority of the state. And in my view, the
contemporary battle over and against neoliberalism should be understood as a battle over
the most needed political imaginary, which is shaping contested discourses and political
practices, as much as a battle over and against economic, environmental, and political
changes.
In this dissertation, I do not repeat the discussions on art’s critical power to open
up democratic spaces in the institutions of art. Instead, I am interrogating what
democracy is to contemporary art and if that has been changing in the time of global
revolt against neoliberalism.10 For this, I first look at the spaces of global art institutions,
namely the biennials and their complex relationship with the local mechanisms of power
and resistance. Later, I look at contemporary art outside of art institutions (the streets, the
public spaces, the mountains and the jungle) to show how communal aesthetics, as
opposed to the personal aesthetics of individual artists and/or curators, has been
occupying the sphere of radical politics.11
The common understanding of engaged art, in the 1960s, asserted that a raised
consciousness engendered by political art would provoke political action. Thus, the
artwork’s message of revolutionary struggle, as intended by the artist, would allow us to
see the inherent contradictions of capitalism, and this should be essential for the critical
9

Badiou, The Rebirth of History, 44.
What is apparent is that, in the context of contemporary art, we are not dealing with just exchange and
production; we are dealing with the politics of codification of artistic space.
11
For a good analysis of communal aesthetics as opposed to personal aesthetics in cultural practices in
common urban spaces see Preminda Jacob, “A Dialectic of Personal and Communal Aesthetics: The Yard
Ornamentation in North Eastern America,” The Journal of Popular Culture 26/3 (1992): 91-105.
10
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awakening of society. This body of thought has its roots in the eighteenth century
Enlightenment, and it was carried forward by the 1968 revolutions. Especially in the
1960s and 1970s, the acts of artistic activism and political activism became increasingly
blurred.
Recently, with what has been described as a “spatial turn of social theory,” or a
“social turn of art,” we witness changes in art’s engagement with politics, from igniting
critical awakening in society to creating communal and egalitarian relations in the public
spaces and in the spaces of activism.12 Since, this type of political engagement of art is
ephemeral and the outcome cannot be calculated, the social and aesthetic viability of
these practices are questioned and the never-ending tension between political activism
and artistic representation is still wrapped up in the centuries-old conundrum: How
exactly do artistic and political spheres interrelate, interact or intersect?
French philosopher Jacques Rancière’s recent works lead us to an important
question in the relationship of politics and aesthetics: When a work of art is bound to a
certain “aesthetic regime” (the already established imposed message, the target audience,
the roles given to the audience) and when the “distribution of the sensible” (the way in
which art is made visible and audible) is unequal, how can art be democratic and
emancipating? In more simplistic words, how can art ever be democratic in light of the

Diversification in socially engaged art, along with contemporary art’s erasure of medium specificity, has
prompted activist/artists to establish more direct dialogue with the public, and in public spaces. Claire
Bishop announced these community based practices as “the social turn of art.” See Claire Bishop, “The
Social Turn: Collaboration and Its Discontents,” Artforum 44 (2006):178-183. Edward Soja described the
spatial turn as “a response to longstanding ontological and epistemological bias that privileged time over
space in all the human sciences, including spatial disciplines like geography and architecture.” Edward
Soja, “Taking Space Personally,” in The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed., Santa Arias and
Barbara Walf (London: Taylor and Francis, 2008), 11-35.
12

6

capitalization of our culture, our urban space, and even our daily life?13 When trying to
answer this question, I anchor my discussion in Rancière’s recent theory on aesthetics
and politics, and especially on what constitutes political art. Rancière argues:
Art is not, in the first instance, political because of the messages and
sentiments it conveys concerning the state of the world. Neither is it
political because of the manner in which it might choose to represent
society’s structures or social groups, their conflicts or identities. It is
political because of the very distance it takes with respect to these
functions, because of the type of space and time that it institutes, and the
manner in which it frames this time and peoples this space.14
For Rancière, the dialogical relationship between the invisible and visible, the
unheard and heard, constitutes the aesthetic dimension of politics as much as the political
dimension of aesthetics. Following Rancière’s lead on this, I look at sites where the
strategies of resistance and dissent occur within particular cultural instances in which the
invisible makes itself visible or the inaudible makes itself heard. I show that what is at
stake is not which art is made visible or what art makes visible, but the instances in which
art becomes a contested arena where the excluded, the marginalized, and the oppressed
become visible to power in a quest for equal representation. Since the revolts of 1968, the
marginalized and oppressed have initiated movements that are not only anti-imperialist
and anti-capitalist, but also aim to attack the core principles of contemporary democracy.
In this dissertation, I do not question whether the subaltern can speak, because as the
liberation movements of the twentieth century showed us, it indeed does. Instead, I aim to
demonstrate to whom the subaltern speaks and in which specific ways.

13

For an excellent discussion on contemporary art as an institution, and its paradoxical relationship with
democracy, see Keti Chuckrov, “On the False Democracy of Contemporary Art,” Eflux 57 (2014), accessed
December 12, 2014, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/on-the-false-democracy-of-contemporary-art/
14
Jacques Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 23.
7

Theoretically, this work also rhymes with the subversive initiatives of the postMarxists who have argued for a new direction in the discourse and historicity of
contemporary politics and aesthetics. To name a few, Chantal Mouffe’s and Ernesto
Laclau’s take on “radical democracy;” Giorgio Agamben’s theorization of the “coming
community;” William Connoly’s concept of “the New Pluralism;” Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri’s notes on “Multitude”; and Alain Badiou’s ideas on “emancipatory
universalism” influence my argument on the radical direction of politics and new radical
subjectivity.15 As these philosophers argue, contrary to the end of ideological conflicts
that Fukuyama insisted upon, “the return of a new theory and practice of revolution” is
prevalent in today’s political praxis.16What I am interested in is the aesthetic dimension
of this radical political praxis.
This dissertation is comprised of two parts that correspond dialectically with each
other. The first two chapters are on the critique of “festivals of art” (the ever-expanding
biennial institution and the international art biennials) and the last two chapters look at
“carnivals of representations” (subversive political and artistic representations in places
that are outside of art institutions). This dialectical approach allows me to analyze and

15

For these concepts and theories see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe eds., Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 2001); Jürgen Habermas, “Constitutional
Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?” Political Theory, 29/6 (2001): 766-781;
David Campbell and Morton Schoolman, eds., The New Pluralism: William Connolly and the
Contemporary Global Condition (Duke University Press, 2008); Giorgio Agamben, Coming Community,
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and
Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin Books, 2005).
16 Thomas Nail, Returning to Revolution: Deleuze, Guattari and Zapatismo (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2012), 1. Also, the highly publicized and sold-out conference, “On the Idea of
Communism” at the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities in 2009 and later “Communism, A New
Beginning?” at Cooper Union, New York, in October, 2011 brought together the world’s leading
philosophers on the subject of emancipatory (radical) politics in the twenty first century. Participants
included, Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Rancière,
Peter Hallward, Terry Eagleton, Gianni Vattimo, Bruno Bosteels, Jodi Dean, Étienne Balibar, and Alberto
Toscano.

8

acknowledge the two sides of the relationship of contemporary art to neoliberalism:
contemporary art as resource and contemporary art as resistance.
In the first chapter, I draw on and extend existing scholarship on contemporary art
and globalization through an analysis of various intersections between developments in
the art world and neoliberal processes. I discuss contentious positions vis-à-vis the role of
the art world and its institutions with regard to the dialectics of global/local dynamics
after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, which transformed
the landscape of contemporary art. I first look at often discussed but poorly documented
art biennials. These spectacular art events, which boomed in the midst of the triumph of
neoliberalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, often dealt with concepts that tie the
exhibition to social issues taking place within the public sphere. Within the multicultural
spirit of the 1990s, the optimistic view posited that the international art biennials brought
to the fore a type of localism, as well as a pluralism, which allowed those exhibitions to
be a space of enunciation for peripheral voices. However, since the new millennium,
biennials have been criticized for creating transnational discourses and standards
indifferent to local economies, histories, and identities.
I direct attention to the fact that every biennial differs not only in its relationship
with the local public, but also in its relationship with the neoliberal restructuring that uses
urban space as its privileged instrument.17 Biennials around the world have completely
different infrastructures, sponsorship mechanisms, ideologies and conditions for
integration (or resistance) to neoliberal globalization. Therefore, they cannot be lumped
17

For more on neoliberalism and the reconstitution of urban space see Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore,
Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe (Blackwell
Publishing, Malden, MA, 2002). David Harvey, in his analysis of neoliberalism, also discusses postmodern
space as an instrument of neoliberalism. See David Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism (London: Verso,
2006) and Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (London: Verso, 2012).
9

together in a single perspective of criticism with a deterministic conclusion on their
submissiveness to neoliberalism. Art Historian David Craven aptly analyzes such
perspective:
This is unsound thinking, among other reasons, because as David Harvey
has observed, the uneven geographical development of neoliberalism, its
frequently partial and lopsided application from one state and social
formation to another, precludes any such overarching formulas about the
automatic relationship of all biennials [writer’s emphasis] to
neoliberalism.18
In fact, all biennials are influenced ideologically, and, to a degree, practically, by
international currents of the global art economy, the effects of which yield a certain
standardization. However, each biennial also has its unique local dynamic that resists the
imposed directives of the biennial model, and each biennial has a different dialogical
relationship with its local art community that affects the level of its reception to
international currents.
The Havana Biennial is a good example to help one understand how relations that
interlock the corporate and artistic interests in the international art world have unique
economic and political effects on the local level, and how the Bienal de La Habana plays
an intermediary role between the cultural politics of the local government and the recent
changes in contemporary art at the global level.
In my other case study in the first chapter, the Roma Pavilion of the 52nd Venice
Biennale shows how, typically, the voice of Gypsy populations in Central and Eastern
European countries is tightly framed and toned down while fulfilling the promise of their
visibility in the world’s biggest and most important international art event. I further
reveal the local and regional political dynamics on the issue of Gypsy identity. I show
David Craven, “Institutionalized Globalization: Contemporary Art and Corporate Gulag in Chile,” in
Globalization and Contemporary Art, ed. Jonathan Harris (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 493.
18

10

that this discourse was incoherent and contradictive because of the competing and
contesting ideologies and benefits of the agents behind this exhibition such as the Open
Society Institute-Roma Initiative (an NGO of a Soros Foundation), the cultural elite of
Roma, the academics who are experts on Roma, and the traditional Romany leaders.
In my attempt to divert attention toward the uneven and unique relationships
between the local actors and global actors in each locality, in this first chapter, I endorse a
relatively new understanding of global/local dynamics by arguing that global and local
are co-constitutive forces. With this perspective, I acknowledge the contradictory position
of local culture both as resource that benefits its chosen hegemonic form of appropriation,
and as resistance that creates forms of local dissidence. I argue that it is in that
contradiction that local’s ability to reinvent itself against the processes of globalization
fortifies it.
Rather than perpetuating the global/local and domination/resistance binaries, I
propose to seek to make visible the constant contestations taking place between the
global and the local because these contestations reveal the very void in neoliberalism’s
overarching and inescapable logic, which in turn makes visible the weak points of the
neoliberal paradigm. Neoliberal discourse relies on the binary position of local/ global to
expand its hegemony, because this dichotomy facilitates the reduction of local
developmental issues and political unrest to a discourse of a mere lack of democracy
founded upon the theme of so-called “backward” culture, so that neoliberalism can find a
legitimate pretext for its “democratic” and “civilizing” discourse. I posit that the
globalization of local art and the localization of global art happen simultaneously and in a
dialectical dynamic that causes these two forces to reinforce each other. Here, what I
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mean by localization of global art is the local anchoring of art in relation to its globality–
the presumed end state of the processes of globalization. In other words, I talk about the
self-representation and self-formulation of the local confronting the imposed directives of
the globalized institutions in the neoliberal system. I conceptualize my understanding of
the local within this framework.
In the second chapter, I focusing on the case of Turkish contemporary art and the
Istanbul Biennial, I continue arguing that art biennials should not be interpreted simply as
a phenomenon with a clear-cut and static relationship to neoliberal globalization and that
biennials around the world present diverse strategies of both integration and resistance to
neoliberalism at the local level. The accounts on biennial criticism often do not take into
account the local reception of the public (for example, that of local intellectuals,
politicians, local artists, art students) as well as the unique agendas of local actors who
enter and exit the ideological, discursive, aesthetic and structural arena of the biennials.
My chapter on Istanbul Biennial is significant to show that biennials are often a site of
contestation for specific agendas of the local actors (also as seen in the Roma Pavilion of
Venice Biennale) and in the case of Istanbul, by the way of this contestation, the political
taboos are challenged.
For the past 20 years, the Turkish contemporary art scene has expanded both
inward and outward with aid from the European Union, the sponsorship of the private
corporations, and the attention of the international art world after the foundation of the
Istanbul Biennial in 1987. In this chapter, I first trace the complete eradication of public
funding for the arts with the implementation of neoliberalism in Turkey after 1980 coup.
Later, I examine the historical and ideological reasons behind the opposition to Istanbul
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Biennial coming from different sectors of the political arena in Turkey that are historical
opponents to each other. While the Istanbul Biennial internationalizes Turkish
contemporary art, the opposition grows against the increasing monopoly of this major art
event in the local art scene. I show that the main reason of “discursive wars” waged over
the Istanbul Biennial is rooted not only on the issue of whose power is being exercised in
the domination of the visual arts realm in Turkey, but also on the issue of who has the
right to make visible and audible the political taboos that constitute the ideological
backbone of the Turkish republic. Thus, the dynamics of the discursive wars denotes the
Istanbul Biennial’s role in the renegotiation of political and cultural geography in Turkey
at present.
I further show how the Istanbul Biennial has played a great role in the
development of the alternative art spaces and plural voices in the art scene in Turkey,
while being subdued by corporate sponsorship. Those artist initiatives and collaborative
practices stand in a semi-autonomous ground and engage in several strategies of
resistance to the western art world system and to the market mechanism embedded in this
system. Such critiques include the class-based concept of public space and hierarchical
processes of producing and exhibiting art. These alternative art spaces and collectives opt
for reconfiguring the separation of public and private spheres by challenging
preconditioned capitalist relations in the public sphere. Included in relations challenged
are those relating to immigrants, political refugees, gypsies, undocumented service
workers, and the rest of the public in Istanbul. In light of Rancière’s theory of the
aesthetic regime as political regime, I discuss Istanbul art collectives that have produced
interdisciplinary projects that seek to rupture the reconfiguration of meaning and
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visibility within the fabric of the metropolis. I believe that the collectives are significant
in recognizing how some interdisciplinary art practices interrupt the conditions and
discourses that produce the regime of art and question art’s relationship to egalitarianism
and democracy.19
In the third and fourth chapters, I analyze the crossroads of aesthetics and political
dissent. I first discuss the contradictory nature of the free-market ideology of
neoliberalism, disguised as democratic reforms and civil liberties. I then show how the
new culture of neoliberalism is confronted by new forms of political subjectivity. I
further demonstrate that, due to the changes and experimentations in the realm of
aesthetics, as well as in new forms of political participation and representation in the era
of global revolt, the aesthetics of civil disobedience and the politics of dissent are deeply
connected. Rancière’s perspective that the aesthetic always is accompanied by politics,
and vice versa, inspires a new understanding for the relationship between the two,
extending beyond the conceptualization of the existing political and aesthetic categories
and their relationship.
Building on Rancière’s ideas on aesthetics and politics, I argue that art’s political
potential resides in art’s ability to change itself in relation to the ideological mechanisms
that make up its regime. The examples of such can be found during some recent
demonstrations, strikes, uprisings, sit-ins, marches, protests, celebrations, occupations,
and revolts where art has been flourishing as both a practice and a product of communal
aesthetics. In those spaces and instances art –that has a real and an immediate
confrontation with the forces and the instruments of oppression—does not suddenly enter
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the realm of politics and become “political art” or “socially engaged art,” rather it
accentuates its existence as politics. In other words, for Rancière art is politics when it
makes visible what is uncontested.
Aesthetic practices during the recent anti-globalization protests, that continued
after the Reclaim the Streets movement in 1996 and Carnival Against Capitalism protests
in 1999, are good examples to search for a new conceptualization of such aesthetic and
political acts rather than merely lumping them into vague categories of “activist art” or
political art.” I look at such practices during the anti-globalization (alter-globalization)
movement, in the teacher’s rebellion in Oaxaca in 2006 and the Gezi movement in
Turkey, and I focus on their visible carnivalesque character–the costumes, the masks and
the interventional tactics. My main aim is to divert attention to the communal aesthetic
experience of the masses for the capacity of this carnivalesque aesthetics to open a radical
dimension of social and sensual encounters that enables the possibility of a radical
subjectivity.
Borrowing from Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of the carnival and carnivalesque and
from Jacques Rancière’s theory of “communities of sense,” I claim that the carnival, as
the sensuous and subversive experience of collective bodies, is the sphere where aesthetic
and politics unite. Rancière frames aesthetic experience as a specific sphere that could
invalidate the usual hierarchies incorporated in everyday sensory experience, which
entails the erasure of the distinction between art and everyday life. Taking aesthetic
experience as a form of collective life, Rancière argues for a radical link between “the
separateness of aesthetic experience and the framing of political subjectivization.”20
Similarly, in his old but recently much celebrated book, in Rabelais and His World,
20
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Bakhtin argues that during social events with mass participation, such as carnivals, bodies
are de-individualized and they belong to a collective force.21 While theorizing the
relationship between corporality and subjectivity through his idea of carnivalesque,
Bakhtin shows that social bodies are made from processes of transgressions:
transgressing boundaries between bodies while also transgressing class boundaries. Thus,
for me, similar to Rancière, Bakhtin links aesthetic and politics by arguing that the
sensual experience of the masses is capable of diminishing social boundaries and creating
revolutionary subjectivity.
To that end, I argue that the realization of revolutionary subjectivity lies within
the process of de-individualization through the collective aesthetic experience during the
riots, revolts, and uprisings–that is, connecting the subject to the other subjects in ways
that the individual subject would not experience during the capitalist relations extant in
the social order. With examples from various parts of the world, I contend that the
carnivalesque practices within the contemporary mass protests can be considered as a
potential site for both individual and collective transformation.
The Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico, and the Zapatismo ideology, seem to be the
most important sources of the radical subjectivity observed in the anti-globalization
movement. There are also clear affinities between the Zapatistas and other antineoliberalist movements in terms of the emphasis on local autonomy and participatory
democracy that is rooted in a belief in the need to decentralize and devolve power. Thus,
in the fourth chapter, I examine the visual representations of the Zapatista Movement that
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are in the form of photographs and murals of the autonomous indigenous communities of
the Chiapas State in Mexico.
The Zapatistas built their long-term struggle on the cultural front–more than in the
political arena, mixing an indigenous cosmology that offers an alternative socio-political
vision for social existence and an autonomist-Marxist discourse that argues for local
autonomy and resistance through self-empowerment. The visual and literal imagery of
the Zapatistas is also important because the attention is drawn to storytelling emphasizing
the absurd and the comic, the poetic, and the everyday.22 Rather than repeating a
discourse on the Zapatistas’ image-making strategies and their use of the media to sustain
a popular, bottom-up struggle, I divert attention to their vision and practice of alternative
politics and to their struggle for equal representation, which are based on the construction
of unique forms of visibility and speech.
In this dissertation, I show that contemporary art is not limited to art that is
institutionalized, but can be found in the most unexpected spaces, such as the streets, the
plazas, the mountains and the remotest villages. The off-space art collectives and
collaborative art practices in small and big cities, the pubic engagement for the
production and visibility of art, and art’s role in recent urban protests across the world are
good examples for demonstrating that a plethora of art resists not only the
institutionalization of the art world, but the mechanism that withers art’s function as
politics. Contemporary art, inside and outside of art institutions, has been seeking to
establish a difference between representing what is political and acting politically. Thus,
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contemporary art is not just about raising awareness but about sharing knowledge and
sensibilities, creating solidarity, and affecting local situations.
The creative visual and performance space of early anti-globalization protests and
recent uprisings that incorporated a domain of such aesthetics attracted the attention of
the activists, artists, intellectuals, and sociologists. There is a great need in social theory
to analyze these visual practices, especially by the way of overlapping spheres of
participation (outside: disobedient aesthetics and activism) and representation (inside: the
museums and biennials).23 My aim is to show the dialectical relationship between art
festivals in art institutions and carnivals of representation in spaces of political resistance,
and discuss how, at times, these intersect, and at other times, the inside-outside
relationship is reinforced by ideological borders.
Various art practices today do not necessarily engage in the matter of art’s ability
to change the world; they are rather involved in art’s ability to change itself in relation to
the capitalist system and in art’s desire to subvert and provoke the ideological
mechanisms that constantly threaten it. To me, what is at stake is the ways in which art
has recognized, worked with, and pushed forward the emancipatory possibilities within
the neoliberal global order. In the presence of a socio-political geography that makes
visible the rigorous struggle for alternatives, it is essential to rethink the interrelationships
between art and politics, to include new and different perspectives, and to ask meaningful
questions. This dissertation is one attempt to fulfill this need.
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CHAPTER I
NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION AND THE NEW
CULTURAL CONDITION
In this chapter, I argue that culture and art under neoliberal globalization have
become a resource for political and economic pursuits and have been used to relegitimize regressive social redistributions. On one hand, the much analyzed and talked
about symptoms of globalization point toward the decentralization of culture; on the other
hand, its economic and political program sustains the control of cultural diversity. Culture
and art have been used as tools for uneven distribution of power, knowledge, and
resources, but they have been tools for sanctioning dissidence and popular struggle in the
late global order.
I stress that the critique of contemporary art must deal with a more complex
situation than art being a hot commodity in the shop window of current visual culture. It
has to address art’s place within neoliberal policies and neoliberal relationships. For this I
propose that there is a great need to first adress the main question that has surrounded
neoliberalism:“Is neoliberalism a mere ideology that expands the existing market systems
or is it a reality controlled by free-market capital?”
It is important that the neoliberal globalization should be examined
simultaneously as an ideological paradigm of the post-Fordist era and as a capitalist
process that still carries forward the imperialist and neo-colonial imprints. I argue that the
processes of the globalization of culture are complex and varied because of uneven
relationships between producers and receivers of culture and thus contemporary art’s
condition around the world is also uneven and fluctuated.

19

The Historical and Ideological Roots of Neoliberalism
Since the late 1980s, which marked the triumphal expansion period of the
neoliberal capitalist economy, the biennial triangle of art market, media, and art has
established new power relations in the world of art, all the while reproducing the existing
ones. Art has entered into a different phase with the borderless connectivity of artists,
critics, curators, and collectors. The enthusiasts in the ever-more-expanding art world
explained these cultural changes with terms such as “global art world,” “global art,” or
“globalization of art” while often ignoring the complex relationship of contemporary art
and culture to the new political paradigms.24
Philosopher Susan Buck-Morss emphasized the fact that what is called the global
art world is a historically unique phenomenon that emerged with this new global
economic order: “The world trade in art intensified in the 1970s and 1980s as a part of
the general financial revolution, along with hedge-funds, international mortgages, and
secondary financial instruments of all kinds.”25 What Buck-Morss calls “the general
financial revolution” is the liberalization of the movement of capital and the reemergence of global finance markets that prepared the ground for this expansion of the
neoliberal economic system. Thus, the global art world embraced the neoliberal
globalization phenomenon not only discursively but also practically.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the term “globalization” quickly became
a popular way of talking about the demolition of visible and invisible borders, networks
of information and production, transnational institutions, fast-traveling ideas and people,
the hybridization or standardization of culture, the dissemination of fast-food culture, and
For this critique see especially Marina Gržinič. “Global Capitalism and the Genetic Paradigm of
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the expansion of the art world and the art market.26 Frequently, in the art world, the term
projected an awareness of larger cultural horizons and thus an awareness of diversity and
plurality in a given culture and society, removing itself from its political and economic
roots. In the meantime, the world was going through significant economic and political
changes. While the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the World Trade
Organization, and other U.S.-led global financial institutions continued to impose
programs of development on under-developed countries through structural adjustment
loans, politicians and businessmen in those countries pursued the neoliberal formula as a
necessary economic realization. Many Third World countries could not lift the weights of
international competition without protective tariffs, and thus the living standards of the
people dramatically dropped. 27
Until the turn of the millennium, while the ambivalent use of the term
globalization has been further fetishized as a force of its own that is irresistible, the use of
the term “neoliberalism”–the ideological and historical basis of those changes–has been
neglected in the media, cultural industry, business world, and art world as well as in
academia. Even in activist circles, the global anti-capitalist movement is referred to as
“the anti-globalization movement,” especially in North America, even though the
American movement is against neoliberalism, not against globalization, since the
movement has emerged because of globalization and uses globalization to its advantage.
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After the millennium, political economists in academia popularized neoliberalism
with negative or positive connotations, but often produced only a vague definition of it
for empirical research.28 The term seems to suggest that liberalism at one point was an
influential political ideology but that at some point it lost some of its significance, only to
revive itself in a new form.29 One of the fiercest critiques of neoliberalism, anthropologist
David Harvey, argues that neoliberalism does not represent only a rejuvenation of
liberalism in general but is a distinctive “theory of political economic practices” that must
be recognized in a particular historical context.30 So what is that particular historical
context?
Until the first half of 1970s, the United States was the main power dominating the
growth of capitalist accumulation, with its arms circling the globe through the
transnational organizations it controlled. However, between 1968 and 1973, the
worldwide energy and monetary crises, as well as unrest caused by uneven development
in the periphery, started to undermine U.S. hegemony. This economic and social
deterioration, the weakening of organized labor, the decline of working-class
consciousness, and the growth of the middle class presented a challenge to the socialist
aspirations of modern liberalism and Keynesianism.31 Professors at the Chicago School
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of Economics in the United States advocated for a reversal of modern liberalism,
challenging the Keynesian model. Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, George Stigler,
Ronald Coase, and Gary Becker provided theoretical and rhetorical aid to the
establishment of neoliberalism as the theory of contemporary political economic
practices. When these economists advocated for a reversal of modern liberalism in the
United States and Great Britain, the neoliberal plan that they created already had been
tested in Chile.
In 1956, the U.S. State Department organized “the Chilean Project” to influence
Chile’s economic thinking and policies. The program was funded by the Ford Foundation
as a joint project with the Catholic University of Chile and the Economics Department of
the University of Chicago. The program continued until 1970. From the beginning, it was
intended to influence Latin American economic policies that perpetuated backwardness
and, by 1965, it was extended to include students from all over Latin America. In 1973, a
socialist alternative was growing in Chile, and the three major parties were in favor of
nationalizing foreign companies and mining, most of which belonged to U.S.
corporations. Augusto Pinochet’s coup d’état on September 11, 1973, overthrew the
revolutionary socialist Salvador Allende’s democratically elected government. Pinochet’s
four-day war left Allende dead and more than three thousand people executed or
missing.32
Eight out of ten Chilean economists who wrote the junta’s economic plan were
trained under Milton Friedman’s program in the Economics Department of the University
of Chicago with generous scholarships from Ford Industries; these economists became
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known as the “Chicago Boys.” After a private meeting with Pinochet, Friedman
convinced the dictator to employ a “shock treatment of economy” and adopt his freemarket policies.33
As early as 1974, the Chilean economy and its labor force were opened to world
markets. Some fifteen years into a period of strict adherence to the neoliberal plan,
unemployment hit thirty percent, and fourty-five percent of the population lived below
the poverty line, while the richest ten percent of the population saw their incomes rise by
eighty-three percent.34 Nevertheless, this plan became the economic model for all of
Latin America and other Third World countries, such as Turkey and China, which
implemented similar policies under dictatorial regimes.
In 1980, Chinese President Deng Xiaoping invited Friedman to China; hence, it
was not the communists that the Chicago Boys were intimidated by but instead the
democratic movements that opposed them. The massacre in Tiananmen Square in 1989
provided an ideal political background for the implementation of neoliberal economic
policies without opposition. Only months before the massacre, Fukuyama, in his
infamous speech on the “End of History,” at the University of Chicago, commented on
the collapse of communist states that this represented: “not an ‘end of ideology’ or
convergence between capitalism and socialism …but an unabashed victory of economic
and political liberalism.”35 Fukuyama further predicted that democratic reforms and free
market reforms are inseparable. In that same year, in September, the people of Turkey
woke up to another bloody coup d’état. On the night of the coup, after taking over the
state, General Kenan Evren announced this: “Turkey needed a surgery and we are doing
33
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it.”36 And the people of Turkey soon learned that this “surgery” meant that fierce political
repression and free market reforms would go hand in hand.
In the first instance, neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to
create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. Post-war
economic developments witnessed the rise of the welfare state, with the distribution of
state wealth across education, health, and social security funds, but the neoliberal policies
of the 1980s shrunk those funds in favor of new markets and international treaties. As
historian Greg Grandin notes: “The ‘market’ rather than the welfare of the population has
become the measure of all appropriate activity of the state.”37 It also must set up those
military, defense, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private
property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets.
The state’s function is to guarantee the quality and integrity of money and not its
citizens.38
Political economist Ray Kiely was one of the first scholars to argue that
globalization is an extension of modern development that has changed in response to
shifts in power relations.39 He explains that many of the processes of globalization are
historically repeated, but the multi-centeredness of economic forces, the seemingly
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unlimited capacity of trade, and the “global division of labor” are relatively novel
developments that emerged from the neoliberal philosophy.40 While the new
developments engendered discourses on globalization and globalism, these discourses
were able to serve the ideological needs of neoliberal expansion by insisting on the
radical separation between economic and social realities.41 In fact, conceptions and
theories of globalization carry with them not just understandings of what the world is
like, but also what can and cannot be done about neoliberal globalization, which makes
“globalization” a site of political contestation. For example, Mark Rupert shows how the
hegemonic liberal narrative of globalization is being increasingly challenged by a
cosmopolitan progressive leftism and an autarchic conservatism.42
In the late 1980s, Anthony Giddens and David Harvey were the two prominent
scholars who developed the early theories of neoliberal globalization. Giddens, in his
much-quoted definition, asserts that globalization refers to “… the intensification of
worldwide social relations, which link distant localities in such way that local happenings
are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”43 Giddens saw
economic globalization as the driving force of change in the new world order and
established a popular globalization theory that explained current processes of social and
political change; yet, he fails to articulate the forces that promoted change. Nevertheless,
Giddens has triggered widespread discourse among social scientists on the topic. On the
other hand, Harvey has argued that neoliberal globalization is a product of the historical
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development of the capitalist organization of production and is not a historical break from
its past forms. Harvey’s more recent analysis underscores the argument that neoliberalism
arose to restore class power, power that was threatened by the collapse of the Keynesian
approach to managing capitalist accumulation based on social democratic systems and
the Bretton Woods system, which had regulated international relations.44 Harvey also
underlines that “the market, depicted ideologically as the great means to foster
competition and innovation, was in practice to be the great vehicle for the consolidation
of monopoly corporate and multinational powers as the nexus of class rule.”45 As such,
for Harvey, neoliberal globalization is a political project of the ruling capitalist class that
has to be recognized in its particular historical context.
Mainstream globalization theory in the social sciences often has concerned itself
with flows of capital, people, commodities, ideas, networks of information and
production, transnational institutions, the anti-globalization movement, and the
hybridization or standardization of culture. Interpreters of the effects and outcomes of
neoliberal globalization have adopted two main positions: The optimistic interpretation
has been closely linked with development theories that saw international development as
a means to expand modernization, industrialization, and economic growth into the socalled Third World countries in order to better their conditions and offer them a share of
the global economic pie.46 This view tried to establish that what in fact favors the
particular interests of the capitalist classes also favors the general interest of all.
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According to this globalist perspective, neoliberal globalization is a win-win
situation, provided that each underdeveloped state adopts the correct policies. Although
these advocates of globalization are hostile to the state, they welcome the United States
as a benevolent force to regulate globalization processes. On the opposing side is the
argument that globalization causes the weakening of states and diminishes divisions
between core and periphery as well as continuing the diffusion of the United States’ role
as an imperial state.47 According to this argument, empire is identified with a network of
collaborating powers, none of which has dominance over the others.
Another perspective insists on the existence of a new dimension of imperialism
emerging through contemporary processes of globalization and argues that the basic
division of core and periphery has not changed, and neither has the U.S. position as the
dominant imperialist power.48 This approach is based on neo-Marxist theories of world
systems theory and explains globalization as an ideology designed to protect the interests
of the powerful, who are concentrated in the Western world. Another branch of neoMarxist theory suggests that the above approach is inadequate for theorizing
contemporary globalization and argues that, as much as hegemony and imperialism, we
should take into account the character and functioning of the new ruling class that has
arisen from the power relations of the contemporary global economy.49 The common
47
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thread in all of these neo-Marxist views is that globalization is inherently a contradictory
and uneven process.50
According to many accounts of Orthodox Marxist thought, cultural imperialism
has been accelerated with the processes of the neoliberal world order, and it is often tied
to the globalization of culture. Although such discussion rightly points to the global tide
for using culture as a commodity, it also constitutes the modus operandi of cultural
imperialism.51John Tomlinson, a prominent cultural theorist, warns us about adopting a
reductionist view of culture under globalization instead of taking into account the
complexity of linkages that globalization has established between politics, society,
technology, environment, and culture. Tomlinson directs our attention to the multifaceted
character of neoliberal globalization and its diverse implications regarding different
geographies and insists that:
… The cultural implication, rather less easily swallowed by some, is that
globalization involves not the simple enforced distribution of a particular
western (say, liberal, secular, possessive individualist, capitalistconsumerist) lifestyle, but a more complicated dissemination of the entire
range of institutional features of cultural modernity. 52
Similar to Tomlinson, Harvey stresses that neoliberal processes are uneven and
contradictory and warns us about the difference between neoliberalism as theory and
neoliberalism as process:
The uneven geographical development of neoliberalism, its frequently
partial and lop-sided application from one state and social formation to
another testifies to the tentativeness of neoliberal solutions and the
complex ways in which political forces, historical traditions, and, existing
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institutional arrangements all shaped why and how the processes of
neoliberalisation actually occurred…The scientific rigor of its neoclassical
economics does not sit easily with its political commitments to ideals of
individual freedom, nor does its supposed distrust of all state power fit
with need for a strong and if necessary coercive state that will defend
private property…We have to pay careful attention, therefore, to the
tension between the theory of neoliberalism and the actual pragmatics of
neoliberalism.53
The way Harvey articulates this difference is important for the ideological implications of
the scholarly analysis of neoliberal globalization. Any narrow claims that assume
neoliberal globalization to be an even development that affects every place to the same
degree (or intensity) and creates a picture of homogenous hegemony with a point of no
return, undermine and block the avenues of resistance to neoliberalism that is as real and
happening as neoliberalism itself.
In the 1990s, globalization became a popular term that articulated progress in
abstract terms. It projected an awareness of larger cultural horizons—an awareness of
diversity and plurality in culture and society—thus removing itself from its political
roots. It is this use of the term that largely appealed to the art world. Cultural challenges
to Eurocentric discourses and the appearance of new art zones around the world have
caused the art world to take globalization seriously, and for the past three decades, the art
world has swirled around the discussion of whether contemporary art is globalized or not,
or how much it has been globalized.
In the late 1990s, India, China, and Southeast Asia emerged as new financial
regions and rose to compete with the Western centers. Concomitantly, the contemporary
art of the Far East started to create a huge demand in the art market, and appeared in large
exhibitions and in the art canon of the West. All the while, the new, curious gaze of the
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Western world was accompanied by postmodern and postcolonial theory that seeks to
break with modern and colonial ways of knowing. These theories informed the
institutional art theory and created a shift in the art history discipline, opening new areas
in the canon. This theoretical shift not only affected the reception of the non-Western art
in the West, but it also institutionalized the art of the non-West within the ideas and
structure of the Western art canon. As James Elkins explains it:
Indian, Chinese, and Southeast Asian scholars write Western-style essays
and books, adopt Western armatures for their arguments, hold exhibitions
and colloquia, create departments and curricula, all in the Western
manner. The discipline itself has been exported and has found new homes,
and countries such as China and India are producing art histories
compatible with Western ones.54
In 1989, the same year that the Berlin Wall came down, the grand exhibition
Magiciens de la Terre took place in the Centre Georges Pompidou, in Paris. The
exhibition aimed to challenge the Eurocentric and exclusive exhibition formats found in
Western art institutions but failed to show that Western art contexts have become
increasingly integrated into an asymmetrical cultural network of connections with the
non-Western world. The critique of Western grand narratives in the curatorial decisions
of art exhibitions and in the art history canon appeared much earlier in different
geographies. Thus, Magiciens de la Terre marked the institutionalization of
contemporary art as “global art” in the globalized world with the same proposal of
“inclusivity” that similar exhibitions had carried before.55
In 2012, during the The Global Contemporary: Art Worlds After 1989 exhibition,
which was curated by Hans Belting, Andrea Buddensieg and Peter Weibel for the ZKM
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Museum of Contemporary Art, in Karlsruhe, the institutional art world once again
intensely enunciated contemporary art’s relationship with globality, globalism, and
globalization (ideologically loaded terms), often articulating the position that
contemporary globalization (thus, neoliberalism) is inevitable. Globalization as a
discourse has been used as a theoretical blue print–and even a fashionable buzzword–not
as something to be explained in its unique historicity and material conditions but instead
as something that explains current cultural and artistic developments around the globe.56
In the first decade of the new millennium, many art biennials formed discursive
platforms where the art world, academics, and intellectuals discussed the issues of
globalization from multiple angles. Yet in these platforms they often dealt with the same
outcomes of globalization, such as the dislocation of identities, the mobility of peoples
and cultural objects, and borders and boundaries, none of which is unique to the
contemporary globalization.57 Examples include Dan Cameron’s Istanbul Biennial, of
2003, which dealt with the concept of “global citizenship,” and in 2005, Documenta 10,
curated by Catherine David, which addressed globalization in terms of uneven urban
development, and Robert Storr’s symposium for the Venice Biennale, “Where Art
Worlds Meet: Multiple Modernities and the Global Salon,” for which Storr brought
together some four hundred art world professionals, academics, and city officials.58

See Ben Rosamond “Constructing Globalization,” in Constructing International Relations: the Next
Generation, ed. Karin Fierke and Knud Eric Jørgensen (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 182-198; Jan
A. Scholte, “Beyond the Buzzword: Toward a Critical Theory of Globalization,” in Globalization: Theory
and Practice, ed. Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (New York: Pinter, 1996).
57
International biennials were not the only big-scale exhibitions that tackled the concept critically. An
international exhibition in Neue Galerie in Graz, Australia, opened in October 2002 with the title “In
Search of Balkania.” In February 2003, Walker Art Center in Minneapolis organized the international
exhibition called “How Latitudes Become Forms: Art in a Global Age,” which examined the ways in which
the globalization of cultural has an impact on local artistic practices.
58
Caroline A. Jones comments: “The Symposium could only mimic the pseudo-egalitarianism that is the
art world’s favorite scam, masking the much larger geopolitical structures that are actually at play, which
56

32

Further, Okwui Enwezor’s Documenta 11, held in 2007, consisted of five “platforms”
staged around the world, culminating with an installation in Kassel designed to
investigate how the relationship of art, politics, and the process of globalization could be
further questioned and explored. Simultaneously, Francesco Bonami’s 50th Venice
Biennale underscored the importance of “global” themes. Also in 2007, Hou Hanru
curated the 10th Istanbul Biennial, which opened with the theme, “Not Only Possible but
Also Necessary Optimism in the Age of Global War.” In addition, the Havana Biennial of
2009 analyzed the topic “Integration and Resistance in the Global Era” and involved an
attempt to address the peculiarities derived from the processes of globalization in a
dialectical perspective. While these biennials aimed to show globalization from below or
establish Marxist critiques of globalization, as I witnessed, they repeated the same
intellectual discursive fanaticism in “globalization theories” and contributed to the
numerous facts and fictions on the subject.
From the 1990s and into the millenium, the subject of the most heated debates
over art was whether globalization caused the expansion, pluralization, and
democratization of the art world, or, on the contrary, contracted it. The vague conclusion
was that contemporary globalization both homogenized and fragmented engagements
with and responses to the art world.59 These debates eventually led to the use of the term
“contemporary art” synonymously with “global art” to refer to current art from the
remote corners of the world that respond to recent techonogical and conceptual shifts. Art
critic Hans Belting has an interesting take on this:
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…its global production and distribution that ‘defines contemporary art.’
But we encounter a certain resistance of Western critics to speak of global
art, since they fear that the Western art scene will lose power when art is
globalized. For the same reason, they would favor the notion
‘contemporary art’ as it is familiar and since it sounds neutral with regard
to newcomers in the art world.60
While Belting critiques the Eurocentric art world he reveals the internal logic of the
current institutionalization of art: As opposed to modernism’s separation of the world
into first, second, and third worlds and excluding the latter two from the historicity of
modernity, now modernity is seen to be happening all over the world in an equalized
historical setting. In fact, the difference in the usage of the two terms in new areas of
interest in the art world, such as the Balkans, the Middle East and East Asia, where
modernity and tradition, and second/third and first worlds are entangled, reveals the
logic of neoliberal globalization that the Western art canon prescribes.
In these, now semi-peripheries of the art world, the term contemporary art is far
from being politically neutral: It refers to art that engages, in one way or another, with
the intertwined developments between the making and circulation of art and the
changing economic relations. In those regions, where dramatic political and economic
shifts happen continuously and rapidly, contemporary art not only indicates art that is
produced since the “end of modernism” or with a certain medium, it indicates art that
deals with the realities of the current and rapidly changing historical moment.
The contemporaneousness of contemporary art not only points to conjunctive
flows but to disjunctive ones. In other words, there are artists, in both the Western and
Eastern hemispheres, who simply do not participate in the production, circulation, and

Hans Belting, “‘Mapping Global Art’ GAM: Critical Perspectives on Current Issues” (2009),
accessed April 29, 2010, http://gam2.zkm.de/blog/2009/08/26/hans-belting-mapping-global-artintroductory-remarks/.
60

34

reception of institutional art and who produce art that is fundamentally different from
what may be called “contemporary art.”
When contemporary art is concerned with its contemporaneousness and not with
its globality, it becomes hard to hide the subtle system of inclusion and exclusion in the
art world, and contested relationships between local art and global art become more
visible. Akin to globalization, popular discussions about “global culture” or “global art”
neglect two important aspects of these developments: the unpredictable and resistive
power of local communities as well as the unevenness of development and unequal
access to technologies across different geographies.61
Similarly, institutionalization of the term “global art,” while indicating the
pluralization and democratization of contemporary art, has concealed the economic
disparities and the unevenness of access to, and the participation of, people in the high
technology-oriented cultural and artistic productions of blockbuster global
exhibitions.62These umbrella terms also hide the harsh realities of the daily life of a
majority of people and issues pertaining to gender, class, and race in different localities
around the globe.63
The core structural order of the current phase of global capitalism presents
common issues and opens similar integration paths in the remotest parts of the world.
However, the material conditions for economic and cultural developments are not equal
everywhere. Cultural industries–where cultural goods and services are produced,
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reproduced, stored, and distributed–still are concentrated mostly in the United States,
Western Europe, and China, which are the leaders of the global economy today.64 Not
only are the processes of neoliberal globalization uneven but they also are exclusionary.
Sociologist Manuel Castells’ observation sums up the exclusive dimensions of the
neoliberalization:
The new global economic system is highly exclusionary…While the
dominant segments of all national economies are linked into the global
web, segments of countries, regions, economic sectors, and local societies
are disconnected from the processes of accumulation and consumption…
Most people in the planet do not work for or buy from the global
economy… Yet all economic and social processes do relate to the
structurally dominant logic of such economy.65
Contemporary globalization has exacerbated existing global inequalities. Thinking
culture within the dichotomies of global cultural production and local reproduction also
carries the weight of a dichotomization that works to the advantage of the more powerful,
which is the center and the global. Thus, instead of regarding culture as reflection of
power relationships in the global order, as suggested by social anthropologist Ulf
Hannerz, we should analyze “culture as an arena of struggle and transformation.”66
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Globalization of Art or ‘Glocalization’ of Art?
For the past three decades, it has been widely discussed how and why neoliberal
economic policies are applied at the global level and how political as well as cultural
processes have being transforming the world into one global market. The way the term
“globalization” is used in the policy, journalistic and corporate communities often differs
markedly from the nuanced understandings developed across a range of disciplines.67 At
the same time, many academic commentaries on globalization, particularly in business
studies, international economics and the political economy, also appear to converge for
the most part upon a common economistic conception of the term.68 In the hummanities
disciplines, such as cultural studies, globalization studies, sociology and art history, the
study of globalization often has dealt with the cultural dimension of cross-cultural
relationships, border crossings, migration and immigrant identities, communication
networks, and transnational communities.69
On the other hand, views of global/local dynamics often take into account central
and local governments, the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations,
multinational corporations, national and international civic organizations, international
and local institutions, and some transnational activists and artists. Hence, binary
formulations used for discussing the relationship between local and global often reduce
local to a submissive counterpart in a hegemonic discourse. Do contemporary art
discourses on global/local dynamics in fact conceal the harsher realities of the neoliberal
world order by upholding an impasse on the agency of the local? I will argue that while
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construction and exploitation of localism has proven to be useful to the logic of
neoliberalism, local movements, individuals, and artists have taken advantage of
neoliberal globalization to determine and redefine the meaning and praxis of localism
altogether.
In the 1990s, hybridism, border cultures, cultural plurality, multiculturalism and
networks of information were popular themes in academia as well as in large-scale art
exhibitions. After the millennium, the crisis in the neoliberal system was felt throughout
the globe, and the issue of the local resistance captured increasing attention in academia,
on the basis of environmentalism, economic sustainability, nationalist ideology, and local
alternatives to the processes of present-day, corporate-led globalization. “Localism” has
been a popular trope to especially articulate contestations and opposistions to the
globalization processes. In fact, localism emerged as a computing term that connotes the
adaptation of computer software to different languages in order to overcome the regional
differences and technical requirements of the local market. Eventually, this term has been
appropriated by the oppositional movements that aim to decentralize and localize the
political and economic power. While the discussions over localism shown as alternatives
to globalism, neoliberalism has immensely fed on the self-upholding myth of the local as
perpetuating itself as the cure to both global and local problems. Austrian curator Georg
Schöllhammer commented on this in 1999:
… Nonetheless, much of that which is, for example, considered local–with
reference to tradition or, as having the nature of a localized culture–which
is put forward against this tendency as worthy of preserving, is based on
just the same foundations–for example on the myths of unmediated social
relations and cultural essentialism.70
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Discourses of localism and localization have been utilized in the art world, not so
much as globalism and globalization, but as artistic strategies that portray the local as a
dissident agent to the processes of globalization. For example, the 7th Sharjah Biennial,
in 2005, focused on the issue of belonging in a globalized world. Okwui Enwezor’s
Documenta 11, of 2007, consisted of five platforms staged around the five continents in
five localities around the world, and in each locality, specific local issues pertaining to
the processes of globalization were addressed. The 6th Taipei Biennial, held in 2008,
aimed to reflect on globalization and local resistances with the theme A World Where
Many Worlds Fit In–a well-known slogan of the anti-globalization movement. The
Havana Biennial of 2009 was organized around the theoretical framework Integration
and Resistance in the Global Era and addressed the agency of the local against the global
processes of neoliberalism. That same year, the 11th Istanbul Biennial evoked a
Brechtian question, What keeps the mankind alive?, and included deliberate political
statements concerning the processes of the neoliberal order from the perspective of the
local. As a result of the postmodern emphasis on the local’s identity as well as its
discursive position in these biennials and many others, the local has become the new
exotic trope in the exhibition space.71
Indeed, when dealing with concepts of the local and localism in art, we encounter
artists whose local points of reference become the essential requirements for their success
and fame in such exhibitions. In that light, Cuban art critic Gerardo Mosquera talks about
the self-exoticism of the artists: “… But too frequently value has been placed on art that
explicitly manifests difference or that better satisfies the expectations of otherness held

See Gerardo Mosquera, Alien-Own/Own-Alien: Globalization and Cultural Difference,” Boundary 2
29/3 (2002): 163-173.
71

39

by neo-exoticism. This attitude has stimulated the self-othering [writer’s emphasis] of
some artists who, consciously or unconsciously, have tended toward a paradoxical selfexoticism.”72 While the self-othering of the artists proclaims the continued colonialist
logic within globalization discourses and satisfies the cravings of the art world for neoexoticism, in some instances, artists consciously aim to overturn this logic. For example,
Yinka Shonibare, with his decapitated figures, criticizes the neocolonial logic hidden
behind the multiculturalist and pluralist mask of the new exhibition systems.73
Shonibare’s installation, Gallantry and Criminal Conversation (2002), which
participated in Enwezor’s Documenta11, deals with the construction of difference as a
new exoticism (Figure 1.1). The work consists of 11 headless mannequins and stacked
wooden trunks distributed around a white platform above which a green horse carriage is
suspended in the air. A close look at the mannequins reveals that they are engaged in
lustful homosexual and heterosexual activities. The headless mannequins are typically
Black. The first presumed reference to heedlessness is the guillotined French aristocrats.
In the Yoruba culture, in which Shonibare grew up, the head is the most elaborate part of
the body and is considered to be the seat of the soul. The chopped-headed mannequins
wearing aristocratic attire with African patterns on their black skins, and engaging in
promiscuous activities, is an excellent Yoruba artist’s representation of his otherness in
the neo-colonial space of display.
Shonibare’s mannequins’ dresses and suits are sewn in the fashion of eighteenth
century aristocratic attire while the patterned fabrics are that of African design. How
Shonibare escapes self-exoticization is hidden in this subtle nuance: There is a bit of self
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in the other. One sees the mannequins as Black subjects, but the symbol that depicts the
colonial atmosphere--the aristocratic attire that those African subjects wear--is that of the
White man. Shonibare, a British-Nigerian artist, rejects the way in which he is expected
to treat popular subjects, such as belonging and identity, and most of all, the self-other
binary. Georg Schöllhammer aptly explains the position in the art world in the era of
globalization of artists such as Shonibare:
It is primarily the youth, namely the immigrant children of the second or
third generation in London, Paris, Los Angeles, New York and other
‘global cities who no longer fit into the identity models brought over and
whose social positioning ‘in-between’ must be regarded as a typical
phenomenon of our times who have become the darlings of the global
exhibition scene. Their identities appear to be built for the needs of the
European world-culture exhibition industry: they carry the genetic traits of
the ethnic other, clearly bringing the cultural capital of family or social
experience of break and continuity, the knowledge of another social or
historical construction and a complex network of experiences into their
work. The question of to what or for what they belong becomes an
existential challenge for them.74
Here, Schöllhammer uses the term glocal to emphasize the craze of local in global
exhibitions. I agree with Schöllhammer’s observation on the glocal exhibition scene;
however, there are many artists just like Shonibare, who carefully use voice and visibility
in such exhibitions to overturn the new type of appropriation of the other in the arena of
Eurocentric representation systems. One could argue that the exotic cults of authenticity
and the concept of purity of colonial heritage have found their twin terms, like belonging
and locality. However, the agency of the local or the other that determines the meaning of
those terms in these international exhibitions should not be undermined. Therefore, we
should take notice that while some artists participating in international exhibitions
explicitly manifest “difference,” to better satisfy curators’ and the public’s expectations
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of otherness and neo-exoticism, other artists utilize native vocabularies as a strategy to
critical engage with their globally recognizable visual languages.
A good example where the global language of contemporary art is negotiated by a
native vocabulary was the 7th International Cuenca Biennial, held in Ecuador in 2001 and
2002. For this exhibition, the Biennial, which previously had been dedicated exclusively
to painting, broadened its conceptual framework, and incorporated digital photography,
video installations, and other forms of digital art as well as sculptures. It was announced
as “the Globalization Biennial,” not only because a variety of media were incorporated
but also because international artists had been invited to meditate on the trendy topics of
globalization. The mixed-media work by Peruvian artists Alfredo Márquez and Angel
Valdez, Caja negra (black box), was especially striking in the ways in which the artists
responded to this call (Figure 1. 2). Their large, baroque canvas was dominated by the
image of a trio--white, black, and mestizo men--dressed in Catholic mantels, while an
amalgamation of cultural and political elements from pre-colonial and colonial times to
the present demonstrated Peru’s imposed process of Christianization and, later,
modernization.
The image is unevenly divided into two with dotted marks. The pagan symbols of
sun and moon are situated in the parts that are lightened or obscured. On the left, in the
lightened part, is the figure of a clergyman who covers his face with the Peruvian flag
like a bandit. The rays that emanate from his hand, which look like sunrays, point to a
series of nude girl figures with angel wings holding rifles, as well as to what seems to be
an indigenous chief whose image is located in the middle. Two other figures of clergy,
who wear ski masks on their faces like typical Latin American guerrillas, hold pictures of
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regular people, possibly political victims. The bottom of the picture shows headshots of
sixteen people, while the top part of the image is a text, which is impossible to decipher.
While these artists adopt universal tropes such as “appropriation,” “inclusion,” and
“hybridity” to participate in the current discourse of the international art world, their use
of these tropes is quite different from their peers in the centers of the art world. While
certain universal tropes, themes, and contexts perpetuate the colonialist logic of the
globalization discourses, some artists like, Márquez and Valdez, reject participation in the
discourse of pluralism and affirm difference for their own, different ends.
While the institutional art world continues to represent and disseminate the
language of modern Western ideology, there seem to be gaps in the translation of this
language around the globe that local subjects fill in. Gerardo Mosquera, the Cuban art
critic and one of the founders of the Havana Biennial, explains this situation in his
critique:
Today, more and more identities and contexts concur in the artistic
‘international language’ and in the discussion of current ‘global’ themes.
From, and not so much in, is a key word for contemporary cultural
practice. All over the world, art is being produced more from particular
contexts, cultures and experiences than ‘inside’ them, more from here than
there.75
When discussing local-global dynamics in the context of biennials and other large-scale
global exhibitions, the observation of renowned Turkish curator and the director of the
first three Istanbul Biennials, Beral Madra, is worth noting here. Madra says: “Istanbul
has two faces: the apparent, which is promoted by the art experts of the global culture
industry, and the real, as reflected in locally exhibited artworks and local critical
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theory.”76 During the international art biennials, while globalized art world professionals
immerse themselves in a superficial review of the local art scene that is already filtered
through the local art elite and their professional and political agendas, some local artists
make opportunistic use of the global art networks, through the biennial system, to set foot
in the global art market. On the other hand, if we look at the reception of the international
art biennials at the local level, we notice that not all biennials succeed to limit the realm
of art. On the contrary, directly and indirectly, some revitalize the local art scene and
open a space for avant-garde art to enter into a complex relationship with local art
world(s) and politics and international art world(s) and politics.
One example that testifies to the complex web of the relationship between local
art-local politics and international art-international politics is Turkish artist Burak
Delier’s 2005 street poster of a girl veiled in the European Union’s flag. Delier, a young
artist of the art collective Reverse Direction and contributor to the post-anarchist journal
Siyahi, has engaged in several social projects, with fellow artists and random workers in
Istanbul, in which he has attempted to reveal the relationship of the art exhibition to the
local art audience and to the layman. This relationship has been criticized often for the
determination of the international art world elite to regulate what is to be said or shown,
and how in whatever city that the biennial is held. Delier, instead of criticizing the art
world in a direct manner, preferred to show that the monologue in which the international
art world professionals are engaged is useless because there are many other constellations
of dialogue an artwork can trigger once it is visible.
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Delier took an irreverent picture of his girlfriend veiled in the European Union’s
flag and initiated a controversial dialogue among different parties (Figure 1. 3). In the
image, the first thing to be noticed is that the girl’s eyes are wide-open, expressing shock
awe, fear, or even amusement. Her expression highlights the curiosity of the juxtaposition
of the Islamic veil and the European flag even more. Upon taking the photograph, Delier
made one thousand posters out of this image and clandestinely plastered them on the
walls of Istanbul’s streets with his friends. The posters stayed on the walls no more than
two days until other people glued advertisements on top of them. However, the reaction
of the public was so extensive that every major newspaper made Delier’s image headline
news. It was immediately splashed over the Internet, and soon the image made its way
even to the front page of the Herald Tribune and the Financial Times. As a result,
Delier’s work quickly became the most iconic image of 2005 in Europe and Turkey. The
artist commented on the political language of the image: “I am not politicizing the
commercial language; it is already politicized. I only aim to open holes in this language
that suffocates us.” 77
Delier created a hole in the sign of the European Union, put his girlfriend’s face
through the hole in the flag, and took a picture of it. The flag and the veil, both of which
are made of the same material, symbolize different ideologies. Although shocking at first
glance, the image contains many layers of meanings that initially are undetermined. In
every local context that the image was received, its meaning has changed. For example,
for the secularist Kemalists in Turkey, becoming integrated into the European Union
could result in more enforced changes in the legal system, which could be a positive
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development for Islamists. For an Islamist, on the other hand, the ambiguous look of the
eyes of the woman in the image might mean that, once in the European Union, Turkey’s
options for becoming an Islamic state would be over finally.
The controversy of the image shook the Turkish art scene and attracted the
attention of the organizers of the Istanbul Biennial, one of the most exclusive spaces in
the international art world. The art world community, which previously had shown no
interest in this image in Delier’s other works when Delier applied to participate in
previous Istanbul Biennials, quickly included him and this image in a sideshow at the
2005 Istanbul Biennial.78 In the exhibition titled Free Kick and curated by another artist,
Halil Altindere, Delier disseminated one-thausend copies of the flag image to the visitors
of the Istanbul Biennial. Some visitors took the poster to Europe, and it even appeared on
the streets of Berlin and Paris subsequently. Some people spat on the poster, some looked
at it with awe, some took pictures with it, some drew mustaches on it, some discussed it
on the Internet, and some glued advertisements or sprayed graffiti on it.
The controversy of the image was so effective in raising public consciousness of
the “threat of rising Islam in Europe” that it was utilized by a European party for
propaganda. In 2007, the Austrian right wing party Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ
(Freedom Party of Austria), which is a direct descendant of right-wing German groups,
used this image, without the permission of the artist, for its electoral campaign under the
title, “Soll das unsere Zukunft sein” (Shall this be our future). To a conservative
European, following Turkey’s acceptance into European Union, the image could signal a
warning of further infiltration of the Muslim population into Europe. Another possible
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reading could be on the opposite end of the political spectrum, namely, how the refusal of
Turkey’s membership to the European Union could drive this Muslim/secular country
into the arms of fundamentalists.
As Delier’s poster kept traveling from the street to the international biennial and
back to the street and to the electoral campaign of a European party, it continued to be
conceived in different manners and was used by different agendas. Nevertheless, this is a
good example to observe that meaning, discourse, and fate of an artwork could not
necessarily be determined with a grip of a particular group or agenda, however strong
that grip might be. Delier took an oriental object, the veil, that is both an exotic and
political symbol that easily could be fetishized in the global context of the international
biennials, but he framed it in a way that generated particular meanings on both local and
international levels.
In the cultural industry, media, and art institutions, being global often means
being capable of directing events and being accessible to international currents. On the
other hand, being local often refers to being isolated and excluded from the mainstream
of global life. Thus, this global-local dynamic represents a repetition of the old
modernity-traditionalism and center-periphery paradigms. There are also significant
attempts in contemporary art that challenge the praxis of power structures without turning
into a binary schema reproducing that power. The Chechen Biennial that was inaugurated
on February 23, 2005, was one of those examples. Also called the Emergency Biennial
this nomadic biennial questioned the authority of the global biennial art shows in
establishing rigid local and global paradigms and shifted the attention to the critical
commitment of art and the political responsibilities of artists.
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In 2005, the Biennial opened simultaneously in various locales in Grozny and in
the Palais de Tokyo in Paris. This nonbudget Biennial was made possible with the
collaboration of more than sixty local and international artists, who produced traveling art
to fit in a suitcase, as well as NGO and human right activists around the world. The
Biennial then traveled to Brussels (Matrix Art Project), to Bolzano (EURAC), to Milan
(Isola Art Center), to Riga (City Hall Exhibitions Center), to Tallinn (Tallin Art Hall), to
Vancouver (Center A), to Puebla, (Plataforma), to Istanbul (Kadikoy Public Education
Center), San Francisco (Play Space Gallery, California College of the Arts) and to the last
stop in 2008 was Bialystok (Galeria Arsenal) in Poland. In 2009, it finally reached
Grozny to become the foundation of an alternative art museum.
The Emergency Biennial, organized by curator Evelyn Jouanno, functioned as a
laboratory for artist collaborations around the world. For each city, artists produced
works in collaboration with a local curator, and at the end of the exhibition there were
more suitcases to be sent to Chechnya. The Emergency Biennial defied all of the
conceptions and practices that consitute the relationship of a global biennial to a local
artist. It erased the mechanisms of center-periphery as well as global-local by showing
the internationalism and colloboration of the artists across localities and temporalities of
the biennial exhibition system. The Emergency Biennial also has been significant in
showing that the art retains in its character a dialogical component that resists the binary
order of things and that the situation of global art and local art is dialectical beyond the
confined ideological space of the binaries.
In the late 1980s, glocalization as a term first was used by Japanese businessmen
as an expression that merged the two worlds, global and local, in a way to raise
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consciousness within the transnational business world about the importance of adapting
to local conditions, market needs, and consumer attitudes. The initial use of the term
referred to infusing the globalist agenda with a touch of local flavor; hence, within a
decade glocalization had come to signify both universalizing and particularizing
tendencies at the same time. Since the late 1990s, glocalization has been adopted by
ecological, political, and artistic local movements and has become an increasingly
popular term in part due to the slogan, “think globally, act locally.”79 This slogan has
captured the attention of an escalating number of multinational marketers, such as
McDonald’s and Wal-Mart, that adapt their marketing strategies to local needs and tastes.
In 2008, the term “glocal” first was used in an exhibition that took place in and
around Maastrich, near the Netherland’s borders with Germany and Belgium in order to
attract attention to global-local dynamics in contemporary art production. It was titled
“Glocal Affairs Where Are You?” and featured one hundred visual artists linked to the
Meuse-Rhine Euroregion. The exhibition was spread out over three nations and in
various border cities including Maastricht, Heerlen, Roermond, Venlo, and Venray in the
Netherlands, Aachen in Germany, and Liège in Belgium, thereby permitting the
exhibition to put an equal emphasis on locality and globality.
Most of the artworks featured in the exhibition were site-specific works that
expressed reflection of general and universal themes that have been popular in other
regional or global exhibitions, such as the search for identity, the complexity of
relationships between cultures, as well as the strong inclination of people’s psyches to
belong to a specific culture. By covering everyday realities through photography,
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performances, and interviews, artists thought and produced from their specific local
context while they dealt with universal themes and issues. Eric Zoran, editor of the
magazine, Artefact: Strategies of Resistance, in one of its editions titled Glocalogue,
offers a bottom-up perspective of the processes of glocalization:
Does this mean that all local cultures should reproduce the Western art
system, foster the global art market and indulge global artistic celebrities?
No, on the contrary, for what could be at stake is a process of grassroots
globalization in the cultural field, and the incorporation and
contextualization of a variety of different histories of art. We might argue
that the globalization of culture should not be understood merely as
homogenization but as the interrelation between cultural homogenization
and cultural heterogenization, which is beginning to emerge as one of the
key issues of global interaction in our time.80
As Zoran suggests, the concept of glocalization enables us to notice the particularization
process within the globalization process.
Internationally renowned art curator Hou Hanru and French philosopher and art
critic Thierry de Duve argued that global biennials should be considered within the
processes of glocalization rather than globalization, because of their ideological as well
as spacial positions between the local and the global. Hanru states: “Events like
contemporary art biennials, initiated by local authorities to promote the position of
locales on the global map, are then global events by nature, while they claim to be locally
meaningful and productive in terms of new localities.”81 De Duve is one of the art
historians who treats the term “glocal” as the amalgamation of global and local, warns us
for the new fethisization of this term instead of “global art.”
With the proliferation of art biennials, all bearing the names of their
hosting cities, the art community–by which I mean both the local art tribes
Erić Zoran, “Glocalization, Art Exhibitions and the Balkans,” Third Text 21/ 2 (2007): 210.
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living in the said cities and the sophisticated nomadic art tribe that hops
from one biennial to the next–has seemingly turned glocal.… Now that all
grand narratives, whether classical or avant-garde, have lost their
currency, the art community seems to have found a new legitimization in
glocal ethics, based on the free and fair trade of cultural goods under the
umbrella of art.82
Since de Duve wrote this article, a well-received exhibition in Maasricht in 2008, as well
as one held in 2010 at the Museum of Modern Art, in New York, and other large-scale
exhibitions have been organized around the concept of glocal.
What I argue here is that, the process of glocalization should be viewed not
simply as a local appropriation and local resistance to the global-universal, but as the
contestation of the two competing forces of neoliberal globalization: consolidation of
hegemonic power over the local and the agency of the local in creating alternatives for a
different globalization. Even so, the outcome of this dialectical pull is multifaceted and
unpredictable.
Indeed, this unpredictable nature of the complex relationships between the local
production and reception of art, and the global art world, opens real possibilities for
contemporary art to challenge the art system under neoliberal socioeconomic processes
and to redefine art’s role in these processes. Rather than the overplayed identification of
the current condition of the art world actors or artworks as global or glocal, we should
consider the praxis that makes up the complex and contradictory relationships between
the local and the global.
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Neoliberalism and the Post-1989 Art World
The fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989, and the series of other significant political
events, including the collapse of the Soviet Union and of authoritarian regimes in South
America and the end of apartheid in South Africa, have changed the political composition
of the world and marked the beginning of the global domination of neoliberal doctrine in
economic and political structures. The year 1989 also was a turning point for the
unprecedented growth of contemporary art, not only vertically in art centers, but also
horizontally toward the peripheries where international art markets had not been active.
For example, the fall of the Eastern Block created an influx of Eastern European and
Russian art that changed the landscape of European contemporary art. On the other hand,
after the shock of the Tiananmen Square massacre, a new generation of Chinese
contemporary artists produced art that challenged Western art criticism and the economic
system of distribution. Subsequently, the increased audience and market for
institutionalized contemporary art created a proliferation of art biennials and of private
museums throughout the world.
Art historian Julian Stallabrass commented: “The global events of 1989 and after
–the reunification of Germany, the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, the rise of global
trade agreements, the consolidation of trading blocs, and the transformation of China into
a partially capitalist economy–changed the character of the art world profoundly.”83
Simply said, after 1989, art and the culture industry came to have a close relationship,
unlike any they ever had had before. This relationship has shifted the vision of the
institutional art world away from proud displays of national “high” culture to a
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privileging of the spectacular potential of art exhibitions. Museums, large galleries, and
international biennials have become increasingly dependent upon corporate funding to
survive, and the institutional art world has become deeply connected to corporate capital
in order to organize and manage the new art market system.84 In the 1990 essay, “Selling
the Collection,” Philip Weiss talked explicitly about this shift in the museum context: “To
a great extent the museum community’s crisis results from the free-market spirit of the
1980s. The notion of the museum as a guardian of the public patrimony has given way to
the museum as a corporate entity with a highly marketable inventory and the desire for
growth.”85
From 1989 onward, art institutions also expanded vertically in the old centers of
art as well as in the new zones. In France alone, more than twenty museums and art
centers have been built. The new Museum of Modern Art in New York, the Musée
D’Orsay and the Centre Pompidou in Paris, the Tate Modern and Saatchi galleries
London, and the Guggenheim Museums in Bilbao and Berlin, and in development in Abu
Dhabi, all have a lifespan of only three decades.
In addition to them, within the past decade, the contemporary artistic praxis in the
Arab world has flourished in part due to renewed real estate investments and capitalistic
ventures. In the Arabian Gulf region, the opening of auction house branches such as
Bonham’s, Christie’s (March 2005 in Dubai), and Sotheby’s (its first sale of Modern and
Contemporary Arab Art was held in October 2007 in London). The Guggenheim building
in Abu Dhabi and the Louvre Museum by famous architects (the former, designed by
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renowned architect Frank Gehry and the latter designed by Jean Nouvel, opening in
2012) attest not only to a growing demand for art works produced by Arab artists but also
point to the globalized spread and brand-name appeal of these institutions. In the past few
years, other sites of interest and investments in contemporary Arab art also have
emerged, such as the establishment of the Arab Museum of Modern Art (Mathaf) in
Doha, Qatar (which opened in December 2010 and was designed by architect JeanFrançois Bodin) and the Museum of Modern Art in Kuwait City. In a region formerly
bereft of venues or institutions to support the arts, all of these new museums appear to
promote further development of a specific art market and the cultivation of a clientele to
support this market.86
The boom of art museums and galleries well indicates that, while private capital
attracts art for the support systems and strong infrastructure it could create, art attracts
investors to the new global cities. Indeed, a dynamic strategy of open-market capitalism
has been to use culture and art as resource for local governments to market their
respective cities to real-estate investors and global tourism, to corporate businesses
seeking good public relations, and to cultural tourists who contribute to the global image
of the global city. As a result, linkages between political, social, technological,
environmental, and art spheres have been established.
A recent example for this linkage would be Art Basel’s business agreement with
Davidoff Group in 2012. At the time Hans-Kristian Hoejsgaard, president and CEO of
Davidoff Group, explained:

The art world’s interest in contemporary Arab art was augmented after the liberal wings of the “Arab
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Davidoff and Art Basel is a perfect fit, building on a well-established
relationship between two organizations with joint roots in Basel. With
historic ties to European markets, both companies have expanded rapidly
in the US in recent years, while actively developing new markets around
the globe, especially in Asia. Our customers share many common interests
with Art Basel’s patrons. As we forge closer ties with the world of art, Art
Basel is the ideal partner, and we look forward to a long-term
collaboration as our brands evolve worldwide.87
Art Basel’s co-director, Marc Spiegler, responded: “As Art Basel is expanding, we seek
partners like Davidoff who are intensifying their engagement with the arts.”88 It is
interesting to note that, just before this agreement, The Oettinger Davidoff Group,
headquartered in Basel Switzerland, developed the Davidoff Art Initiative in Miami as a
part of the company’s new public-relations campaign. Davidoff’s investment in art not
only smartens up its corporate image but also helps it to normalize cigar smoking and
even make it fashionable. The company advertised this initiative: “Davidoff Cigars is
extending the reach of contemporary art to Davidoff’s products and environments
worldwide.”89 This merger of art and business benefits both parts that aim to expand their
market all over the globe. Through this initiative, Davidoff Company started an artist
residency program in La Romana, Dominican Republic, which “seeks to help emerging
and mid-career Dominican and Caribbean artists develop their skills, make connections
within global artistic networks, earn exposure for their work and share their expertise
with others in the region.”90
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The first artist of Davidoff’s residency program was Cuban-born Dominican artist
Quisqueya Henríquez, a 1992 graduate of Instituto Superior de Arte in Havana, who is
already a well-recognized global artist and was a participant of Art Basel in Miami in
2008.91 Henríquez benefited from the Davidoff’s residency program in 2013 by creating a
series of artwork for the inaugural Davidoff Art Edition. The artist created 50 special
collector’s editions prints to be sold along with the special edition box of cigars. Her
prints show the process of cigar making and its cultural significance in the Dominican
Republic. In a recent news release, Davidoff Art Initiative announced: “The artworks
created by Quisqueya Henríquez are inspired by her visit to the Davidoff manufacture in
Santiago de los Caballeros, Dominican Republic, where she witnessed the exceptional
craftsmanship and passion involved in cigar making.”92 Davidoff further announced that
collectors and cigar aficionados could find this special edition of cigars and Henríquez’s
prints at Davidoff’s Collectors Lounge during Art Basel in Hong Kong in May 2014. I
should note that during Art Basel in Miami in 2013, as an associated partner of Davidoff
operated a VIP lounge in the art collector’s lounge. In this walk-in humidor, a cigar roller
from the Dominican Republic demonstrated “the art of blending and the art of rolling a
Davidoff Cigar.”93
With Henríquez’s artworks and the VIP lounges in Art Basel Davidoff
romanticized the exploited labor of cigar workers of the Dominican Republic and this
romanticization served as an outlet to sell cigars to the global elite in Hong Kong and
Miami–adding another dimension to the exploitative mechanism of cigar manufacturing
91
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of the global companies in the Caribbean. On the other hand, this romanticization of cigar
labor attracts rich tourists to the Dominican Republic, and the government of the
Dominican Republic justifies the promotion of such tourism as a driving force for local
economic development–another mechanism of exploitation of natural and human
resources that has been worsened by neoliberal globalization.94 Meanwhile, Hong Kong
and Miami secured their position in the league of global cities created by real estate and
financial markets, by hosting the world’s premier art show, Art Basel, and welcoming the
crème de la crème of global cultural tourists. Hence, the Davidoff Cigar example allows
one to observe the ways in which neocolonial and neoliberal relations under globalization
are integrated and how these mechanisms work interdependently on global and local
scales. As seen in this example, culture and art have been instrumentalized as a resource
not only to re-legitimize regressive social redistributions but also to conceal the logic and
effects of neoliberal globalization.
Circulation of artists, dealers, curators, art works, and information mimic the
networking of a global market while maintaining a hierarchical structure.95 Among many
factors are the unprecedented global roles of independent curators as well as the global
division of art labor. These are indications that, in the neoliberal era, the art world has
adapted the organizational model of the corporate system. In fact, it would not be an
exaggeration to state that the art world consummated its marriage to the corporate world
94
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not only by the privatization of the art sector and the overwhelming mechanism of private
sponsorship but also by using the same technologies and organizing principles employed
by corporatism to increase production, marketing, and exchange. Meanwhile art world
professionals are being regarded as resourceful and creative entrepreneurs of the new
economy that produce intellectual property and innovation, the immaterial labor that the
neoliberal economy needs.96
When art started to be more dependent on the private forces in the market,
mainstream art criticism ceased to be independent of those forces. After the 1980s, the
major art magazines available in the United States, such as Frieze, Flash Art, Artforum,
and Art in America, noticeably favored news releases and public relations-type works to a
strong criticism of exhibition making. Very likely this development was mainly because
the new private galleries and other private art institutions that boomed in this period
financed these magazines. Nevertheless, by the 1990s, curators started filling in the gaps
of “critical” art criticism and assumed the responsibility of emphasizing strong points of
view. With that shift, the role of the curator changed from being someone “in the team”
to a “professional consultant” who dominated the organization of discourses surrounding
contemporary art exhibitions. Some artists reacted to this new hierarchy while they
continued building careers in the biennial system. Hazel Friedman summarizes the new
power of the curator:
In its most dynamic incarnation, curatorial power is about the ability to
promote dialogue, to try and scramble the hierarchies, to bring new breath
to old bodies. In its vulgar incarnation, curatorial power is about the might
of right; right artists; right discourse. Right time, place, and response. It is
about the ability to turn yesterday’s artist starving in a garret into the
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brightest star in the art firmament; to condemn one genre to death and
transform another into gospel.97
As Friedman argues, the curator now also functions as a significant creative agent
in his or her own right, actively participating in the development of artists’ projects and in
the selection of mediating devices employed in the presentation of an exhibition–the
exhibition’s mode of dialogue with the intended public(s). For that matter, today, the
curator must negotiate careful relationships between himself/herself (often representing
international currents in the art world) and the local artist/local audience in the
geographical location of a biennial or the museum.
Sociologist Pascal Gielen analyzes the current state of contemporary art by
referring to Paolo Virno’s argument on multitude and post-Fordism, and suggests that the
dematerialization of artworks parallels the process of post-Fordization (the neoliberal
economy is also called the post-Fordist economy, which emphasizes the transition from
material to immaterial labor).98 In a post-Fordist economy, even the immaterial goods are
turned into commodities. Gielen argues:
Design and aesthetics–in other words, external signs and symbols–are
major driving forces in today’s economy, because they constantly heighten
consumer interest. We are all too familiar with this point of view, which
has been propagated by countless postmodern psychologists, sociologists
and philosophers since the 1970s.99
Gielen looks at the proliferation of biennials from the point of social labor and calls this
phenomenon “post-Fordization of the museum.” In his analysis of the post-1989 art
world Gielen concludes: “the museum is infected by the biennial virus.”100 This comment
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refers to the “increase in temporary exhibitions and an inversely proportional decrease in
research into and attention to the collection.”101 When the exhibition itself is regarded as
an artwork, then one who has “the idea” to organize it becomes a quasi-artist–the author
of the immateriality of the labor. Hence, when one’s labor is co-modified, the curator,
typically working as a global agent, becomes a part of the co-modification of the
artworks, as it is the curator’s ideas that utilize the artworks at will. On the other hand,
although Gielen’s assumptions hold true for many large-scale exhibitions, the
collaborative models for curatorial production contest the conventional notion of the
curator. Interdisciplinary roles that now define the curatorial subject, especially in the
extension of their activities beyond institutional frameworks, hold true in that there are
multiple art worlds: the institutional art world that complies with neoliberal directives and
the alternative art worlds that contest the over-arching logic of this relationship.
After the neoliberal restructuring of the economy though growing markets, the
international flow of consumer goods has gone hand in hand with the flow of immigrant
workers, and art world professionals have accompanied the circulation of artworks
among transnational mega exhibitions, museums, and art fairs. The mobilization of art
world professionals also has pointed to the emergence of a new, controversial type of
“nomad” artist. This nomad artist often lives in one of the urban centers, exhibits in many
others, and travels from one international biennial to another in the same way an
executive circulates to secure new exhibition deals.102 This type of artist is far from the
genius, outsider, or bohemian figure that we encounter in the history of Western art.103
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The nomad artist promotes him/herself in an in-between existence instead of by proving
genius or uniqueness. The way in which this nomad artist relates to the product of the
global exhibition culture, which eliminates the artist’s dependence on his/her studio, is a
question to be explored elsewhere.
In the past two decades, the number of the art biennials has grown significantly.
There were approximately ten biennials or triennials in 1989, and today, there are more
than hundred, about sixty of which are international mega events.104 Each year, new
biennials are added from the remotest parts of the world, the majority of them sponsored
by private corporations. It is not surprising to note that some successful biennials were
associated with the emergence of neoliberal political and economic landscapes. The
Istanbul Biennial, which was founded after the end of the military dictatorship (1989);
Gwangju Biennale in South Korea, which was founded after the democratic revolution
(1995); and Manifesta (The European Biennial of Contemporary Art), which emerged
after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the recharting of Europe’s geography, all indicate the
start of the restructuring of the economy according to neoliberal principles. International
art biennials have been so popular and so influential in defining and shaping the current
condition of institutional art that some analysts refer to this phenomenon as “the
biennalization of the art world.”105
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International curator Dan Cameron describes the difference between a biennial
exhibition and museum, gallery or public exhibitions:
…Of course, organizing a biennial for City X because its civic leaders
want to draw favorable attention to their home is also not a disinterested
rationale, but it isn’t quite the same as a museum or public space
presenting an exhibition of so-called ‘cutting edge’ art, in which every
object on view has already passed through the hands of a blue-chip dealer.
However, if through a biennial you can upload the principle that the
world’s art belongs together naturally, to be experienced on a regular basis
by a broad cross-section of society, then you are also giving a solid form
to a vision that only the biennial, and by implication its curator, can
provide.106
As Cameron points out, the idea of global art is inherently a part of the biennial
phenomenon and the idea and vision of a biennial is often in the hands of an international
star curator. This “biennalization” process has been associated with the dictatorship of the
curator and has also been criticized for producing extremely standardized exhibitions that
no longer can harbor a level of intimacy among artworks, artists and discourses–a claim
underlined by the fact that the artists and curators are generally the same ones traveling
from one biennial to the other.107 During the opening days of these biennials, while the
art world professionals immerse themselves in a superficial review of the local art scene
that is already filtered through the local art elite and their professional and political
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agendas, some local artists make opportunistic use of global art networks by exploiting
the biennial system to set foot in the global art market.
In the 1990s’ climate of multiculturalism, optimistic observers regarded the
biennalization of contemporary art as an emergent space for the redistribution of cultural
power, especially in the non-Western world. After the millenium, observers have
recognized the new phenomenon of art biennieals as a continuation of the ninteenth
century world exhibitions, where neo-colonial profits were subtly calculated and used as
a tool for the globalist system of neoliberal expansion–a new form of hegemony and
recolonization by the West.108 The latter view suggests that, although peripheral biennials
promised to end the hegemony of the United States and Europe in art, the contemporary
art circulating the globe in the biennials still is judged by the international art world,
based on institutional (i.e. Western) art standards, and creates standardization of
postmodernist pluralism. Thus, the alternative spaces biennials might offer lose their
credibility and any decentralizing effect, as Rasheed Areen, the founder and editor in
chief of the journal Third World, has noted:
The recent globalization of capitalist economy, still dominated and
controlled by the West, has attained a new power and confidence, which is
now being translated through the globalization of world cultures. This has
created a new space and job opportunities for the neo-colonial
collaborators, and with this has emerged a group of ethnic or multicultural
functionaries, in the form of writers-cum-curators from different parts of
the Third World. With the rhetoric of exclusion on their tongues and an
appeal to liberal conscience of Western society, these new functionaries of
the system drag anyone and everyone, so long as they belong to their own
ethnic or national groups, to the art market of the West. We thus have
Chinese, Africans, Latin Americas, etc., promoting their Chinese (which
108
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could include Southeast Asians), African and Latin American artists
respectively. As for history or ideology, they are no longer needed.109
Areen sums up the contradiction in the art world very well. Just as the recent
globalization of capitalist economy marginalizes nonwestern economies, the recent
globalization of art under new liberalism cannot effectively address the ongoing
structural marginalization of nonwestern artists. It is even complicit with it because,
while the rhetoric of inclusion serves well the logic and philosophy of the liberal market,
it does not ensure the representation of oppressed groups.
While the intellectual crisis surrounding identity politics continues to mark its
importance to contemporary political philosophy and practice, the selection of artworks
included in biennial exhibitions still has a lot to do with the art’s (or the artist’s)
controversial character, capacity for igniting heated debates, and exchange value. For
example, although tens of thousands of visual tactics and images have been employed
around a variety of political protests around the world, only a handful of images that
proved “marketable” atracted the attention of the art world, and those that did were
almost immediately inserted into the biennial discourse.110 A good example is Richard
Serra’s lithography poster of a thick, paint-stick silhouette of a hooded Abu Ghraib
prisoner, with the text “STOP BUSH.”
Serra’s litograph was produced to be carried in street demonstrations against U.S.
policies in Iraq, and was distributed freely over the World Wide Web (Figure 1.4). The
image shows a black figure wearing a Ku Klux Klan hat and with his hands open as if to
Rasheed Areen, “Beyond Postcolonial Cultural Theory,” in The Third Text Reader: On Art, Culture, and
Theory, eds., Rasheed Araeen, Sean Cubitt, and Ziauddin Sardar (London: Continuum, 2002), 342-343.
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say, “I am not resisting.” What is haunting about the image is the reversal of the roles of
the victim and the oppressor: the image of a tortured Abu Ghraib prisoner is transformed
into that of a violent xenophobic. This kind of reversal creates unexpected and continuous
leaps in a person’s psyche between the image of the oppressor and of the oppressed. After
this simple but haunting drawing became popular on the Internet, in an excellent
commercial maneuver, the art world made Serra’s work widely known through a poster
advertising the Whitney Biennial in 2008. Serra’s lithography was included in the
Biennial but with a slight alteration: The text said “STOP B S,” and 250 copies were sold
on the Internet for $2,500 each to attract attention to the biennial. Serra’s work is one of
many examples of artworks that are made for the streets but get caught up in biennials’
fetshisizm of controversial political art.
The Whitney Biennial is one of the most criticized biennials after the Venice
Biennale. A day before the opening day of the 2012 edition, a group called Arts & Labor
(a workers group founded in conjunction with the New York General Assembly for
Occupy Wall Street) protested and asked for an end to the Whitney Biennial in 2014.111
Their criticism of the Whitney Museum and its Biennial targeted corporate hegemony in
art institutions and stressed the exploitative art labor relations on the local level in a
written statement:
We object to the Biennial in its current form because it upholds a system
that benefits collectors, trustees, and corporations at the expense of art
workers. The Biennial perpetuates the myth that art functions like other
professional careers and that selection and participation in the exhibition,
for which artists themselves are not compensated, will secure a sustainable
vocation…The Whitney Museum, with its system of wealthy trustees and
ties to the real estate industry perpetuates a model in which culture
Maura Judkis, “ Occupy Calles and End to Whitney Biennial,” The Washington Post, February 28,
2012, accessed 25 March 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/style-blog/post/occupy-calls-forend-of-whitney-biennial/2012/02/28/gIQA55KEgR_blog.html
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enhances the city and benefits the 1% of our society while driving others
into financial distress. This is embodied both in the biennial’s sponsorship
–represented most egregiously in its sponsorship by Sotheby’s, which has
locked out its unionized art handlers–and the museum’s imminent move to
the Meat Packing District, a neighborhood where artists once lived and
worked which is now a gentrified tourist destination that serves the
interests of the real estate industry.112
Arts & Labor’s sound criticism on exploitative labor relations is shared by many artists
and activists who try to carve themselves a place within and without the art institutions.
On the other hand, art historians and art critics, who often are critical of corporate
influence in arts, look at neoliberal globalization as an overarching development that has
changed economic and institutional relations in the art world everywhere. Chin-Tao Wu,
an art historian and curator, has written in detail on the increasing privatization of art
institutions and the involvement of corporations in the circulation and exhibition of art
and in the art market. In her meticulous study, Privatizing Culture: Corporate Art
Intervention Since the 1980s, Wu demonstrates the economic and ideological interests
that lay at the root of American art institutions that are run by a handful of influential
national elite on their boards, such as the Guggenheim Museums and The Museum of
Fine Arts, Boston.113 Art historian Charlotte Bydler, in her 2004 dissertation, Global Art
World Inc: On the Globalization of Contemporary Art, explained that the migration of
international art labor is on a south-north axis, just as are the majority of workerimmigrants. Hence, cosmopolitan art labor traveling from one biennial to the other has
been given privileges that are not reachable for immigrants.114 That same year, art
historian and curator Julian Stallabrass launched his book, Art Incorporated: The Story of
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Contemporary Art, which shows that contemporary art has become increasingly linked
with corporate capital, especially in the international biennial system.115 However,
Stallabrass assumes that neoliberal processes are homogenous—affecting all the globe
evenly—and argues that all biennials are subsumed by the logic of neoliberalism and the
same processes of neoliberal globalization.116
While it is crucial to acknowldge that the biennial as an institution sits on an
interlocked relationship of corporate and artistic spheres, a critique of the relationship of
contemporary art and globalization should take into account multiple discontinuities and
contradictions flowing from this relationship and the biennial institution. In a dialectical
approach, Craven warns us about the one-sighted view of biennials and taking on the
phenomenon as a homegenous system of institutional relations:
In fact, biennials, which never simply ‘reflect’ neoliberalism or
globalization, are densly mediated institutions even as the terms of this
mediation are quite diverse, depending on the nation at issue and the
regional history under consideration, as well as contestation. As a group,
the international biennials are multidirectional entities that embody
cotested meanings, which oscillate between colonialism and/or
neolcolonialism versus anti-colonialism, on the one hand, and nationalism
and/or transnationalism versus internationalism, on the other hand.
Consequently, it is simply an ahistorical assertion to write that
‘extraordinary proliferation of biennials is driven by the same forces,’ no
matter on which continent they occur or in relation to which set of
regional tensions.117
Art biennials are also criticized for standardizing contemporary art around the world to
have a common use of medium–often video art, film, photography, and Internet art–the
kind of art forms that are mechanically or electronically reproducible. These art forms
express and emphasize an important aspect of neoliberalization: the enlargement of
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communication and networks. Although this is largely the case in Western biennials, for
biennials of other geographies, where high-end tecnology is still for the privileged few,
such generalization is invalid. Such criticism pointed to the spectacular character of the
biennials and deemed artworks such as sound installations, large on site-installations,
talking billboards, and interactive computer works, as “biennial art.”118
In 1999, Peter Schjeldahl, the art critic at the New Yorker, coined the term
“festivalism” in to refer to the nonsalable art circulating the biennials that is celebrated
for its spectacular potential.119 Schjeldahl described the term as “the new order of
universal frazzlement” overtaking biennials around the globe.120 He argued that this type
of art was spectacular and pointless, “heavy on information but resistant to
contemplation.”121 He also called this new order “global rationalization of the art game,
whereby one kind of artist stays in the studio while another becomes familiar with many
airports.”122 Schjeldahl wrote:
I call it festivalism that has long been developing on the planetary circuit
of more than fifty biennials and triennials, including the recent Whitney
Biennial. Mixing entertainment and soft-core politics, festivalism makes
an aesthetic of crowd control. It favors works that do not demand
contemplation but invite, in passing, consumption of interesting–just not
too interesting--spectacles.123
Here, Schjeldahl’s term “festivalism” generalizes all the biennials and emphasizes
their spectacular potential. In fact, festival and spectacle are two different concepts and
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practices.124 Festivals may contain elements of spectacularization–such such as film
festivals and art festivals–or they may retain elements of carnival such, as rave music
festivals and community festivals.
I propose a critical application of Guy Debord’s theory of spectacle and Bakhtin’s
perspective of carnival to analyze the interplay of spectacle and carnival on the global
stage of international biennials.125 I look at biennials from neither the perspective of the
carnival, which points to experimental, democratic and transformative character, nor the
perspective of spectacle, which is the control mechanism used by biennials to control
public discourse to the benefit of corporations and local actors who seek to implement
neoliberal doctrines. Those perspectives have very valid points, but they do not grasp the
situation coherently and adequately because they look at only one side of the relation
between biennials and neoliberalism. I situate my view within the framework of
“festival,” which is a concept that embodies a synthesis of the dialectical relationship
between carnival and spectacle.
The biennials as art festivals often provoke contemporary art’s potential as a
spectacle rather than being an exhibition for a set of contemplative objects, on the other
hand, they produce an environment of carnival that allows subversive and plural voices to
confuse, surprise, and shock the audiences. In sum, carnival is expressive while spectacle
is instrumental, and a festival of art can uphold both.126
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The Venice Biennale and the Havana Biennial: The Centripetal and
Centrifugal Forces in the Institutional Art
Much of institutional art production today is not predicated on notions of objecthood but rather on investigating the relationships between a particular art production and
the globality of its context. Along these lines, international art biennials have been
criticized for being ideological fortresses of the art world and creating standardized
exhibition systems on one hand, and on the other, have been praised for being hubs of
“global art.” However, the issue of the international biennial in the rapidly globalizing
world under neoliberalism is more complex.
The institutional art world is not homogenous–neither globally nor nationally. The
practices of contemporary art are as uneven and internally incoherent within the art world
system as much as outside of it. For example, we cannot put the Ushuaia Biennial,
Venice Biennale, Havana Biennial, or the Tirana Biennial on the same scale because their
scale, audience, and ideological concerns are not the same. In this section, I argue that
some peripheral biennials, such as the Havana Biennial, act as a centrifugal force that
produces a multiplicity of spin-offs from the totalizing art discourse, while the Venice
Biennale, organized for more than a century, acts as a centripetal force pushing peripheral
exhibitions and discourses toward standardization and conformism.127 I argue that the
Havana Biennial performs in opposition to mainstream biennials, such as the Venice
Biennale, which often positions the art of the global South or that of the minorities of
Europe as a space for a new exoticism. Havana creates, maintains, and supports a thirdworldism that, most of all, opens a possible crossroads for the engaged critique and
For more commentary on Bakhtin’s dialogical concept of two conflicting forces, see Renate Lachman,
“Bakhtin and Carnival: Culture as Counter-Culture,” trans. Raoul Eshelman, and Marc Davis, Cultural
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practical struggles. The Havana Biennial consciously adds elements of carnival in its
performances by means of neighborhood initiatives and by its careful use of public
spaces, while at times yielding to a certain spectacularism that satisfies the cultural
tourists flooding to Havana. The Venice Biennale also incorporates radical and
subversive voices, but those are often overwhelmed by the grand spectacle of the event
itself. Finally, the Venice and Havana Biennials are also great examples of art biennials
that have created spaces and opportunities for various global and local forces to compete
and contest. These examples are important for understanding that neoliberalism is a
highly contested world order, and precisely because of that, they present opportunities for
alternative formations.
Every two years, renowned art critics, art writers, museum directors, gallerists,
and auction house owners make a pilgrimage to Venice. During the opening days of the
Biennale, this privileged art crowd dines at the same restaurants, runs from one opening
to another, and meets at the same rooftop bars of their luxurious hotels to discuss what is
new, which curator or artist was rather lame or exciting, and plans to meet in the another
upcoming biennial somewhere.128
The Venice Biennale is known as “the mother biennial” for being the oldest,
largest, and the most influential in the art market. Every other year, the crème de la crème
of the institutional art world see hundreds of works in single day in the national pavilions
of the Giardini (a six thousand-square meter park), in the Arsenale, a huge former ship
production complex, and in dozens of other spots scattered around the city. What’s
expected from these art professionals is to take the pulse of contemporary art production
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around the world and to “make sense” of their rapid consumption of the artworks when
they return to their offices in New York, London, Paris, Cologne, and Milan. The
institutional expectation, to capture the spirit of art from all over the world that has been
selected and judged by a few art elite, is unrealistic.129
Most of the national pavilions are sponsored by private institutions, and most of
the artists are put forward by dealers and curators who have, directly or indirectly, a
financial interest in seeing their work on display.130 Chicago Sun-Times writer Margaret
Hawkins describes the atmosphere very well:
Imagine an amusement park of ideas where people stand in line for
attractions dreamt up by artists to assault the senses and dazzle the mind.
Imagine an Olympics of contemporary art, a World’s Fair of galleries
where a dozen languages can be heard in an hour. Then drop that into the
elegant ruin of Venice, city of Titian and Marco Polo, canals and
gondolas, and you can only begin to imagine the Venice Biennale.131
The Venice Biennale attracts approximately one million visitors every two years,
hence remaining a tourist destination. It is quite notable that while other biennials are
making great efforts to engage with local citizens and locatable audiences, Venice
remains for professionals–for cataloguing, marketing, and prestige. Nonetheless, within
the bedazzlement of the Mother Biennial, some exhibitions seek to make a mark in the
international landscape of art. In the 52nd Venice Biennale of 2007, the Biennial’s theme
was Think with the Senses Feel with the Mind: Art in the Present Tense. In addition to the
Italian Pavilion in the Giardini (biennial gardens), African Pavilion, which was
incorporated that year in the Arsenale, and the Latin American Pavilion in the city center,
the Biennale featured another transnational exhibition, but this time, it was an ethnic
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collective: the Roma Pavilion. The pavilion uses a politically correct term, “Roma,” the
plural for “Rom,” to represent the Romanese-speaking populations, which are
traditionally also known as Gypsies across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
The sudden interest of the organizers of the biggest international art exhibition in
the contemporary cultural production of the Roma population reveals the political and
economic interests underlining such international mega art shows. Rather than the
consequence of a sudden and spontaneous humanitarian interest, post-1989 political and
economic developments spurred governmental and nongovernmental entities to get
involved in Romany representation. It was the continuation of a complex set of political,
economic, and discursive relations marked by the collapse of state socialism and
European Union expansion that was part of the ongoing liberalization and
democratization of Central and Eastern European countries.
Since 1989, an improved situation for the Roma has become a key condition for
the entry of CEE countries into the European Union. New political interests that focus on
this particular ethnic group have started growing as a result, and the rhetoric of “Roma
inclusion” in these states, which had politically and socially excluded the Roma for
centuries, has taken a different turn.132 It is therefore not surprising that, for the past
decade, research foundations and the academic community have become very interested
in “the Roma problem” alongside along state institutions, international organizations, and
human rights groups. The fact that the international art world had not previously paid
attention to Romany artists, and no Roma had yet represented his or her home country in
The European Union’s expansion has added approximately one and half million Roma to the EU
population; the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 added another three million. However, there are
only two Roma members in the European Parliament. In 1999, the accession partnerships for Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia in the European Union specified “Roma integration” as
a priority.
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the Venice Biennale, reveals the difference between the politically correct rhetoric of
Roma “inclusion” and the actual realization of this rhetoric.133
The Roma Pavilion’s main sponsor was the Open Society Institute, which is a
Budapest-based international NGO (non-governmental organization) that is a part of the
U.S.-based Soros Foundations network.134 Other financial sponsors were the Alliance
Cultural Foundation, based in Munich, and the European Cultural Foundation, based in
Amsterdam.135 George Soros, the global financier and philanthropist, is also the founder
and chairperson of the Open Society Institute and the Soros Centers of Contemporary
Arts (SCCA). Within this socio-political context, the Roma Pavilion presented itself with
an immediate question: Was this blockbuster representation a part of the institutional
creativity aimed at the socio-political integration of the former communist Europe into
the global economic circuits?
I argue that the overexposed bohemian and transient Romany identity fed
multicultural discourse in the EU and in international art institutions rather than offer an
133
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alternative view for equality of representation for minorities. Following the policies of
the project called “Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015,” the Roma Pavilion in Venice
was curated around identity discourse. The exhibition organizers intended to counter
romantic stereotypes and misconceptions about the Romany culture in the effort to
produce a constructive reconstruction and representation of Romany identity.
Overall, the exhibition represented stereotypes in an ironic manner. At times the
Romany identity was essentialized as “the other”–running against the rhetoric of
“inclusion”–and other times, offered a new exotic territory for the art world. The problem
is best pronounced by Gottfried Wagner’s question in the exhibition catalogue: “Are we
creating an ethicizing, socially motivated ‘special case’ sponsored by philanthropy, in the
hybrid environment of the art establishment?”136 To give an example, Szentandrássy
István’s paintings, presented in a small and poorly lit room behind thick, red-velvet
curtains, strongly reinforced Romany stereotypes. Szentandrássy is a student of János
Balázs, whose works are regarded as the quintessence of Roma painting. The exotic and
mysterious figures and wild horses depicted in vivid colours with high-contrast light were
literally the embodiments of the Romany stereotype in nineteenth century art and
literature (Figure 1.5). Szentandrássy’s paintings presented the Roma as a-historical
subjects living in a dreamlike world that appealed very much to the Orientalist gaze,
which fosters the idea that marginal populations live a life of fantasy away from modernday material realities.
All of the agents involved with the Roma pavilion–cultured Gypsy elites, the
Soros foundations, and the Venice Biennale organizations–had their own agendas. It has
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been argued extensively that international biennials, which proliferated after 1989, have
been linked intrinsically with corporations that are interested in specific cultures, and
often have exhibited those aspects of each culture that open up ways to their
consumption. On the other hand, the cultural products of ethnic minorities have been
pushed into international art markets that in turn gain credibility in relation to certain
political and cultural institutions behind the biennial exhibitions. As seen in the Roma
exhibition, the politics of inclusion is embedded in contradiction: In spite of the diversity
of the Roma population, which is characterized by multiculturalism and multiterritoriality, Romany intelligentsia formed their activism within the project of “ethnoidentity.” This political framework supports the efforts of the “Decade of Roma Inclusion
2005-2015” founded by the Open Society Institute of the Soros foundations, the World
Bank, and the European Commission, which also are the same financial supporters of
contemporary Roma art in the international scene across Europe.
This exhibition space, created by the Romany intellectuals and sponsored by the
Soros Foundation, existed in a delicate zone between the politics of inclusion of Roma as
the cheap workforce of Europe and Roma nationalism. Nevertheless, the alarming issue
that this exhibition made visible was that Roma nationalism has been sustained primarily
at an élite level that hinders democratic participation of the rest of the Roma people. The
danger of this identity politics of the Romany élites lies in its appeal more to the CEE
nationalists, who believe that Roma is a distinctively alien population, than to the diverse
Roma communities with different socio-political needs, capabilities, and interests.
Moreover, the promotion of difference above the rhetoric of a distinct nation has been
used as a cheaper alternative to material equalization of Roma’s economic conditions. It
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provides the basis for the ideological, political, and institutional dislocation of Roma
minorities from the majority population of the European Union nation, thus freeing their
governments from the costly part of their citizenship.
It seemed to me that rather than giving international visibility to the Romany
artists and the socio-political situation of the Roma in Europe, the exhibition aimed at
satisfying the expectation of the Venice public in respect to Gypsy art. For examples, in
the paintings of Gabi Jimenez and Kiba Lumberg, Damian Le Bas’s cartoonish maps,
Nihad Nino Pusija’s photographs, and Delaine Le Bas’s installations, decorativeness,
naiveté, and kitsch were exaggerated to the degree that it masked social commentary. On
the other hand, works such as András Kállai’s sculpture Fat Barbie (2006), Dusan
Ristic’s installation titled Global Warming (2007), André Jeno Raatzsch’s mixed-media
work Sommersault (2005), and Mihaela Ionela Cimpeanu’s large-scale sculpture Wings
(2007) adopted a universal contemporary visual language, thus making no reference to
Romany culture stylistically or conceptually. Overall, the artworks lacked a historical
grounding in social issues; it appeared that they could have been made in any period of
post-modernism. For example, none of them make any reference to the Communist past
of the Roma or comment on historical positions during the post-communist era. The
works chosen transmitted the idea that the Roma people are, on one hand, different and
exotic, and on the other hand are modern and open to cultural assimilation.
If the display of Roma art seeking equality in representation had been at stake,
instead of an exhibition that stimulated the Orientalist gaze for the undiscovered culture
of the uncultured, the organizers could have created an alternative setting to the biennial
model in Budapest, where the curator of the exhibition, as well as the sponsoring
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exhibition, resides. In 2003, the Roma community in Hungary erected a space of
representation symbolically called the “Hungarian Roma Parliament.” The place
functions as a cultural and community center. Varieties of cultural programs and facilities
are available, such as a theater stage, a Roma painter’s gallery, concert series, a film club,
language courses, and a playhouse for children. Some 100 works of art on the walls of
this space belonged to Hungarian Roma artists, including some who had no formal
education beyond grade school. Most of the artists lived in poverty and had no steady
income.
The artists participating in this cultural and political public organization produce
visual works that engage with their community in a direct and dialogical way, in order to
raise consciousness of the reasons for their social exclusion. Attention to this space,
instead of the directions chosen for the Venice Biennale, could have presented an
opportunity to establish systematic and effective social inclusion of the Roma population
as an alternative to its self-ethnicization that feeds nationalist and conservative politics.
The dissident voice of Roma/Gypsy existence has much to offer to other counterhegemonic formulations in Europe and the rest of the world. Indeed, many lessons can be
learned from Roma and their historical opposition to the structures of European
domination and the systems of capitalist modernity. The Roma Pavilion, without a doubt,
boosted self-confidence among the Roma and partially achieved its goal to dip Romany
artists’ feet in the international art circuits. From here on, would the Romany artists take
the challenge to overcome their systematic disqualifications from broader cultural and
political representations, both in the art sphere and in the political sphere?
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In contrast to the Venice Biennale, which positions the art of the global south
and/or the minorities of Europe as a type of new exoticism, as exemplified by the Roma
pavilion in the 52nd edition, the Havana Biennial creates, maintains, and supports a
dialogical platform that opens possible avenues for engaged social critique.137 The
Havana Biennial plays a big role in Cuba’s search to resolve the complex relationship
between local cultural expressions and international languages, especially with issues
pertaining to the hegemonic biennial “model” that boomed in every corner of the
world.138
During the economic crisis of the 1990s, an important part of the cultural policy
of Fidel Castro’s government was to promote cultural tourism and the creation of wealth
through cultural production. Since then, just like the Venice Biennale, the Havana
Biennial has been one of the instruments for the capitalization of culture and tourism, the
two axes that have supported the Cuban economy during the past two decades.
Nevertheless, the opening of the Cuban art market to the world has created a class
division among Cuban artists and has shifted the Havana Biennial toward the promotion
of Cuban art internationally as an integral part of the new Cuban economy. Yet, I argue
that the Havana Biennial rests on a complex set of relationships with the international art
world, the local art market, and the Cuban government.
The biennial system arose from the culture of the international capitalist system,
and Cuba’s role in the international arena has largely involved influencing the culture of
revolutionary societies. Although, over three decades, a tension between these two
For more on the Roma Pavilion in the 52nd Venice Biennial, see Tijen Tunali, “The Politics of ‘Roma
Inclusion’ at the 52nd Venice Art Biennale,” Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review XI,
Special Issue: Art and Politics in (Post) Communism (2011): 701-711.
138
For more, see Luiz Caminitzer, “Between Nationalism and Internationalism,” in Signs of Tradition:
80’s Art from Cuba, Exhibition Catalogue (New York: Museum of Contemporary Hispanic Art, 1988).
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polarities has existed in its curatorial and exhibition structure, the Havana Biennial has
been viewed as a key space of contestation between the international art system, largely
embedded in corporate funding, and local pressures that push the Cuban art community to
open up to international markets.
Since its launch in 1984, the Havana Biennial has acted as a buffer zone between
local art institutions and the international art market: While acknowledging the powerful
hand of international markets, it has supported and guarded local art interests. Because of
the direct engagement of the state with cultural productions in Cuba, through cultural
policies and institutions, the Havana Biennial depends on other art institutions, as is the
case of other biennials that are privately sponsored. Centro de Arte Contemporáneo
Wifredo Lam (Wifredo Lam Center of Contemporary Art) is the state institution that
organizes the Havana Biennial and controls a majority of visual art activities in Cuba. It
produces most of the exhibition catalogs published in Cuba and the art magazines Arte
Cubano and, more recently, Arte por Excelencias, which celebrated its first edition
during the 10th biennial in 2009.
The curatorial team for the Havana Biennial includes experts in the arenas of art
and culture, who also are regular contributors to those art magazines. Even Cuba’s two
major private galleries, Galería Habana and HB, which handle the Cuban art trade
overseas, are connected to the Wifredo Lam Center of Contemporary Art through the
Havana Biennial. Those galleries contribute to the biennial by housing performances,
collective activities, and workshops as side venues for the biennial and providing
exposure of their collections of contemporary Cuban art to the international biennial
crowd.
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As the primary sponsor, the Cuban government’s goals for the biennial should be
considered within the framework of the ongoing revolutionary struggle within the
cultural and educational sectors of Cuba. The Havana Biennial was one of the many
cultural festivals and institutions that were born in Cuba in the early 1980s. Others
include the Festival of New Latin American Cinema, the Havana Ballet Festival, the
House of the Americas, the National Print House, as well as the New Latin American
Cinema Institution, which followed the establishment of the Ministry of Culture and the
foundation of the Instituto Superior de Arte, in 1976. Cuban cultural institutions and the
Havana Biennial were founded to challenge Western value systems embedded in
colonialist discourses with the cultural solidarity of Latin America, Africa and Asia,
geographies with a historical resistance to Western hegemony. La Bienal de la Habana,
since its inception, has worked as a venue for negotiations, not just of stylistic differences
between various artists and art collectives but also for disputing agendas on the socialist
utopia and the discourses regarding Cuba’s ideological and economic struggles in the
new world order.
At the time the Havana Biennial was launched in 1984 by the Wifredo Lam
Center of Contemporary Art , young graduates of the Instituto Superior de Arte had been
marking their presence–not only artistically but socially–and had been building a rigorous
artistic platform that questioned social problems as well as the subordinate relationship
between art and authority. A generation of artists, later known as the “80s generation,”
opened a new way of dialogue with their society, while confronting the international art
scene with better self-awareness.139 As a result, the Ministry of Culture, with its openminded leader, Armando Hart, started to play the role of a negotiator between the
139
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artists/writers and the state in order to satisfy the political needs for a more open and
sincere dialogue with the rest of world and Cuba’s longing for cultural prestige in the
international arena. With that, the Havana Biennial came to embody a distinct space of
negotiation between the Cuban state’s cultural program and the demands of a generation
that struggles for changes within an autocratic social order.
I argue that the Havana Biennial continues to be the site of political, linguistic,
and artistic struggle between the state and participating artists. However, the voice of the
locals is not completely lost within the ideological dominance of the state’s language. On
the contrary, in certain circumstances (and a prestigious international festival of art is one
of them) artistic subjecthood and authority become present as a counterpart to the state in
a dialogical interaction. This dynamic was especially prominent in 2009, during the 10th
Biennial. One could easily argue that the subjectivity of local artists and intellectuals is
not completely lost within the dominance of the state’s ideological language. Among
many examples, the long-term, performance-like project titled Cátedra Arte de Conducta
(Behavior Art School), organized by Tania Bruguera from 2002-2009, is especially
significant.
Bruguera’s work at the 10th Havana Biennial at the Wifredo Lam Center of
Contemporary Art literally dealt with the idea of official language and dialogue (Figure
1.6). Bruguera, the founder of Cátedra Arte de Conducta (department of art conduct) at
the Instituto Superior de Arte in Havana, created a stage and invited Cubans to talk about
“anything” for one minute. She also provided 200 disposable cameras to the public to
document the event. During one-minute speeches, two actors–a man and a woman
dressed as officials of the ministry of interior–tried to put one of two doves on the
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shoulder of each speaker. This gesture invoked an event that had occurred on January 6,
1959, when a white dove landed on Fidel Castro’s right shoulder while he gave his initial
speech of the revolution. At the time, the dove had provided proof for the followers of
Santeria–the Afro-Cuban religion–that the gods supported Castro because he was
spiritually “crowned” as the leader of the Cuban people. Upon taking the stage in
Bruguera’s performance, one woman cried hysterically, another screamed, and a young
man kept silent for a minute. One participant acted like Castro and said, “This should be
banned.” Another was thrown off the stage because she exceeded the one-minute rule.
Approximately thirty speakers criticized the government’s actions against the freedom of
speech and the use of the Internet.
At the start of the 2009 Havana Biennial, the Cuban Minister of Culture, Abel
Prieto, was interviewed by Pablo Espinoza for Cuba’s popular communist newspaper La
Jornada. In that interview, Prieto spoke highly of the Biennial, asserting that one of its
principles is to build an alternative to the concessions market, and describing it as a
vehicle to defend the idea of the Cuban utopia. When asked about Bruguera’s
performance, he condemned some of the participants for being provocateurs but also
defended free speech: “This is one of the subjects of critical art in Cuba. We are
promoting a critical art of reflection to help us pinpoint our flaws, so that we can defend
the utopia. If the criticism comes from a position of commitment to the country, the
results can be really fruitful.”140 In a convincing way, he showed that the Ministry of
Culture continues to serve as a buffer between the demands of the Castro government and
“Ése es uno de los temas del arte crítico en Cuba. Estamos fomentándolo para reflexionar, que nos
ayude a descubrir nuestras distorsiones, que nos ayude a defender la utopía. Cuando se hace crítica como lo
hace Tania Bruguera, desde una posición de compromiso con el país, los resultados son realmente
fecundos.”Pablo Espinoza, “Bienal Habanera Cuba fomenta un arte crítico para defender la utopía: Abel
Prieto,” author’s translation, La Jornada, April 5, 2009, 12.
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the demands of young artists, most of whom were born after the period when Cuba
enjoyed the reputation of being the “true utopia” for leftist intellectuals and artists. Prieto
added that, “It’s a healthy thing, this criticism since the revolution, from a position
committed to the revolution, which often coincides with the critical analysis we’re doing
to achieve greater efficiency, fighting the same bureaucracy that we ourselves have
created.”141
This conundrum is at the core of Cuban life and culture today: With two legal
currencies, minimal Internet access, growing international investments, and stark social
divisions between those who can and cannot access external resources, cultural life in
Cuba revolves largely around social negotiations. Bruguera’s performance provides a
good example of how the Havana Biennial has built a dialogical space where multiple
agents–the sponsoring state, local Cuban artists and other Third World artists, as well as
the mainstream art world dominated by Western interests–navigate local and universal
cultural domains.
Mainstream biennials often are detached from their local environments, with the
biennial inserted into the visual space of the city only by means of billboards, airport
advertisements, signs and pictures of the venues, and maps. By way of contrast, the 10th
Havana Biennial actively involved public development projects that constructed valuable
experiences from the contextual practice of art. One of those projects was LASA
(Laboratorio Artístico de San Augustín), which took the biennial to one of Havana’s
peripheral neighborhoods, San Augustín. The project was initiated by painter Carlos

“Es sano, es una crítica desde la revolución, desde una posición comprometida con la revolución y
muchas veces esas críticas coinciden con el análisis que estamos haciendo para lograr una mayor eficiencia,
luchar contra las mismas trabas burocráticas que nosotros mismos hemos creado.” Ibid. Author’s
translation.
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Ariel Candelario and was created with the collaborative work of fifty artists from
Venezuela, Cuba, Canada, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Italy, Mexico, France,
Puerto Rico, Japan, and Brazil, who were engaged in a variety of visual artistic
disciplines, including architecture, urban planning, music, dance and film. The
experimental space erased the border between the artists and the inhabitants, as well as
spectacle and the spectator, and aimed to inspire egalitarian social relations in the
economical, educational, and ecological systems. The residents actively participated in
the experimental transformation of their neighborhood through a variety of architectural,
sculptural, photographic and film projects while they discovered joyful aspects of the
places they live in and enjoyed their environment from completely new viewpoints. The
laboratory and the actions, performances, and interventions it created–although each year
in a different neighborhood–continues today.
As is the case in Havana, every biennial incorporates elements of carnival and
spectacle to different degrees. The Havana Biennial makes a conscious effort to create an
atmosphere of carnival, so much so that, at times, one could forget that it is an exhibition.
Manuel Mendive’s unannounced, spontaneous and ritualistic performance was one of the
most unforgettable moments of the carnival atmosphere that the Havana Biennial created.
For the opening of his exhibition El espíritu, la naturaleza y las cabezas and corazones,
(Spirit, Nature and Heads and Hearts) at the Galería Origenes, in Havana’s Gran Teatro,
Mendive painted the dancers from Cuba’s Contemporary Dance Ensemble, the National
Folkloric Group, and the Caribbean Dance Company, and prepared them for the
performance. Huge crowds joined in when a group of dancers, dressed in carnival
costumes Mendive designed, started their parade at the Saratoga Hotel and danced
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through the infamous Prado Promenade to the rhythm of percussion. They engaged in a
dance mimicking the rituals of transformation, resurrection, and renewal. The event
resembled a mixture of the Rio Carnival and African religious rituals evoking the
symbolism of carnival rituals and the African spirit world.
Every year, Havana ensures that the Biennial pours out into the streets like a
carnival and includes the public of Havana in variety of collateral events, workshops, and
collaborative projects. However, Havana is also concerned with the kind of popularity
and attention that boosts tourism and economic activity in the city during the Biennial,
and so, now and then, it opens a space for spectacle and entertainment, as well. For
example, one of the main plazas of Havana witnessed a grand spectacle. The artist Kcho
(Alexis Leyva Machado) organized a spectacle at one of the largest plazas in Havana, in
front of the Convent of San Francisco de Asis. He “burned the ship” with the help of Cai
Guo-Qiang, who carefully mounted hundreds of fireworks on the wire that raised the boat
off the ground as well as in the boat, which had only a wooden skeleton. With thousands
of locals and Biennial visitors watching, clapping, screaming, and yelling, the boat, raised
four stories high above the ground, exploded and burned.142All the Cuban TV stations
were present for broadcasting live.
The Havana Biennials since 1984 have exposed the domination strategies
established as irreversible hegemonic models of the sphere of art. While other peripheral
biennials, such as those of Istanbul (1989), Sharjah (1991), and Gwangju (1995), after
gaining prestige in the Western art world, lost focus on challenging Eurocentric art
142

After the devastating effects of recent hurricanes, Kcho organized the Martha Machado brigades, with
the young artists, musicians, actors, dancers to help improve the living conditions and well-being of the
Cuban people. A branch of this project was mounted at the La Cabaña ditch to allow an open space for the
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discourses and supported the inclusion of the host city in the post-1989 economic order,
Havana remains insistent upon the activist and radical seal of its raison d'être.143
Havana’s strategic attempts to unleash rebellious energies and practices in geographies
and cultures in the Global South also has influenced a handful of other peripheral
biennials, such as Cuenca (1987), Dak’Art (1992), Johannesburg (1995-1997) and most
recently, Ushuaia (2007). Following the Havana Biennial’s lead, Manifesta 6, which was
held in 2006, and biennials held in 2007, including the Biennale de Montréal, the 5th
Berlin Biennale, and the Biennale of Sydney, featured record numbers of artists from the
Global South and fostered dialogue among artists in the North-South axis.
Cuba today is in constant flux trying to adapt to the changing circumstances in the
world and maintain the Revolution at the same time. The Havana Biennial occupies an
important space for social negotiations between the Cuban state and Cuban artists and
between the Cuban artists and the global art market. And the government’s goals for the
Biennial should be considered within the larger frame of the ongoing revolutionary
struggle in the cultural and educational sectors of Cuba.
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CHAPTER II
THE ISTANBUL BIENNIAL: AN INSTRUMENT OF NEOLIBERAL
RECONSTRUCTION OR AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ALTERNATIVE
FORMATIONS?
Contemporary art in Turkey has emerged from a set of conceptual, as well as a
concrete, contestations between Islamism and secularism, modernism and postmodernism, and nationalism and globalism. This rich, creative environment has been
jeopardized by three military coups and the intervention of the corporate sector. For the
past two decades, the growth of the Istanbul Biennial and the proliferation of private art
institutions and galleries have strongly impacted contemporary art practice in Turkey.
Countless studies, discussions, lectures, artistic, and activist activities have dealt with the
privatization of the art sector and the obvious agenda behind the Istanbul Biennial, which
is to turn Istanbul into a fashionable trademark in the world of global cities.
After discussing the history of the Istanbul Biennial through the lens of local
politics and neoliberal developments in Turkey, I examine the historical and ideological
reasons behind the hostile environment during the 2007 and 2009 editions generated by
some nationalists, anti-globalization activists, and the Faculty of Fine Arts at Marmara
University. I argue that the heterogeneity of responses to the Istanbul Biennial reveal the
complex and contradictory nature of the union between local institutional art and global
capital, as well as contestations between anti-systemic praxis on the streets and the
systemic praxis of the art world. The case of Istanbul is a good example to observe
various contradictions through which the biennial system is contested with alternative
propositions coming from both inside and outside the art world.
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Privatization of Culture and the Istanbul Biennial as a Trademark
In Turkey, state support for the cultural sector declined in the 1970s and 1980s,
and the growing private sector took matters into its own hands. When the state cut
subsidies for large cultural events, a group of art-loving industrial families decided to
establish a foundation that would promote and organize the artistic and cultural sector. In
1973, fourteen businessmen gathered under the leadership of Dr. Nejat F. Eczacıbaşı
founder and former CEO of the Middle East’s leading Pharmaceutical Corporation–to
found the Istanbul Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı, IKSV (Istanbul Foundation for Culture and
Arts) as a leading cultural institution in Turkey. An internationally recognized art critic
and curator of the first three Istanbul Biennials, Beral Madra explains the goal of this
institution from the vantage point of its founders:
The primary aim of the new elite that founded the institution was to break
away from a Soviet-like state hegemony and establish their class power.
That started in the late 1970s and culminated in the 1980s with Prime
Minister Turgut Özal’s government, which adopted the neoliberal
economic program word by word. This new economic elite tried to
exercise its hegemony not only in contemporary art but in all cultural
fields. We may easily call this a ‘post-bourgeois’ movement in Turkey,
where the character of the bourgeoisie changed from being a modernist,
bureaucratic or state-guarded class to a liberalist class that created its own
destiny. IKSV and the Istanbul Biennials played an instrumental role for
that matter, especially for this new elite class to connect itself to the global
elite.144
The first International Istanbul Festival, organized by the IKSV, occurred during
the same year as the 50th anniversary of the Turkish Republic. The Istanbul Festival,
until the 1980s, consisted of film screenings, theater productions, jazz concerts and ballet
performances, as well as art exhibitions held in the historic venues of Istanbul. In 1987,
the Istanbul Biennial was inaugurated; in 1989, the Istanbul Film Festival and the
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Istanbul Theater Festival were founded and organized as separate events. In 1994, the
Istanbul Festival changed its name to the Istanbul Music Festival and let other, separately
organized festivals emerge in the city. Among these, the Jazz Festival, the Electronic
Music Festival, the Rock’n Coke Festival, and Minifest for kids were the most popular.145
The IKSV continues to be the largest cultural organization in Turkey with its visual arts,
music, theater, and film festivals, and receives funding and sponsorships from the leading
Turkish companies that favor the Kemalist nation-state ideology–the founding ideology
of the modern Turkish state.
On its website, IKSV states that the Istanbul Biennial’s mission is to be a vessel
for the rapid economic and ideological integration of Istanbul with the “global art
world.”146 Madra explains the process:
After the Berlin wall collapsed, the walls of art were also demolished.
Before, half of Europe was closed to the outside world. This affected
Turkey a lot. When the wall collapsed, Turkey got connected to the
Balkans not only geographically but economically. Our art market became
internationalized along with that of the Balkans. When Europe turned to
the Balkans, it noticed us too. Although we were a NATO country, we
were in a black hole of the Soviet World. We can easily say that Turkish
contemporary art internationalized after the interest and economic support
of the post 1989 EU.147
In her dissertation, Turkish sociologist Sibel Yardımcı analyzed the Istanbul Biennial
from the point of urban festivals and demonstrated that the Istanbul Biennial always has
received a different type of attention from the IKSV and its sponsors.148 For Yardımcı,
this occurs because contemporary art in Turkey has been increasingly used to present
Sibel Yardımcı, Kentsel Değişim ve Festivalizm: Küreselleşen Istanbul’da Bienal (Cağaloğlu, Istanbul:
İletişimYayınları, 2005), 15. As Yardımcı observes, traditional Turkish performances such as Mevlevi (of
Rumi) acts and Shadow Theater were dropped from Istanbul’s Festival agenda as individual festivals
occurred.
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Istanbul as a trademark to the world.149 Istanbul, with its centuries-old role as a
commercial bridge between the West and the East, and given the fact that it was so far off
the main route of the art world, made it an ideal site for a new art market. Thus, it would
be unrealistic to disregard the implementation of a neoliberal program in Turkey when
considering the ideological and economic roots of the Istanbul Biennial.
Since its foundation in 1923, the cultural and political terrain in the Turkish
Republic has been marked by a conflicting dynamic between Islamic religious
commitment and secular institutionalism. The Turkish military is the guardian of the
founding principles of the modern Republic and its commitment to secularism. Thus, for
86 years, the Turkish military has continued its heavy influence in politics with bloody
interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Finally, the 1980 military coup supplied the
necessary conditions that replaced the processes of “democratization” with institutional
oppression and modernist development through a variety of neoliberal projects.
While the U.S. support of this coup was suppressed quickly, three decades later
two artists from Paris, Leonore Bonaccini and Xavier Fourt, who founded the media
collective “Bureau d’etudes” in 1998, commented on the U.S. interventionist policy in
their work titled “Administration of Terror,” which appeared in the 11th Istanbul Biennial
in 2009. The artwork resembled a map of military operations revealing important
historical data, and included an informative text:
On April 4th of 1952, before Turkey became a part of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), there existed a secret service called “contraguerilla.” The headquarters of this service in Ankara was in a building of
CIA operations called “American Aid Committee.” This organization
along with Turkey’s national secret service MIT, prepared the ground for
the two military coups (1960 and 1980). They are responsible for 5,000
killings by unidentified assassins in the 1970s, what was then announced
149
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by the media as the work of the extreme rightists or Kurdish terrorists.
This organization in 1978 alone organized 3,319 fascist attacks in which
813 civilians were killed and 3,121 people were injured.150
On January 24, 1980, while Turkey was going through dramatic economic and
political turmoil, a decree was passed in the Turkish parliament that allowed a neoliberal
economic program, prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to transform the
Turkish economy.151 This decree removed all legal obstacles for Turkey to become an
open-market economy. The Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel appointed Turgut Özal,
who was known for his admiration of American foreign policies and the IMF, as the sole
person responsible for the economic restructuring. On September 12, 1980, Turkey was
shaken with yet another coup. But this time, the coup ensured that political repression and
forced economic restructuring of neoliberalism would go hand in hand.
As the founder of Koç Holding, which was the sole sponsor of the Istanbul
Biennials from 2009 to 2019, Vehbi Koç said: “September 12 involved a reestablishment of the state.”152 The 1980 coup revived the Kemalist doctrine in a way that
situated Turkey’s future inside the capitalist rather than in the socialist world.153 The
officials in power supported the January 24 decree, which prescribed the IMF’s program
word for word, giving Turkish companies the ability to market their products and services
globally and to participate in the global economy of big corporations. In 1983, the
election, under the auspices of the military, replaced the junta with a right wing, liberal
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government.154 While the persecution of journalists and other intellectuals continued, the
enforcement by the IMF and the World Bank of what President Özal called “bitter drugs”
for the economy, hit Turkey in the form of a swift and massive privatization of stateowned factories and institutions.
Since its founding in 1923, the processes of modernization in Turkey, in the
Kemalist ideological tradition, were built upon a kind of Westernization that was
designed to simultaneously battle Westernization. The Kemalist reforms were forged to
invent a new citizen, and this operative principle not only was enforced by laws but also
entrenched itself in vast arenas of life, from universities to the subjects of artistic and
cultural works, for decades to come. The state founded and funded hundreds of Village
Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri), People’s Houses (Halkevleri), as well as cultural centers,
theater and opera buildings, and art institutions in the cities to organize and to enlighten
all Turkish citizens in cultural, artistic, intellectual, and economic aspects. This top-down
modernization also produced the development of largely administrative, middle-class
gatekeepers of the Kemalist ideology who served as part of the state apparatus. However,
the transition to a neoliberal program of the privatization of state assets and a loosening
of the state’s control over the market significantly weakened this hegemonic class in the
1990s. The attempt to maintain an ideological grip, which involved values filtered from
the West in order to mold a Turkish, Westernized cultural sphere, also was weakened.155

154

After the approval by referendum of the new Constitution in June 1982, the junta organized general
elections, held on November 6, 1983. Three parties created by the junta entered the elections, and Özal
became the 19th Prime Minister of Turkey. In 1989, Özal was voted by the parliament to become the
President of the Republic.
155
In Turkey, when popular segments of society entered into the post-modernization of culture in the 1990s
–especially due to immigration from rural Turkey to economic centers–it created a new system of values.
Those values included a new lifestyle, music, architecture, and fashion that eventually constituted a new
postmodern Turkish identity that had decolonized from Western influences. However, the politics of the
new political elite that came into power during the neoliberal turn and established “political Islam” also
93

The 1990s marked an entirely different era for Turkey’s social and cultural
spheres, which assured that the previously isolated state would be integrated into the
globalized economy with free-flowing capital. While the funding of cultural activities by
private corporations had positive impacts on the symbolic economy of the mega-city, the
state continued its privatization campaign. With minimum state support, some cultural
sectors disappeared. The Istanbul Biennial, which located itself in a semi-central position
on the international map of contemporary art in the 1990s, enabled growing cultural
traffic between Europe and Istanbul. This traffic also increased the demand for Turkish
contemporary art, usually with a focus on Istanbul, in the international art market–and
especially in Germany, where there is a significant Turkish migrant population.
This was a golden decade for many young Turkish artists. Following
depoliticization during the 1980s, Turkish artists, showing abroad, found a long-awaited
space for representation loaded with the potential for political expression in their works.
Since then, many have been actively engaged in major international exhibitions, art fairs,
and artist residencies. The visual culture of nationalism, the traumas of gender
oppression, the social effects of rapid industrialization and urbanization, as well as the
new cultural conditions that were followed by the mass immigration from rural areas to
big cities, constituted the main themes that the new generation of artists continually
delved into as the new millennium approached.
In the 2000s, the shrinkage of the Ministry of Culture and its merger with the
Ministry of Tourism resulted in a major deficit in the states already minimal support of

merged with this popular culture. Eventually, populist politics, popular culture, and the culture industry
together created an “entrepreneurial culture.” For further discussion of this point, see Hasan B. Kahraman,
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the arts. The new ministry cut its relationship with independent artist initiatives and
collectives and found a “solution” to the issue of art funding by leaving it to the mercy of
big corporations. Two of the most prominent and prestigious families in Turkey, the Koç
and Sabancı families, opened private museums with their own private collections; these
museums took the names Pera Museum (2005), Istanbul Museum of Modern Art (2004),
and Sakıp Sabancı Museum (2002). A few privately owned banks opened large art
centers–two of the most influential ones are named Aksanat, the cultural foundation of
Akbank, and Garanti Platform of the Garanti Bank (2001)—while several large
companies joined them by creating, for example, Siemens Sanat (2004). In sum, by the
beginning of the twenty-first century, a major portion of Istanbul’s nonprofit arts sector
had moved to the hands of private corporations.156
Alongside these changes in the art world and current affairs in Turkey, perhaps
surprisingly, the number of art academies increased remarkably during the same years.
When the Istanbul Biennial was founded in 1987, there were twelve art academies. By
the time the Biennial celebrated its 10th edition in 2007, they numbered no less than fiftyseven, and almost all of them were privately funded. It should be emphasized that the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which came to power in 2003, has
been assessing this situation in a pragmatic way and looking at it favorably so that it can
absolve itself of any public responsibility. For example, unlike any other European
country, Turkey dedicated only about twenty percent of the funding to the Turkish
pavilion at the Venice Biennials, and by 2007, state support for the Istanbul Biennial had
Azra Tüzünoğlu, ed., Dersimiz Güncel Sanat (Istanbul: Outlet, İhraç Fazlası Sanat, 2009), 90.
Additionally, there is the Art Center/Istanbul, which is a contemporary art venture launched in 2008 by the
Borusan Center for Culture, and the Koç Contemporary Art Museum is forthcoming. Here, it might be of
interest to also note that these institutions do not engage in research. They also do not collect with a stated
mission. It is not clear, for examples, how they distinguish themselves, what kind of institutions they
collaborate with, or how they make their decisions.
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diminished to approximately two percent. This decline in state sponsorship, to some
extent, reflects the AKP government’s policies, which are informed, on the one hand, by
Islamist precepts and practices and, on the other hand, by the neoliberal market economy
and Turkey’s membership in the European Union (EU). Of course, the change already
had taken place after the 1980 coup; the AKP government merely marked a culmination
of that process.
The Istanbul Biennial, like the IKSV’s other festivals, lost state economic support
in the early 1990s. Thirty percent of the sponsorship for first two Istanbul Biennials, in
1987 and 1989, which were then called “International Contemporary Art Exhibitions,”
came from public institutions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Ministry
of Culture and Tourism. By the 4th Biennial, in 1995, private sponsorship was fully
established. The 5th and 6th Biennials were sponsored by various Turkish corporations
that gave substantial funding, space, and equipment to each biennial.
In 2001, the 7th Istanbul Biennial opened with the main sponsor being the
Istanbul Stock Exchange Market. In 2003, the 8th Biennial was officially sponsored by
Japan Tobacco International (JTI), which is the world’s third largest transnational
tobacco company.157 Various Turkish companies co-sponsored the ninth Biennial.
Finally, in 2007, Koç Holding, Turkey’s largest industrial corporation, which also
produces armor-plated warships for ten countries, became the main sponsor of the
Istanbul Biennial for the next ten years, with a pledge to contribute 2.5 million euros per
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biennial.158 Additional support has been increasingly available, since 2003, through the
European Union (EU) integration process, foreign national funding organizations, and
international foundations. EU resources have been funding private museums and
galleries, fine arts faculties, artists associations and collectives, as well as workshops,
panels, and forums, primarily in Istanbul. Istanbul has become the symbol of Turkey’s
new, modern face that is turned to the West, even more than in previous decades of its
history. As Vasıf Kortun explains:
The contemporary production has integrated itself into the Euro-American
circuit, and is being integrated by it. The integration has been provided by
the Istanbul Biennial and less than a handful of independent curators and
writers. The Biennial has become the index, but also the most organized
institution of guidance and patronage, and by default a monopoly.159
As discussed earlier, since the neoliberal turn of the late 1980s, there has been an
increasing interest from the business world in the arts, owing in large measure to the
shifts in sponsorship of the arts. Over the last decades, art sponsorship has evolved from
philanthropy and patronage to sponsorship that contributes not only to the company’s
prestige but also to its brand name awareness.160 Now, the social responsibility projects
of large businesses locate their interest in the arts and culture within the corporate and
strategic structure of the company, rather than by casting their involvement as
representing traditional acts of charity with no return.
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In 2007, when Koç became the main sponsor of the Istanbul Biennial, Rahmi
Koç, the honorary CEO and son of the founder of Koç Group, received the most
prestigious Hadrian Award–named after the Roman emperor and given by the World
Monuments Fund–for Koç’s support and preservation of art.161 After sponsoring the
exhibition, “Beyond Babylon: Art, Trade, and Diplomacy in the Second Millennium
B.C.,” at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, Koç Holding informed us
through its websites about its sponsoring activities in culture and the arts: “Such
exhibitions are crowning opportunities for promoting Turkey as an advantageous place to
do business as well as for advancing Turkish businesses and cultural tourism and for
developing our country’s brand identity in the U.S.”162During the press conference for the
11th Istanbul Biennial in 2009, Ömer Koç, the new CEO responsible for Koç Holding’s
support of the Istanbul Biennial, declared once again that: “The Istanbul Biennial makes
Istanbul a trademark that it deserves in the globalized world,” while he sat next to the
curators, the What, How and for Whom (WHW) curatorial collective from Belgrade,
which organized the Biennial in an explicitly Marxist-revolutionary tone.163
In the following days, fierce criticism targeted the WHW on Internet blogs and in
some daily mainstream newspapers for the hypocrisy of their work. It is interesting to
observe that after their manifesto-like talk at the press conference, quoting heavily from
Bertolt Brecht and Rosa Luxemburg, the WHW sat at the same table with the corporate
sponsors, while Ömer Koç seemed to have been very pleased with an exhibition that was
saturated with a fierce socialist critique of the current system.
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To a significant degree, since the neoliberal turn, the interests of the corporate
elite have challenged the validity of radical strategies and emancipatory schemes in an
artwork and/or an exhibition.164 Nevertheless, sponsoring mechanisms at international
and local art events have limited efficacy in controlling local art production. First of all,
such investments control only the structural (economic and institutional) organization of
the event, and second, corporate sponsors might have motives that are more economic
than ideological.165 Except in an extreme case, such as when the sponsor is directly
attacked, the corporate sponsor does not interfere because the exhibition is seen–even the
most radical exhibition–as a good opportunity to look “liberal” in the economic sphere.
Simply stated, for the maintenance of corporate power, there is no bad PR for
sponsoring a cultural event. Those of the oppositional front (even without visiting the
exhibition and seeing the artworks) conclude that the Istanbul Biennial unavoidably
serves the ruling class. I emphasize that when the influence of corporate power over the
arts is conceived as inevitable and irreversible, there cannot be a question of
emancipation to begin with.
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Corporate Sponsorship and Opposition vis-à-vis the Istanbul Biennial
During the course of the Istanbul Biennials presented since 1987, the critical, as
well as skeptical, attitudes of the general public, and those of intellectuals from different
spectrums of the Left, toward contemporary art have become more prominent.
Sociologist and art critic Süreyya Evren articulates these attitudes in the catalogue of the
11th Biennial: “Even when they refer to political concepts or discuss political issues, it is
believed that these contemporary artists speak from a pseudo-leftist viewpoint; they are
either regarded to be far from convincing, or simply, hiding behind a mask.”166
Critics of the Istanbul Biennial, which include both nationalist and leftist sectors
of Turkish politics, are quite hostile to the biennial phenomenon. They often base their
arguments, which directly parallel the biennials to the processes of neoliberal
globalization, not only on the expansion of the art market but also on art’s relationship
with the corporations that circulate global capital through financial markets, real estate
investments, and global tourism. A common argument is: “What the biennials present
around the world as the art of our day, in fact, destroys the real art both in Turkey and
everywhere else.”167
In Turkey, while the modernism-oriented art schools have questioned the strength
and formal qualities of the artworks in past biennials, emerging young artists also have
protested the exclusive character of the Istanbul Biennial that allows the participation of
the same small number of Turkish artists who are known internationally. Some of this
criticism also has linked the newly recognized power of independent curators with the
Sürreya Evren, “Neither with nor Without You,” in Insan Neyle Yaşar?: Metinler : 11. Uluslararası
Istanbul Bienali, 12 Eylül-8 Kasım=What Keeps Mankind Alive?:The texts : 11th International Istanbul
Biennial, September 12-November 8, ed. Ilkay B. Ayvaz and Nazım Dikbaş (Istanbul: Istanbul Kültür Sanat
Vakfı, 2009), 375.
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globalization of art under neoliberal hegemony. Thus, the foreign curator often is treated
as the “other” and is not to be trusted by the local art world.168Another criticism suggests
that the Istanbul Biennial has been acting as a double-edged sword: On one hand, it
presents new Western trends to local audiences and thereby challenges the local culture
that oscillates between modernity, postmodernity and tradition, and on the other hand, it
markets Turkish art, as well as the city of Istanbul, to Europe as an oriental marvel.169
While corporate sponsorship and cultural imperialism are the two main targets in
arguments against the Biennial, there is ample evidence that these arguments are merely
rhetorical. For example, neither the Istanbul Contemporary Art Fair, the private museums
founded by the industrialist families, or large art galleries founded by banks have
received the same type of criticism regarding the power of the ruling class on the
contemporary art scene. Another example is that, since the 1990s, EU resources funded
private museums and galleries, fine arts faculties, artists’ associations and collectives,
workshops, panels, and platforms. In 2006, Istanbul was named as the cultural capital of
Europe, and the cultural sector received generous funding from the EU to realize this
project. Neither mainstream Left nor Orthodox Marxists took on these issues to argue
over cultural imperialism of the West; rather, a big fuss was made about to whom all this
funding went. Thus, I argue that the cold shoulder given to contemporary art in Turkey is
rooted in more complicated issues than simply the structural and ideological tribulations
of the biennial institution.
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The reasons that lie behind the discursive wars waged by some leftists against
contemporary art and the Istanbul Biennial can be found in four areas. The first is the
aesthetic factor that reveals the missing link between the mainstream Turkish media and
the experimentalist, postmodern avant-garde, which is due to the fact that Kemalism–as
the founding ideology of the Turkish State–has had close ties to modern progressivism,
while modernism and postmodern/contemporary art in Turkey have developed as critical
stances in relation to those.170 The second is the economic factor that affects older
generation of artists because within the international space that the Istanbul Biennial
created, the Turkish art market favored the work of young experimentalist, technologydriven, and nonconformist contemporary artists. As a result, modernists who enjoyed
their share of the small, local art market have, for a long time, lost their fame and fortune.
The third factor is political. Since 1989, in Turkey just as many other places around the
world, capitalist manifestations in culture have been more visible in the visual arts than in
any other art form.
Despite the common agenda of anti-neoliberalism, the Turkish Left has not
reconciled differences among its own ranks to establish a common front for contesting
the latest privatization campaigns in the cultural sector of the recent neoliberal
governments. The forth factor is the ideological factor. Turkish society is dangerously
divided into two opposing ideological formations, the Kemalist-nationalist bloc, and the
neoliberalist-Islamist bloc. The Kemalist-nationalists manipulate the Istanbul Biennial’s
discursive space in order to indirectly criticize the ideology of the ruling party and they
use this space for nationalist propaganda. The anarchists on the other hand, who have
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been the historical political enemies of the nationalists, attack the Biennial mainly with
their view that associates the biennials to elitism and corporatism in arts.
While corporate sponsorship and cultural neo-imperialism have been the two
main arguments used to target the Istanbul Biennial, there is ample evidence that this is
only a discursive matter. For example, the Istanbul Contemporary Art Fair, the private
museums founded by the industrialist families, and the large art galleries founded by
banks, as previously mentioned, have not received the same amount of criticism
regarding the power of the ruling classes over the contemporary art scene. Interestingly, it
was not until the 10th and 11th editions of the Biennial, under the main sponsorship of
Koç Inc.–the largest corporation in Turkey–that some Kemalists, modernist artists,
anarchist activists, and academics in fine art schools fiercely protested the Istanbul
Biennial in the media and in public. Nevertheless, as will become clear in the following
pages, the main factor in what I label as “discursive wars” is rooted in the issue of whose
power is exercised in the domination of the visual arts realm in Turkey.
To discuss the Turkish Left’s relationship to contemporary art is very problematic
for reasons that are ingrained both in the character of the widely dispersed Turkish Left
and the historical divide between multiple camps that represent avant-garde art in Turkey.
The formations that comprise the Turkish Left are outlined with firm political views on
the one hand, and porous ideological borders on the other. For example, Turkey has a
total of fifty-three registered and non-registered communist parties, which have divided
and re-divided many times within themselves because of their different positions on the
ideas of socialism, Maoism, Leninism, Trotskyism, internationalism, and nationalism as
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well as the political representation of Marxist thought in Turkey.171 The Left is further
divided on the ideas of Kemalism–the ideological backbone of the Turkish Republic and
the military. Due to the fact that the Turkish state itself has exercised colonialist
oppression over Kurdish and Armenian citizens and other minorities, the Turkish Left
could not reconcile the anti-colonialist ideology of Marxism with the nationalism that a
majority of the Left is associated with. This exacerbates even more the political and
discursive rivalry among the scattered Left. In addition, official nationalism had filtered
into Turkish socialist thought, right from the start, due to the influence of Maoism.
Interestingly, even some Internationalist Marxists turned into fierce nationalists after the
collapse of the Soviet Bloc. It should also be noted that there are militant parts of the
working class, but the domination of the unions and the influence of bourgeois ideology,
such as Islamism, nationalism, and national liberationism, have effectively prevented
workers from uniting on a class basis.
The 1980 coup d’état was another major blow on the Turkish Left. For the junta,
any other political philosophy except Kemalism (the idée force of the republic) was
rotten and measures should be taken to revitalize the society. Political repression and
forceful economic restructuring had to go hand in hand.172 Bedrettin Cömert, a Marxist
art historian and theorist, was among those intellectuals killed by the radical nationalists.
Many writers, poets, actors, and film directors were prosecuted and jailed. The new
constitution, to which Turkey still adheres, assured the authority of the army in the states
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fundamental organs. This last coup, after others in 1971 and 1960, finally produced an
apolitical environment, which Bülent Kahraman calls a “tutelage society” in Turkey.173
The anti-imperialist/nationalist camp that follows Kemalism–the ideas of the
founder of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk–constitutes a large portion of the leftist
political spectrum. However, in 1998, after seventy-five years of being in power, the
Kemalists lost their power to the neoliberal Islamist party, the Justice and Development
Party (AKP). The AKP has been supported by culturally and socially marginalized
segments in conservative parts of the country, the emerging neoliberal bourgeoisie, the
old pro-EU bourgeoisie, the part of the working class that is unemployed or outside of
syndicate support, non-separatist segments of Kurdish society, and some liberal
intelligentsia who had been trying to challenge the authoritarian structure of the republic.
While the Kemalist-nationalists argue that real democracy in Turkey should come
through “Kemalist enlightenment,” the neoliberal Islamists argue that it is through the
processes of globalization and liberal politics that bottom-up democratization is possible.
In this climate, Turkish society is polarized on two fronts: on the one hand, nationalism
versus pluralism, and on the other, secularism versus Islamism. Dangerous outcome of
this polarization is the concealment of the political class-base separation that is the
manifestation of real division in Turkey, with the question of secularism under the threat
of political Islam and nationalism under the threat of Kurdish separatists. Thus, while the
political and cultural opposition to the neoliberal/Islamist government is organized along
the ideas of secularism and nationalism, the class-based anti-globalist resistance is left to
some marginal anarchist and communist formations.
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The mainstream media celebrated the AKP government as a “democratic change.”
Yet the Kemalist-nationalist camp has interpreted this development as a “counterrevolution” against Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s modernist revolution. Although this branch
of the Turkish Left has allied its version of progressivism with the issue of secularism, it
has used secularist thought as a weapon to contest the new political elite. Kemalists have
especially exploited the anti-imperialist sentiment of Kemalism with the hope of restoring
their power, and they have organized giant demonstrations (sometimes exceeding two
million people), displaying nationalist symbols, and slogans in the major cities.174 The
Kemalist-nationalist camp typically has dismissed the Istanbul Biennial as an instrument
of the “neoliberal imperial project.”175 These critical discussions culminated during and
after the 10th Istanbul Biennial in 2007, which was themed “Not only Possible but also
Necessary, Optimism in the Age of Global War.” Internationally renowned Chinese
curator Hou Hanru created what is now a longstanding local debate that started with this
theme. Hanru’s aim with that Biennial was summarized in his words in an article
published in the Biennial Catalogue:
In the age of global wars and globalization of liberal capitalism, it is not
impossible but also necessary to revitalize the debate on modernization
and modernity and put forward activist proposals to improve social
progress…to reinvent effective models of modernization to face the
challenges of globalization, which are driven by liberal capitalism and
dominated by Western powers.176
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This theme, in fact, was a smart and calculative strategy by Hou to please the
corporate sponsors, who responded by donating a record amount of money to the 10th
Biennial, while at the same time injecting a dose of hope for change in a country where
the 1980 coup had destroyed the revolutionary spirit while corrupt politicians destroyed
the last bit of belief that people had for social reformation. Hence, the winds of hope that
the curator aimed to create did not blow in intellectual circles but instead blew at the
Global Compact Leaders’ Summit, organized by the United Nations. Ali Koç, the
representative of Koç Holding, in his talk to hundred high government officials and more
than one thousand CEO’s of transnational corporations, proudly announced: “The
Istanbul Biennial that Koç Holding will sponsor over the next ten years emphasizes
optimism that we need in the world of global wars, global warming, and big social and
economic problems.”177
The 10th Istanbul Biennial was the focus of local media coverage for several
months after the Biennial, not because of its theme or some controversial artworks that
were exhibited but because of the sensitive local political issues that curator Hanru
touched upon in his catalog essay. Hanru wrote:
Turkey, as one of the first non-western modern republics and a key player
in the modernization of the developing world has proved to be one of the
most radical, spectacular and influential cases in this direction. But a
fundamentally crucial problem is that the modernization model promoted
by the Kemalist project was still a top-down imposition with some
unsolvable contradictions and dilemmas inherent in the system; the quasimilitary imposition of reforms, while necessary as a revolutionary tool,
betrayed the principle of democracy; the nationalist ideology ran counter
to its embracing of the universality of humanism, and the elite-led
development generated social division. Populist political and religious
forces have managed to recuperate and manipulate the claims from the
“bottom” of the society and have used them to their advantage.178
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The Kemalist-nationalist media singled out this paragraph from the rest of the
essay and interpreted it as a direct attack on the ideas of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his
modernist reforms. After a media call to protest, 131 academics, led by the dean of the
Fine Arts Faculty at Marmara University, issued a declaration condemning Hanru for
referring to Atatürk’s reforms as “top-down” impositions and for accusing the founder of
the Turkish Republic of being a “non-Humanist.”179 The protest letter addressed the
“delicate times in Turkey” and called on the curator “to be more sensitive.”180 The socalled “delicate times” terminology pointed to the “approaching” sound of military boots
that could crash the anti-secularist and anti-Kemalist demands of the new neoliberal
status quo, which also had gained economic power in Turkey. As stated by Elif Çağlı:
The Turkish parliamentary system, which was not established by a
bourgeois revolution encompassing a mass of the people as occurred in the
West, is used to being recurrently shaken by military coups. Alongside the
coups of 27 May 1960, 12 March 1971 and 12 September 1980, the
military intervention, defined as a postmodern coup, on 28 February 1997
and finally the e-coup military declaration issued on 27 April 2007 by the
Head of the Army clearly demonstrate this…The political and social traces
of the military-fascist regime of 12 September have not been completely
purged…During such times when the parliamentary system is deadlocked
and political life is dragged into chaos, a backward part of the working
class and the majority of the petty bourgeoisie look to the army as a saving
grace. Thereby the road to military dictatorship is paved by the passive
support of the people.181
The Kemalist media and the academics’ protests towards Hou’s biennial should
be considered within this political context. In Turkey, it is not only a political but also a
social taboo to criticize Atatürk because the society at large embraces him as the “Father
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of the Turks.”182 Recently, for example, Kemalists have started a campaign to pass a law
that protects “Atatürk and Kemalism” from any criticism. Nevertheless, on some
occasions, critics of Hanru in the mainstream media also condemned Armenian artist
Atom Agoyan’s video in the 10th Biennial, a video that questioned the Armenian
Genocide–another taboo topic in Turkey that is not discussed in public and is usually
dismissed as a “Western lie.”183
The debate over Hanru’s essay intensified the already clear polarization of
Turkish artists and intellectuals, as some protected Hanru and freedom of speech, while
others went so far as to accuse him of being “an agent” of neoliberal Islamist power.
IKSV, the organizing institute, issued a statement protecting Hanru that said: “As an art
and culture establishment, we would have expected the Fine Arts Faculty to regard free
thought at least as sensitively as we, and to approach such events as the Biennial from an
art perspective.”184 Hanru’s essay, once again revealed the nature of the discussions on
the democratization in Turkey. While Kemalist-nationalists argued that real democracy in
Turkey should come through the Kemalist enlightenment, the neoliberal Islamists
currently in power argue that it is only through processes of globalization and neoliberal
politics that bottom-up democratization is made possible. The dialectical pull between
these two discourses–statist modernizations against globalist development–constitutes the
core of contemporary political and economic life in Turkey.
Hanru’s criticism in the Biennial’s catalogue not only brought the academy, the
artists, the organizers, the curator, the state and the media face to face in discussions
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concerning what a foreign art curator may and may not dare to say about “us” in “our”
Biennial, it also provoked a series of creative protests. For example, an anonymous group
of artists added to the carnivalism of the Biennial atmosphere by hanging a dozen dirty
pairs of underwear on the wire fence of the biggest venue with a big note saying, “They
should clean up their own dirty underwear first (Figure 2.1).”185
Hanru’s biennial was successful in opening the Pandora’s Box and creating a
public discussion of taboo subjects that urgently needed to be put on the table. For several
months, the 10th biennial was discussed in the daily newspapers. In the archives of the
IKSV, I encountered more than 120 articles published by the local media during the
months following the biennial, all on the debate over Hanru’s essay. In a country such as
Turkey, where coverage of art and art festivals rarely gets beyond a brief paragraph, the
attention that this biennial received was unprecedented. This event also demonstrated that
the impact of a biennial could extend far beyond the actual spatiality and temporality of
the event itself. Massive reactions to Hanru’s biennial showed the common ground for all
kinds of justification for controlling the artistic and discursive practices in order to hide
layers of conservatism and the ultranationalist consciousness–a central feature of
contemporary Turkish society. The Istanbul Biennial has yet to spark heated, in-depth
debates about art, culture, and politics. Although some progressive voices are drawn into
the abyss of pessimism and cynicism, others have taken every opportunity to foster public
discussions on these issues.
One of such engaged artists is Burak Delier. Anarchist, activist, and artist, Delier,
in 2005, inaugurated a dummy company called “Reverse Direction,” which, in his words,
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“says No!” to conservative politics and the repressive tools of governments.”186 This
imaginary company, housed in a local shop front, will sell a real product. The idea, notes
Delier, is not just to take on an economic system as the subject for the artwork but to get
“inside” it.187 Delier aimed to question society’s present forms of production and
consumption by using those same forms to sell a controversial product: Through this
company, Delier designed and produced clothing and uniforms that protected those who
wanted to defend their subjective responses and those who attempted to write clandestine
alternative histories from the open violence of the consumption-focused, pseudodemocracy of neoliberalism and nationalism. So far, Delier has manufactured two
products via Reverse Direction: Parkalynch, a lynch-proof demonstration jacket, and
Madımak’93, a fire-resistant suit inspired by an arson attack that killed many people
during a leftist congregation. Parkalynch was selected by curator Hou Hanru for the 2007
Istanbul Biennial (Figure 2.2). It immediately captured the attention of the leftist media,
and the work singlehandedly gained more notice than hundreds of other artworks found
in the mega exhibition.
Delier seemingly created a commodity object, a jacket to be worn against
lynching during street demonstrations. The work had a price tag of one hundred euro, and
it was advertised as if it could be bought and sold during the Biennial. This work not only
commented on the art object as a commodity and the biennial institution as the window
display of art, it also attacked the biennial logic from multiple angles. It is a red coat with
multiple functions, to be worn in demonstrations and riots. Delier explains: “Parkalynch
is made for those who read history backwards, and it is also for those who resist the
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political and cultural violence of neoliberalism as well as official nationalism and for
those who do not want to yield to corporate hegemony in art.”188In a country where
hundreds of workers, while peacefully celebrating May Day, are attacked by armed
forces, Delier’s work embraced multiple dimensions of meaning. Delier’s intention was
to approach the art object as a commodity but as a commodity with a political as well as
an exchange value. Moreover, this art object was not produced exclusively for the art
world elite, but literally for the “man on the street,” fighting against oppression. With an
ironic twist, Delier’s advertisement for rebellion against neoliberalism used the Istanbul
Biennial, which itself was born of the neoliberal system, as a cultural space for
opposition. With that, Delier became the voice of outsider protests and criticism of the
Turkish anarchists and the anti-globalization activists who managed to penetrate through
the fortress of the corporate art world.
Another piece of art that left a mark on the 10th Istanbul Biennial was the work of
Slovenian artist Tadej Pogačar, titled, “CODE: RED, Brazil, Daspu,” in collaboration
with the P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E Museum of Contemporary Art founded by Pogačar and
DAVIDA, the local organization in Brazil founded by a sex worker named Gabrielle
Silva. DAVIDA’s activities concentrate on the areas of education, health, documentation,
communication, and culture, in addition to doing research and publishing a newspaper
called Beije Rua (Kiss from the Streets). “Daspu,” a brand name in the fashion world,
was used to foster the struggle of prostitutes against prejudice. The work was exhibited
with the subtheme, “World Factory,” in IMC–one of the five venues of the Biennial–
which is a mall of textile shops.
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Pogačar is the curator and founder of the cyber platform P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E, which
is based on an alternative cultural and social activity known as the “new parasitism.”189
P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E is both a cultural foundation and a mobile organism that searches for
alternative cultural and socioeconomic operating methodologies, while developing
relationships with local activist groups around the world. In 1993, it developed to be the
P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E. Museum of Contemporary Art, which is a virtual organization that
serves as a parallel institution to the museum model and criticizes the museum institution
by introducing alternative forms of communication and establishing new connections.
With his interventionist logic and institutional critique, Pogačar spotlights hidden or
ignored social phenomena, groups, practices, and relations. “CODE: RED, Brazil,
Daspu,” was part of a larger project that has run at conferences and seminars, as well as
at exhibitions concerned with the victims of global neoliberalism in different countries of
the world, such as Brazil, Estonia, and Thailand.
At the 10th Istanbul Biennial, Pogačar and DAVIDA installed samples from
their fashion brand, Daspu. These were various T-shirts and a bridal gown made from
sheets and the cloth of “love hotels” in Brazil, and as such, they blurred the lines between
struggle, pleasure, leisure/carnival, and activism. Daspu, which is made up of designs
created by prostitutes, was founded in 2005 to strengthen the struggle of prostitutes
against prejudice. The clothing installations were accompanied by video installations
showing Pogačar’s project “Street Economy Archive,” which documents simultaneously
various facets of the informal economy in different cities around the world. Pogačar calls
attention to the post-1989 period, when global capital under neoliberal policies declared
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its triumph. The prime impact of this process in Brazil was that, after the devastating
economic crises of the 1990s, prostitution (especially child prostitution) had risen
drastically.190 The fashion brand/artwork, distilled from political ingredients in its
conventional signs, opened up a fresh political disclosure that seeks to identify alternative
models to create social transformation. “CODE: RED, Brazil, Daspu,” is a unique
example of a long-term collaborative and participatory project that explores models of
self-organization, marginalized urban minorities and parallel models of economy. With a
multi-layered strategy, Pogačar and DAVIDA criticized the normative and discriminative
society that has at its core capitalist neoliberal subjugations based on exploitation,
dispossession, racialization, and privatization.
Both Delier and Pogačar, just as Hans Haacke, Daniel Buren, Michael Asher,
and many others before them, engage in a serious institutional critique from within the
biennial institution. These two examples in the Istanbul Biennial, and many others that
we encounter in the biennials around the world, show us that, although the biennial is an
art institution and as such could be used as a resource to legitimate dominant ideologies,
it would be a narrow assessment to conclude that all biennials are essentially subservient
to the dominant order and that the artworks exhibited in them are ultimately bound within
the neoliberal logic that influences the cultural sector. The kind of criticism that targets
the Istanbul Biennial dismisses the artworks as simply reflecting the neoliberal directives
and serving to the elites’ agendas and needs. David Craven, talking about dissident
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artworks in biennials, rightly criticizes this view, which has more and more become a
common criticism also in the art world and the academia:
None of these artworks and others like them, simply ‘reflected’ the
ideology of neoliberalism, nor did they merely mirror either the nationstate aspirations of an art institution or the local concern of regional forces
financially sustaining it. Instead these artworks stood as ideological
challenges to their respective audiences, even as they stand as
interpretative challenges on the intentional level to any scholar who tries
to disentangle them from the cliché of globalization or neoliberalism.191
During the 11th Istanbul Biennial, in 2009, local criticism toward the Biennial
increased, this time coming from young anarchist activists. This criticism, differently
from that of the nationalists, focused on the apparent contradictions between this
edition’s overtly Marxist rhetoric and the fact that one of Turkey’s biggest corporation
that produces warships and tanks for eight countries including Israel sponsored it and the
founder of Koç Inc., Vehbi Koç is publicly known for his support of the 1980s coup.
Nevertheless, such criticism, which was highly innovative and creative, revealed the
complex and contradictory nature of anti-systemic engagement on the streets and the
critical position of some biennials toward the neoliberal system.
In this 11th edition, the WHW's members and curators from Zagreb, Ivet Ćurlin,
Ana Devic, Natasa Ilic, and Sabina Sabolovic, used the theme “Den wowon lebt der
mann?” (What Keeps Man Alive?) –a song from Bertolt Brecht’s 1928 “The Threepenny
Opera.” The Biennial catalogue–which was available to visitors for a very small fee–had
an image on its cover of the world reversed from its usual north-south orientation,
signaling a determination to turn the established order on its head, at least metaphorically.
The Biennial was inaugurated on September 12, 2009, a day when eighteen people lost
their lives in Istanbul due to a flood (caused by poor city planning and the vulnerability of
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the poor to natural disasters). It was also the 29th anniversary of the 1980 coup. The
roundtables and lectures of the Biennial took place on the Istiklâl Caddesi, a pedestrian
street that was home to many political protests over the decades. While the international
art world discussed popular postmodern topics, such as “who needs a world view” and
“politics outside art,” the Kurdish mothers–known as Sunday Mothers—were protesting
for their missing children during the reign of the military junta and another group was
pleading for the release of political prisoners, were located just outside the doors (Figure
2.3). This discussion of “everyday politics” behind the doors, being so detached from the
everyday reality of the street outside, became a good example for the rightful criticism
that the art biennials’ discussion platforms are often more discursive than practical.
During the days that those meetings and roundtable talks took place, on the same
busy street of Istanbul that receives approximately one million visitors a day, the
anarchist organization Resistanbul–founded specifically to protest upcoming IMF and
World Bank meetings–circulated an open letter to the curators, artists, and participants of
the 11th International Istanbul Biennial and to all art enthusiasts, reading in part:
We have to stop pretending that the popularity of politically engaged art
within the museums, and markets over the last few years has anything to
do with really changing the world. We have to stop pretending that taking
risks in the space of art, pushing boundaries of form, and disobeying the
conventions of culture, making art about politics makes any difference.
We have to stop pretending that art is a free space, autonomous from webs
of capital and power…We have read the conceptual framework of the 11th
International Istanbul Biennial with great interest and a grin on our faces.
We have long understood that the Istanbul Biennial aims at being one of
the most politically engaged transnational art events. And what a
coincidence! This year the Biennial is quoting comrade Brecht, dropping
notions such as neo-liberal hegemony, and riding high against global
capitalism. We kindly appreciate the stance but we recognize that art
should have never existed as a separate category from life. Therefore we
are writing you to stop collaborating with arm dealers such as the Koç
Holding, which white wash themselves in warm waters of the global art
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scene and invite you to the life, the life of resistance. …Join the resistance
and the insurgence of imagination! Evacuate corporate spaces, liberate
your works. Let’s prepare works and visuals (poster, sticker, stencil, etc.)
for the streets of the resistance days. Let’s produce together, not within the
white cube, but in the streets and squares during the resistance week!
Creativity belongs to each of us and can’t be sponsored.192
This call was interpreted as “naïve” and “biased” by some Turkish contemporary
artists who participated in previous Istanbul Biennials and as “premature” and
“inadequate” by others. For example, regarding the letter, Ahmet Öğüt, one of the artists
displaying works in the Turkish Pavilion at the 2009 Venice Biennale, said: “Such a
choice between street and the white cube is not necessary.”193 Delier, who came to be
known for his strategic criticism of neoliberalism at the 9th and the 10th Istanbul
Biennials, said: “It is true that this group reacted fiercely upon only hearing the
contextual title of the Biennial. One cannot judge an exhibition without seeing it.”194
It is because of their opposition to the undemocratic consequences of the modern
state-building in Turkey, which has been ongoing since 1923, these activists who
passionately protest the Istanbul Biennial have declared that contemporary art has been
losing its shield against the spectacularization of culture in the age of globalization and it
needs to be autonomous from politics.195 In fact, what was being uttered rhetorically by
the Brechtian slogan of the 11th Biennial “what keeps the man alive?”–the merging of
aesthetics and politics in the spontaneity of the everyday–had just been occurring outside
the Biennial venues, if not inside.
During the opening week of the Biennial, the protestors adopted creative
strategies from the activism of the anti-global movement. The anarchist group that called
For full text see Appendix I, “Open Letter from Anarchist Resistance Groups in Istanbul, September 9,
2009,” 296-297.
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themselves “cultural commissaries” circulated subverted images of Biennial posters with
symbolic mockery in the streets of İstiklâl Caddesi and also disseminated them through
the Internet (Figure 2. 4). They also organized gatherings for the upcoming anti-global
resistance days in popular spots in town. These anti-IMF and anti-globalization meetings
merged with anti-biennial meetings, where the group prepared to protest both the IMF
meetings in Istanbul and the Istanbul Biennial. Additionally, in some popular bars and
locales of İstiklâl Caddesi, some creative performances took place. For example,
anarchist-artist collective İç Mihrak (internal enemy) presented a three-minute
performance called “Beğenal” (changing the word “bienal” to “beğenal,” meaning in
Turkish to choose and buy), whose theme was on corporatism in the arts and “Koç’s
invasion” of the Istanbul Biennial. An anonymous group circulated short videos of
animated images on social media networks mocking the ironic relationship of the Marxist
biennial under the sponsorship of Turkey’s biggest corporation, which is known for its
support for the 1980 coup and thus the prosecution of many intellectuals and artists.
The artist groups, which are a part of the anarchist organization Resistanbul and
called themselves “the culture commissaries,” also were present at the exclusive opening
gala of the 11th Biennial. They disseminated a leaflet with the title Direnal! (mocking the
world “biennial” and literally meaning in Turkish to resist and take) and read a
declaration to the public that talked about the basic consequences of the decisions forced
by the IMF and the World Bank. They ended with the call: “You and your loved ones can
now resist these privileges and declare your zaart (a mockery term for art that also means
in Turkish “flatulence”) to art bureaucrats, art traders and toadies who domesticate art in
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the limelight spectacle, like that of IKSV.”196 When an executive representative of Koç
Holding was making a speech about the importance of the Biennial for the economy of
Istanbul, protest noises from outside were heard. Then the curators staged a theatrical
show in place of an opening speech, which added another Brechtian element to the
carnival. They shouted Brecht’s slogan, “A criminal is a bourgeois, and a bourgeois is a
criminal!” while the founder of the Eczacıbaşı Corporation, Dr. Nejat Eczacıbaşı, the
Minister of Culture, and Koç Holding’s CEOs were present and applauding in the front
seats. Meanwhile, the activist crowd that was led by the group Resistanbul–some wearing
clown costumes–was performing an intervention by shouting slogans, whistling, and
playing drums and trumpets outside the venue to protest the hypocrisy of the event
(Figure 2.5). At the news conference for the 11th Biennial, Mustafa Koç announced that
he found the criticism of his sponsorship a healthy reaction and added that, for Koç
Holding, it is out of the question to censor the critical freedom of an artist.197 By being
the sponsor of the event, Koç Holding proved its liberalism, while organized criticism to
Koç’s sponsorship was interpreted by the mainstream as well as by radical leftist media
as proof that the Istanbul Biennial had been completely institutionalized.
In fact, most of the 120 projects, by seventy artists from forty countries in the
three venues, were inundated with political (socialist) messages, thoughts, stories,
documents, comments, and questions. Strewn across the floors of the biennials three
spaces–the Antrepo warehouse, the Feriköy Greek School, and the old Tobacco Factory–
were occasional texts printed with “turn Left,” with an arrow showing Left (Figure 2.6).
This was not a directional message literally but a suggestive political orientation for the
For full text see Appendix II, “Manifesto Disseminated by Anarchist Resistance Groups in Istanbul,
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public that puzzled many who were confronted by it. It was striking that most of the
artists involved in the Biennial were simultaneously activists engaged in social change
with leftist inspirations. In this edition of the Biennial, the curators from Zagreb looked
far beyond the familiar matrix of Western galleries and their star artists. Instead of
inviting big names from the art world, they invited artists mainly from Eastern Europe,
the Middle East, and Central Asia, many of whom had no dealers or galleries supporting
them and therefore were “unknown” to art world specialists.198 The curatorial collective
What, How and for Whom (WHW) explained the aim of their role in the 11th Istanbul
Biennial:
As a collective, we believe that within the exhibition context it is possible
to take a critical position and that the format of an exhibition can produce
temporary yet polemical agencies for contesting the dominant social
frameworks. We are especially interested in contesting the negative
aspects of these frameworks–representational, paternalistic, hegemonic,
etc. –and exploring how those can be transcended into more flexible
platforms that generate knowledge and mobilize certain critical potentials
and public attention.199
Perhaps the most prominent aspect of the 11th Biennials relationship with Brecht
was not the questions or the problems it presented through citing his well-known slogans
but instead that it opted to create a space that would reflect the contradictions of the latest
capitalism, just like a Brechtian theater stage. Thus, the reactionary responses right in
front of this stage also can be seen as a part of the Brechtian theater, giving the audience
the agency to break away from the rules of the conventional theater. Not unlike what
Brecht did in his projection of the dialectical tensions between art and industry in his
theater, the WHW staged the tension between the cultural industry and contemporary art,
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which paved the way for the protests of diverse groups–an attempt that would have been
appreciated by Brecht. After all, the dialectical pull between oppositional and commercial
art is as persistent today as it was in Brecht’s time.
While the curators were severely criticized by some intellectuals and artists for
using Brecht as their clown for the biennial entertainment industry, they indeed took very
seriously Brecht’s dictum of “making the creation of art transparent.” For example, “The
classroom project” was one of the most interesting parts of the biennial, providing
exhibited information ranging from biennial demographics to the curatorial research
process, from background information on the choice of locations, to how the budget was
spent. The fact that this project was sponsored by Koçtaş–one of the Koç Holding’s
companies specializing in marketing Africa’s so-called “blood diamonds”–gave it an
undeniably ironic twist.
The Istanbul Biennial is a battleground for the traditional camp of the art world–a
battleground that encompasses academics, collectors, gallerists, who mainly constitute
the Kemalist-nationalist camp, and the younger, active generation of artists as well as
others from various disciplines engaged in art activities and criticism. The former camp is
powerful in the local arena but is weak internationally, while the latter depends on
international funding as well as on international exhibitions and residencies for their
existence and visibility. This stark division is prominent not only in what I called “the
discursive wars” but it also reveals itself in the form of exclusion as well as of
censorship. For example, in the 9th Istanbul Biennial in 2005, Delier’s photographic
work “Guard” was expelled from the exhibition after being viewed during press-preview
days.
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The image showed a man standing in front of a ceremonial soldier, holding a
knife behind his back (Figure 2.7). Thus, as the viewer confronts the back of the man, the
knife becomes the focal point of the picture, representing a visible but silent threat to the
Turkish soldier. The removal of the photograph demonstrated that a threat to the Turkish
army was not something the conservative and Kemalist-nationalist art world could
tolerate, even in the environment of an international biennial. Ironically, during my
interview with him, Delier revealed to me that it was not the Biennial authorities who
wanted the work being taken down from the wall but some other participating Turkish
artists.200 In the end, while the mainstream media did not take up the issue for fearing it
would create dangerous publicity, government prosecutors sued the catalog publishers of
the Biennial for including this “anti-patriotic” work.201
In 2009, perhaps the most interesting critical development was that of an
alternative biennial, which took place during the 11th Istanbul Biennial. While the IMF
and World Bank meetings led to counter-meetings and demonstrations on the streets,
ninety-seven independent artists and eighteen art collectives, none of whom were
represented at the Istanbul Biennial for various reasons, gathered to stage an artistic
activism to present their radical perspective on the processes of the new global order,
called neoliberalism, and its relationship with art.
The exhibition was called Hayalet (which can be interpreted simultaneously as
“imagine” and “ghost” in Turkish) with the subtitle “My name is Casper (Emre
Author’s interview with Burak Delier.
Here, it is important to note that the war between the Turkish army and Kurdish rebels has exacerbated
since 2001. The Turkish government and the nationalist media continue to manipulate the chauvinistic
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Zeytinoğlu’s catalogue article).202 To produce this exhibition, 265 participants worked
collectively for two years on an interdisciplinary project called “The Alternative Work
Platform.” It was organized on horizontal and communal principles without the usual
advisory board, directors, curators, or sponsors. Without any intermediaries, the
exhibition also sought to bandage the long-damaged relationship between contemporary
art and the Turkish public. Although the event was announced in the local newspapers as
“the alternative biennial” and the works in the exhibition openly targeted to mock the
Istanbul Biennial, the organizers insisted that they prepared this artistic platform to
transcend the biennial model and not to contest it.203 The artists insisted they were not
“anti-biennial,” but they criticized the authority of the Istanbul Biennial for having such a
dominant voice in the public sphere of art.
The exhibition focused on the ways in which the Istanbul Biennial has
maneuvered Istanbul’s creative impulse and its political terrain on the national and
international scene. Moreover, it aimed to demonstrate that a radical artistic experience
and a democratic exhibition not only are necessary but are possible. The artists/organizers
made this clear in their manifesto: “150 years after, the interpretation of the ghost (read
communism) and art has been transformed. When the first ten years of the twenty-firstcentury staged the crises in every aspects of life, we encounter the Ghost once again. To
face the reality and to transform it…For another look, another word, another reality.”204
The project started during the course of the previous Biennial. In 2007 a group of
artists published a comprehensive critique of Hanru’s Biennial and distributed it to the
Theater lovers in Istanbul had already met Marks’ ghost before the 11th Biennial. Just before the
opening of the 11th Biennial, an independent theater in Istanbul, Dostlar Tiyatrosu, exhibited a play titled
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visitors in front of the doors of the Biennial venues. On the last day of biennial the artists
organized a panel called “After the Biennial” at Nazım Hikmet Kültür Merkezi (Nazım
Hikmet Cultural Center)—a meeting place for radical leftists. To make it an international
dialogue, the group contacted artist initiatives in Cuba and Greece and exchanged
thoughts on how a biennial could be possible without corporate involvement. Two years
later, three generations of artists culminated their research, criticism, and dialogue with a
giant independent exhibition, the only one of its kind in Turkish history.
Ironically, the exhibitions space was an old state bank building, which went
bankrupt when facing a boom of private banks in the 1990s. The artworks were placed in
the attic, on corners, in bathrooms and in–what used to be–the safe of the bank building.
Although what these artists attempted to voice in this alternative exhibition was not a
critique of any particular exhibition of the Istanbul Biennial but instead a critique of the
structural and sponsorship mechanism of the Biennial, there were particular works that
mocked, attacked, and made fun of the slogans and themes of the 10th and 11th Biennials
(Figure 2.8). The venue was only two blocks from the Biennial’s main building, the
Antrepo in Tophane, and the neighborhood also housed the Istanbul Modern, Turkey’s
first modern art museum.
The event was advertised on social media and in artist blogs as well as in some
alternative art magazines as “the historical exhibition in a historical building: For an
alternative view, alternative voice, alternative art, a ghost is among us!”205 In the catalog
for the exhibition, which was published mostly electronically, Emre Zeytinoğlu’s article,
“My Name is Casper,” in the catalog pointed to the exhibitions overtly Marxist line and
incorporated many Marxist slogans. Zeytinoğlu begins his article with a quote from the
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Communist Manifesto: “There is a ghost among us in Europe, the ghost of
communism.”206 He continues with a thorough analysis of the ghost of communism in
nineteenth century Europe to clarify how the concept of ghost should be perceived in the
exhibition: “Those in power in the nineteenth century were very afraid of the ghost of
communism. Today, those in power are not afraid of the ghost that Marx skillfully
created. Because the language that lost its context, a state that has been a puppet of the
new power mechanisms and subverted texts, turn the ghost of communism to the Casper
the friendly ghost!”207 Yavuz Tanyeli, one of the artist/organizers of the exhibition,
agrees with this idea in his interview with Hürriyet Daily News and adds that:
It is the first time in many years that we are talking about this idea openly.
It was erased from people’s minds but came back due to the economic
crisis. We don’t claim the idea of socialism should be implemented the
way it is, without questioning it. It has to be questioned, but at the same
time we should try to find in it something practical. This art movement is a
way to start rethinking socialism.208
The project aimed to create an artistic movement that would bring together
diverse tendencies, multiple generations of artists, and a plurality of voices, all raising
their voices against the existing hierarchical mechanism and corporate hegemony in art.
Hence, most importantly, it was a one-of-a kind event, which demonstrated that
contemporary artists could negate and resist existing structures with an activist zeal and
even that an alternative new order of art is possible.
Both the discursive and the economic field of the Istanbul Biennial have made
possible numerous projects and events that were unimaginable for Turkish artists in the
1970s and 1980s. Before the Istanbul Biennial was established in 1987, the local art
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infrastructure in this mega city was literally nonexistent. Madra summarizes the situation
of the art sector in Turkey before the Biennial:
We had three small museums/galleries that the state totally ignored for
years, that couldn’t afford to buy two paintings a year nor could they
afford to repair their buildings…Nobody wanted to support the young
Turkish artists who achieved considerable success in Europe by
themselves. The art environment was closed to any relationship to
international artists, curators, or art critics. There was almost no art
historical or critical research of the works being rotten in artists’ studios
for thirty years.209
Since the 1980s, through the channels that the Istanbul Biennial has built,
international ideas and concepts have flowed into Turkey, and Turkish contemporary art
has become visible internationally. The Biennial vitalized the local art scene to such an
extent that young Turkish artists, who had been deemed too radical for the local art
market, such as Taner Ceylan, Mehmet Dere, Burak Delier, Genco Gülan, Elif Çelebi,
Inci Furni, and Esra Ersen and many others, found opportunity for visibility and
represented their political attributes both locally and internationally.
In Turkey, the lack of institutional support for art and culture has provided an
inquisitive distance of the artists and intellectuals to the state apparatus–and thus the state
ideology, which allowed a new generation of antinationalist artists to emerge. Unlike the
old generation of modernists, a young generation of artists collaborated with its peers
from the Kurdistan part of Turkey, such as in the cities of Diyarbakır (Kurdish: Amed)
and Mardin (Kurdish: Mêrdîn).210The interactive dialogue between Istanbul and the
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southeastern Turkey enabled some Kurdish artists such as Halil Altındere, Ahmet Öğüt
and Şener Özmen to be visible in the contemporary art scene in Turkey.
When their work caught the attention of the international art world and the wardeprived zone of Turkey has received art funding from the EU institutions. As a result,
contemporary art centers flourished in the zone after the Diyarbakır Arts Center (DSM)
founded in 2002 and the contemporary art activities boosted immensely in this muchneglected part of Turkey. The 9th (2005) and the 10th (2007) Istanbul Biennials included
parallel events in Diyarbakır Art Center and organized tours for the international art
world guests. Soon, private galleries and entrepreneurs flocked into region. The Sakıp
Sabancı Mardin City Museum and Dilek Sabancı Art Gallery opened, and in 2010, the
International Mardin Biennial was founded with the intention “to bring contemporary art
from Turkey’s west to the east “in the same year.211 And Diyarbakır (the ancient city of
Mesopotamia, the capital of Kurdistan)–after being known as the center of the war
between the Kurdish rebels and Turkish army for thirty years–have come to be called
“Paris of Kurdistan” by the international art world.
Istanbul Biennial is a good example that each biennial has the capacity to
stimulate not only structural but also artistic and critical mechanisms in the local art
scene. The fierce criticism toward the Istanbul Biennial is continuous. In the most chaotic
days of the Gezi uprising in the summer of 2013, the anti-neoliberalist anarchists targeted
Istanbul Biennial as a part of their protests. The posters mocking the Biennial posters
were glued on the walls of Istanbul along with other plethora of visual disobedience on
the walls.
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The 13th edition was titled “Mom, am I barbarian?”and curated by Fulya
Erdemci.212 During the heat of the Gezi uprising a photograph appeared in the social
media, showing a child coming out of a cloud of pepper gas, with police following him
and holding a paper that reads “mom, are police human?” (Figure 2.9). The photograph
that circulated on the Internet was real and taken during the Gezi, but it had a stamp that
said “Isyanbul”—an alteration of the world Istanbul with isyan (revolt)–that announced
the act as a staged protest toward the Istanbul Biennial.
Erdemci openly supported the Gezi and answered to the discussion of protests of
the biennial during the uprising: “Yes, art is a part of the system, but while protesting the
system we should not come to the point to say ‘art is dirty, let’s kill it.’ Art has an
inherent capacity to be critical to the system.” 213 The conceptual framework of the
Biennial “urban transformation” was the fundamental concern of the Gezi uprising.
Erdemci canceled the installations and exhibitions that are in the occupied area of the
Gezi protestors to let the creative process on the streets take over. Hence, this time, the
Biennial was not in the role of the producer of the discourse and an analyzer of the local
situations, it had to remain as an observer while Gezi was creating a political space for
both discourse and action.

For the conseptual framework of this edition see Fulya Erdemci. “Curator’s Text.” In Mom, Am I
Barbarian? 13th Istanbul Biennial Guide (Istanbul: IKSV, 2013).
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Off-Space Artist Collectives and the Emerging Alternative Art
Scene in Turkey
In the 1980s Turkey witnessed a new atmosphere of economic restructuring and
depoliticization of social life. On September 12, 1980, a right-wing military junta led by
General Kenan Evren took state power, established martial law, abolished political
parties and trade unions and eradicated all democratic rights. After the 1983 election–
heavily guarded and influenced by the junta–a right-wing “liberal” government replaced
that of the military government that came to power with the 1980 coup d’état. This
preserved the state’s fundamental conservative ideology while taking forward the new
economic mentality of the neoliberal system such as intensive privatization of stateowned factories, institutions, and other public assets.
Political repression and forceful economic restructuring went hand in hand. Many
writers, poets, actors, artists, and film directors were prosecuted and jailed. In the 1990s,
the intellectuals and artists have started to come out of a morose existence they were
thrown into during the junta period the decade before. In fact, through the 1990s, the
large exhibitions that took over the public spaces emptied by the junta were produced and
organized by the independent artist collectives without presence of a curator or sponsor.
Those exhibitions, such as Genç Etkinlik 1, 2, 3 (Young Activity 1, 2, 3), Performans
Günleri 1, 2, 3, (Performance Days 1, 2, 3), and Seratonin (1, 2), with their continuing
editions, initiated long-lasting dialogues with the public as well as with the young art
students in the art academies and have become the predecessors of the civic artist
initiatives.
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At the turn of the century, the shrinkage of the Ministry of Culture and the merger
with the Ministry of Tourism resulted in major cuts in the states already minimal support
to art. The new ministry cut its relationship with the independent artist initiatives and
collectives and found a solution to the issue of art funding by leaving it to the mercy of
big corporations. As I have argued earlier, in a few years, ninty percent of Istanbul’s art
world establishment changed hands to the private sector.214
The Istanbul Biennial has been important, not only for the corporate business
world to attract international private investments and for Turkish contemporary art to
expand outward, but also for revitalizing the art infrastructure in Istanbul as well as in all
major cities of Turkey. This also inevitably allowed the growing of underground cultural
activities and antiestablishment art spaces in the 1990s, which were invisible after the
1980s–after the military junta’s cultural directives. The Istanbul Biennial has become a
powerful institution that is capable of being a magnet that, ideologically and politically,
affects the alternative artistic energies inside and outside the Turkey’s art word. In this
part, I will talk about the artist collectives and off-space art practices that have been
systematically resisting the domain of the “global” art world over the market and the art
discourse in Turkey.
A variety of art practices around the world have been emerging on the margins of
the institutional art world and challenging what is accepted in culture as aesthetics. In the
so-called “off-spaces,” which are simultaneously connected and disconnected from art
world institutions, often political and aesthetic tactics interplay with each other to form an
experimental and dialogical platform. These interdisciplinary art activities often do not
seek to challenge political positions or ideological perspectives; they create a space of
214
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interaction, exchange, and communication, with spontaneous collectivism and activist
zeal. Open-ended collaborations are often a true interdisciplinary interaction wherein
artists, sociologists, architects, philosophers, activists, and the public work together. 215
Collaborative practices produce a creative, cognitive process on a premise of
establishing a novel relationship between one small group and a broader community in an
attempt to create a reciprocal dialogue. Moreover, to participate in a collaborative project
means that, through the act of collaboration, different ideas are cast, synthesized, and
regenerated. These projects, based on interaction and dialogue among actors on different
ranks of the social ladder, create new ways of asking questions as much as they create
new ways of understanding art and social phenomena. I argue that instead of criticizing
these works for not presenting a collective disruption to the instrumentalization of
contemporary art or measuring their immediate impact in the social fabric, the analysis of
these practices should focus on their potential capability to organize and develop a novel
formation of art praxis that challenges what is conceivable as art in the society.
The off-space artist initiatives in Turkey that started flourishing in the 1990s are
founded on the principles of civic and public with an ethic of working collectively in a
horizontal relationship.216 The exhibitions by these artist-initiatives have allowed
contemporary art to gain unprecedented public visibility in Turkey. There have been
arguments that, after the implementation of neoliberal free-market reforms and the vast
privatization campaign they enforce, collective struggles have become private struggles.
For example, in the 1980s, Cuban contemporary art was vivid, with numerous art
Art historian Patricia Phillips asserts: “Interdisciplinarity is not simply an indiscriminate amalgamation
of conventions from different fields, but a faceted way of looking at the formation of knowledge and the
public realm. Interdisciplinary aesthetic practices are a way to think critically and act publicly.” Patricia C.
Phillips, “(Inter) Disciplinary Actions,” Public Art Review 29/11 (2003): 15.
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See Levent Çalıkoğlu, “Modern Birey, Sivil İnsiyatif,” in Çağdaş Sanat Konuşmaları 2: Çağdaş Sanatta
Sivil Oluşumlar ve İnsiyatifler, ed. Levent Çalıkoğlu (Beyoğlu, Istanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2007), 7-14.
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collectives flourishing not only in Havana but in all major cities throughout Cuba.217 And
Rachel Weiss argues that, by the 1990s, when capitalist market forces entered Cuba, the
characteristics of Cuban collectives had changed: “…while the figure of collective
remained more or less constant during the period of new art, its fundamental meaning and
vision has now inverted, from a vision that was public and civic to one that is often
private and hermetic.”218 I argue instead that, in each locality, art entails an array of
creative practices that are not all in a direct correlation to economic interests, especially
when those interests themselves are contradictory. This is also true for works produced
by artist collectives: While some yield to standardization and the institutionalization of
market mechanisms, others create a multiplicity of split-offs from these mechanisms.
Nonprofit art spaces, collaborative project groups, and off-space art exhibitions,
which are produced by various artist collectives, first appeared as a reaction to the
privatization of art institutions and the hegemony of the Eurocentric art world in artist
residencies, art fairs, and international biennials. Nevertheless, in time, they presented a
rich array of criticism, with multiple viewpoints and a variety of creative impulses. These
artist collectives, in their relationship to one another as well as in their relationship to the
public, have constituted different forms of interactions that have emphasized the making
of art rather than the consumption or reception of it, but the main difference lies in the
way that they problematized the public space. The artists, as well as the sociologists,
architects, and philosophers, have formed these initiatives with a political consciousness
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that questions the ways in which framing and re-framing of the visible and the invisible
are constructed through the collective experience of the community in the public space. 219
In Turkey and elsewhere, the main issue that these artist initiatives have often
raised was the reconfiguration of the separation of the public and private spheres and
questioning of hierarchies in what is defined as “public.” There have been significant
discussions within the radical Left suggesting that the break between art production and
state support had deeper consequences than just an ideological shift and the privatization
of cultural production since the 1980s.220 According to this discussion, what was at stake
was the “publicness” of artistic and cultural expression:
First is that the public potential of art and culture was suppressed. What
was originally an ethical quandary of asking support from the State, turned
later into the evaporation of the concept of the public… We are yet to
evaluate the damage implicated by the absence of the concept of public
and consequently of citizenry, belonging, and a shared sense of ethics and
core values.221

As the production of public culture was transferred to the entertainment industry in the
private sector, the “publicness” of culture lost its social capability for the public.
Thus, what the variety of nonprofit alternative art practices in Istanbul are apt to achieve
has been precisely what Nicolas Bourriaud means by “the re-configuration of the
separation of the public and private spheres” in order to create a true dialogue between

These intellectuals/artists have been influenced largely by Henri Lefèbvre’s discussions of the “social
production of urban space” and “spatial justice,” by Rancière’s articulation of the “distribution of the
sensible,” and Nicolas Bourriaud’s concept of “relational aesthetics,” which points to interactive
relationships among individuals, communities, individuals, groups, social networks, etc. See Nicolas
Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics (Dijon: Les Presses du réel. 2002)Lefèbvre, The Production of Space, D.
Nicholson-Smith, trans. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) and Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics.
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the public and visual arts–a dialogue that the modernist republicans and the Istanbul
Biennial could not achieve.
Especially in Istanbul, some artist collectives have taken every opportunity to be
visible within the cultural agenda of the city and have tried to establish themselves as a
part of the social and political terrain of the rapidly changing urban space. The survival of
these artist initiatives depends on careful calculations regarding the strategic entering into
and exiting from the institutionalized art system. Some examples: Extra Mücadele
(1997), Extra Struggle engages in designing imaginary objects for imaginary customers;
Apartman Projesi (1999), Apartment Project space constructs a relationship between the
street and trespassers; Oda Projesi (2006), Room Project exhibits collaborative artistic
activities in a room of artists apartment; Xurban_collective (2000) creates web-based art
projects and is involved in activist art projects on the Internet; Nomad (2002) is an
association that experiments with new patterns in digital art production using a crossdisciplinary approach; K2 (2003) targets immediate neighborhood responses to
interdisciplinary, independent art projects in Izmir; Karşı Sanat (2003), Reverse Art
establishes a non-gallery space that exhibits independent projects; PIST (2006) exists as
an interdisciplinary project space for any artist collectives that want to participate; Altı
Aylık (2006) produces wearable, displayable, and saleable textiles that read confessions
as an open expression of political beliefs (sales support women’s shelters throughout the
city); Tershane (2006) is a large factory-like atelier that functions as a transformative
space for contemporary thought and art; (2006); Hafriyat Karaköy (2007) is a venue that
hosts alternative visibilities on sinister topics, located on one of Istanbul’s busiest streets;
Garaj Istanbul (2007) is a nonprofit performance art cooperative also functioning as a
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nongovernmental organization; Masa Projesi (2007), Table Project exhibits artworks on
a table placed in unexpected spaces throughout the city; Daralan (2007) aims at
widening the narrow-space of producing and exhibiting art with games, plays, and
spontaneous performances; Artık Mekan (2008), Discarded Space operates as an
interactive art space in the nonfunctional space of an historical apartment building; IMC
5533 (2008) experiments on independent curatorial practices.222
The underlying context of the works and events produced by these artist
initiatives concerns the cultural and political processes on a global level that led to
immense changes in the local urban environment over the past two decades.223 These
alternative formations, apart from the projects they produce, also struggle to keep the
visual art scene vibrant with artist meetings and panels, workshops and discussions, film
screenings and video shows, and open studios and lectures. Madra explains the desperate
attempts of these young artists to become visible within the social fabric of the city:
All these underground activities emerged because of necessity. We have
an abundance of young artists graduating from fine art schools every year.
But interestingly for the last couple of years, the contemporary artists
come from other disciplines besides art, such as sociology and political
science. It is nearly impossible for a young art graduate to emerge as an
artist in Turkey because there is no strong art system. So they have only
one solution: become a group and try to be visible as a collective. They
not only put their creativity and energy together but their money too. 224
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In May 2006, Didem Özbek and Osman Bozkurt founded the PIST
Disiplinlerarası Proje Alanı (Interdisciplinary Project Space) in a neighborhood that is
distant from the entertainment-art district of Istanbul. This part of town is known for its
low income, cosmopolitan populations, including Armenians, Greeks, Gypsies, and
immigrants from East Asia and Africa. A couple of floors of each apartment building are
typically transformed into unregistered ateliers that produce textiles to be sold in
luxurious boutiques just across the main avenue. The rest of the businesses are small
grocery stores, traditional coffeehouses, small shops, car repair shops, and restaurants.
During the day, the division between public and private space becomes unclear, with
shopkeepers having tea in front of their shops, housewives chatting from balcony to
balcony, and children playing on the street.
The artists, having been attracted to these dynamics, rent three adjacent shops on
a corner. They prefer not to tell curious neighbors that it is indeed an art space, because
their aim is not to educate people on how to view or think about contemporary art. What
the artists aim for is to mix performance on the street with performance in the art space:
to engage in the daily activities of street life.225 The window display is sixty meters wide,
allowing for ample visibility from the street.226 At any time of day, video and
photography installations on the windows will draw the attention of a couple of
passersby, which can turn into tens of people joining the crowd in curiosity. However, the
window is by no means the only space of display. With different projects, the sidewalk,
even the asphalt street itself, are transformed into an exhibition space.
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For example, in 2009, English artist Michael Coombs joined the PIST for a
project of sculpture. The men in the car shop in the neighborhood helped him to make a
cast of a broken car to produce a sculpture. The car sculpture then was carried and placed
in front of the PIST. For the public in Turkey, public sculpture often means the statue of
Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. The stunned public participated in this odd
sculpture installation–a clandestine occupation of the street–by examining it, sitting on it,
wanting to paint it, and even making a cover to protect it from the rain. Neighbors did not
hesitate to question the work on their street, but soon accepted it as if it were a piece of
furniture in their home, like a chair on which they sip tea in front of their building or
shop. Another project that questioned the division between private and public spaces
were 24-hour video shows in the windows. People would sometimes pull up a chair and
watch the film from the sidewalk, as if they were in their own living room. Strangers,
sitting next to each other, discussed the short film among themselves and asked questions
to the directors of the PIST.
As explained earlier, since the 1990s, the emergent corporate art system in Turkey
has become even more exclusive in terms of its local audience. The Istanbul Biennial,
Istanbul Modern Art Museum, and other art venues often are visited only by members of
the privileged class and by art students. For the Turkish public, the concept of artwork is
typically limited to public sculptures, and some of these recently have become sites of
debate when either the prime minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, or a local municipality want to
demolish a sculpture for its political content. The impact and duration of the public
reception of artworks such as those in and around the PIST, which try to establish a
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dialogue with “the man on the street,” can be questioned, but it is precisely that
questioning that makes these projects successful.
PIST literally means dance floor and runway in Turkish. It is not just an
alternative exhibition space for young artists but is a space that many different actors in
society could land in and take off from. In January 2009, a young artist, Delier, along
with another artist friend Güneş Terkol, and with sociologist Eylem Akçay, launched a
new project at PIST called S.T.ARGEM (Street Collectors Research and Development
Center). This multidimensional art project operated with a conception of art as a set of
social relations and designed to collaborate with the street garbage pickers in Istanbul.
S.T.ARGEM’s main goal was to investigate and identify the relationship between artistic
practice and public service, or that between an artist and variety of people with different
social origins and class compositions.227 The project created a social environment where
different people, included artists, sociologists, garbage pickers (mainly wastepaper
collectors) working illegally on the streets, and various paper companies came together to
exchange ideas as well as to participate in shared activities, such as discussions of
alternative recycling policies in the megalopolis, making ecological banners, engaging in
street activism, producing protest videos, and making public sculptures from discarded
materials.228
When I interviewed them, Delier, Terkol and Akçay enthusiastically claimed to
have founded an alternative institution–an institution of trans-class relations.229 The
reason for labelling this “an institution” was to direct attention to the way it contests
Author’s interview with Güneş Terkol, Eylem Akçay, and Burak Delier in Istanbul-Turkey, December
10, 2009.
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traditional class hierarchies.230 The project lasted for three months, from January to
March 2009. During that time, the project space worked as a platform for interaction
among artists, musicians, activists, researchers, and public workers, in a way that
expanded the public sphere in a post-bourgeois direction.231 These dialogues produced
situations for the expression of multiple subject positions and promoted the kind of
exchange that could overturn the existing social relationships.
The projects included object-based designs, such as a garbage bag with the image
of a favorite singer of the garbage collector (Ferdi Tayfur) that garbage picker Osman
Gülek hung on his trolley while he roams the streets of Istanbul, as well as other
collaborative works, such as a series of video projects, performances, art-project days,
protest meetings, and workshops. In the “Video-Action Workshop: The Paper-men” 13
paper-garbage collectors filmed their daily life encounters with various people in the
society. Those who are constructed as “objects of gaze” in TV shows, which show the
lives of people living on the fringes of the city and looked upon as “possible criminals”
have become the “subject of the gaze” with a camera in their hands.
The street paper garbage pickers, numbering approximately 100,000 in Istanbul,
are self-employed members of society, usually Gypsy families who have been doing this
job for decades or new waves of impoverished immigrants from Central and Eastern
Turkey, a group that also makes up the lowest and most impoverished class in the
metropolis. These public workers roam the streets and pick up recyclable garbage, such
as plastic and metal cans, but mostly paper, and sell them to paper companies or
recycling companies. They decide for themselves when or how long to work and which
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zone of the metropolis to cover, hence the paper companies determine the price and the
quantity of the purchase. Rivalry often exists within this large group of workers based on
the territory in which they work, the length of time the worker has spent in this job, and
the type of relationship established with buyer companies.
These garbage collectors often are regarded in public statistics as unemployed and
thus are considered to be an unproductive force. Their position as an underground worker
also reduces them to an invisible position in society. Philosopher Brian Holmes talks
about the French jobless movement in the 1990s and articulates that for workers, “To be a
surplus (laid off, redundant) was to be reduced to silence in a society that subtracted the
jobless from the public accounts that made them into a kind of residue–invisible and
inconceivable except as a statistic under a negative sign.”232 The garbage collectors, in
this case, did not march on the streets or protest in plazas with banners proclaiming, “We
are not surplus, we are plus,” as French workers did. They just kept on doing what they
always did on the streets of Istanbul, hence making themselves the subject of the “gaze”
and “speech.”
S.T.ARGEM questioned how autonomous a working-class activity could be from
capital and how social relations could be subverted through interclass and trans-class
encounters. This project also invited us to rethink the social perspective of recycling
politics in Turkey, including the re-commodification of recycled garbage from already
consumed commodities and the role of local and daily practices in the implementation of
neoliberal reforms. But, most importantly, it made visible the possibility of another world
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by creating horizontal collaborations in a country where art has been commercialized by
a handful of powerful elite for narrow social and economic aims.
During my interview with him, one of the artists on the project, Delier, underlined
his thoughts about the master-slave dichotomy of such trans-class relationships and
argued that their aim was to form parallel relationships as opposed to vertical ones in
order to “…not to be a part of the solution but to be part of the problem.”233 Thus, what
Delier and his friends’ objective was not to create a “critical awakening” in the society,
but instead to have a democratic collaboration with “the man on the street.” Delier
identified this project as “an experiment that not only targeted the rigid class
relationships, but also aimed to break the usual subject-object formation in those
relationships.”234 Delier also added that their goal was not to reach a certain number of
illegal garbage collectors, but to stay at a close proximity and openness to them.
Since the 1990s, the emergent corporate art system in Turkey has become even
more exclusive in terms of its local artists and audience. The Istanbul Biennial, Istanbul
Modern Art Museum, and other art venues often are visited only by members of the
privileged class and by some art enthusiasts. For the Turkish public, the concept of
artwork is typically limited to public sculptures, and some of these recently have become
sites of debate when either the prime minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, or a local municipality
want to demolish a sculpture for its political content. The impact and duration of the
public reception of artworks such, as those in and around the PIST could be questioned
but it is precisely that questioning that makes these projects successful.

233
234

Author’s interview with Burak Delier.
Ibid.
141

In another interview, another collaborator, sociologist Akçay told that what they
encountered in the art world was mostly the questions, such as “what are your solutions
to the problems of the garbage collectors?” and “what do you hope S.T.ARGEM’s
outcome would be?” Akçay stated that what science, art, and theory does is to try to
construct the subject of the given question or problem and that these questions were
raised from this mentality. Akçay further explained that, “what we were trying to do was
to dismantle the established form of identifying and naming the problem in collaboration
with those seen as ‘the problem’ or ‘having the problem’”235
Contrary to the conventional approach of the avant-garde, where an artist or an
intellectual should be the one who shows the others where to go or what to discover in
themselves, this type of dialogue, which these artist collectives have been producing in
Turkey, create possibilities for realizing French philosopher Jacques Rancière’s idea of
closing the distance between ignorance and knowledge. 236According to Rancière, if there
is no gap between two intelligences, then the equality of intelligence in all of its
manifestations is possible. The collaborative art projects in Istanbul, such as in the
example of S.T.ARGEM continue to defy the distribution of roles that exist within the
hierarchal logic of “who gets to make-visible or make-sayable” in the public place–and
thus who exercises political power.237
In his argument on “the distribution of the sensible,” Rancière emphasizes that
politics entails, among other things, the struggle for equal representation in the
established order, and this equality pertains to a “certain form of the neutralization of
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hierarchies,” nevertheless “the world is divided between those who can and those who
cannot afford the luxury of playing with words and images.”238 Thus, the battle for selfrepresentation is bound with the contested images in society–specifically who is
“allowed” to say or to show as well as what is allowed to be said and shown.
In Turkey and elsewhere, the collaborative art practices have been producing new
forms of social relations as much as they have been creating new openings for more
democratic conditions for speech and visibility. Rancière explains that: “Art is more and
more to-day about matters of distribution of spaces and issues of re-descriptions of
situations. It is more and more about matters that traditionally belonged to politics. But it
cannot merely occupy the space left by the weakening of political conflict. It has to
reshape it, at the risk of testing the limits of its own politics.239” PIST and S.T.ARGEM
have emerged from a need to struggle for inclusive democracy in which the public space
encompasses the entire citizen body, and where decisions at the macro level are part of an
institutional framework of equal distribution of political power among citizens. 240 This
connotes a different concept of freedom than defined by neoliberal ideology. This is a
struggle for freedom to achieve self-determination and equal participation in society’s
deliberative activities in the public sphere.
The two examples discussed here demonstrate that, when the public/citizen
already is conceived as involved actor and the aesthetical already is conceived as
political, then the question of how we (art historians and critics) should assess the
Fulvia Carnevale and John Kelsey, “Art of the Possible: In Conversation with Jacques Rancière,”
Artforum (2007):12-19. Ranciere explains: “I call the distribution of the sensible the system of self-evident
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political import of artworks becomes meaningless. In Art Incorporated, Stallabrass
argues: “If the work is shown without any prospect that it will have an effect, its display
becomes mere performance and its viewing a form of entertainment.”241 One could argue
that this view not only confines art in formal terms but also regards the display and
reception of such projects and many other socially engaged art as involving closed
monologues rather than open dialogues.
Open-ended, socially engaged art projects do not always propose or aim for a
concrete effect in the society, and for the reasons I have explained, they do not need to.
Such projects also do not always generate democratic interactions. For example, the
exhibition of documentary photography in the controversial art space Karşı Sanat on
September 4, 2005, which showed the lynching of the members of the Greek Orthodox
community in Istanbul in 1955, was prepared with the collaboration of the grandchildren
of the victims. On the opening day, the street-passers and the people who live in the
neighborhood attacked the exhibition by throwing stones through the windows. What was
alarming about this spontaneous attack, which brought to mind the attacks and lynching
of 1955, was that it was not the shadow of the army, the brutal aggression of police, or
the motivation of the far-right nationalist party; it was a conscious decision of the public
that mimicked the violence shown in the work of art. Turkish art critic and art historian
Erden Kosova has argued that the inadequacy of contemporary art in Turkey, in terms of
producing a democratic space for the perception of art, may be related to the inability of
the Turkish progressive-radical Left to influence the masses.242 Thus, with these kinds of
projects (such as those of the S.T.ARGEM), which are designed to create the kind of

241
242

Stallabrass, Art Incorporated, 42.
Kosova, “Dışarı Çıkma Cesareti,” Varlık 17 (2007): 9-12.
144

open dialogue that allows for many possible responses, we should recognize that the
realization of these possibilities depends on the larger and complex socio-political and
cultural resonations in the society, which differ from one particular society to the next.
Here, it is important to recall Michael Hardt’s reading of Rancière: “Politics
involves not only the distribution but also the production of the common that is, the
production and reproduction of social relations and forms of life...”243 These collaborative
art practices have been producing new forms of social relations as much as they have
created openings for the democratic distribution of the sensible, although the outcome is
unpredictable and immeasurable. Rancière’s observation is, once again, significant here:
“Art is more and more today about matters of distribution of spaces and issues of redescriptions of situations. It is more and more about matters that traditionally belonged to
politics. But it cannot merely occupy the space left by the weakening of political conflict.
It has to reshape it, at the risk of testing the limits of its own politics.244”
The PIST and S.T.ARGEM have emerged from a need to struggle for a
democratic society in which the public space encompasses the entire citizen body, and
where decisions at the macro level are part of an institutional framework of equal
distribution of political power among citizens (“inclusive democracy” as theorized by
Takes Fotopoulos). 245 This connotes a different concept of freedom than one defined by
neoliberal ideology. This is a struggle for freedom to achieve self-determination and
equal participation in society’s deliberative activities in the public sphere.
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CHAPTER III
THE ART OF NEW POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF NEW ART
In this chapter, I discuss how the neoliberal market value system is theoretically
encoded as a natural pattern of social organization through manipulation of concepts of
freedom and democracy. I also discuss the fact that a new social movement to dismantle
neoliberal instrumentalizations of concepts of freedom and democracy has been growing
by creating an inclusive and horizontal praxis of grassroots struggle.
I argue that, unlike the liberation movements of the 1960s and the worldwide
protests of 1968, the global anti-capitalist movements that have grown in the past three
decades have no leading ideology. Rather, they retain common revolutionary
characteristics, such as the struggle against power, praxis of participatory politics, and
promotion of horizontalism.
The struggle against neoliberalism is also the struggle for the regime of equal
representation–a struggle for dismantling the existing system of representative
democracy. Rancière’s understanding of “the aesthetic field” as the distribution of what is
visible and sayable is useful in rethinking what it means “to be visible” and what it means
“to speak” in the current era of globalized revolt.246 Finally, borrowing insights from
Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975), we can identify the communal aesthetic experience of the
masses in anti-capitalist protests and uprisings as a carnivalesque aesthetics because it
opens a new dimension of social and sensual encounters creating a radical subjectivity
that transcends the immediate reality of existing social relations.
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The New Society of Neoliberalism and the New Political Subjectivity
Neoliberalism, with its promises of freedom and democracy, lived its triumphal
days from 1989 until 2008, when the global economic crisis began with Wall Street's
fourth largest investment bank, Lehman Brothers, going bankrupt.247 In neoliberal
philosophy, economic freedom, which is founded on voluntary capitalist exchange among
well-informed agents, also claims to guarantee political freedom. In fact, the core of
neoliberal philosophy involves liberating private enterprises from any restrictions and
regulations imposed by states, and it is clear on its preference of economic freedom over
political freedom.248 In a neoliberal economy, while the power of the state decreases as a
protector of tariffs, bonds, and transnational economic agreements, its raison d’être as the
protector of the nation, with its military actions, greatly enlarges. The U.S.’s missions in
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as Turkey’s subsequent massacre of the Kurds in Iraq and
Syria, are sufficient examples to illustrate greater militarization of the state at the expense
of the political freedom of citizens.249
In the neoliberal era, the praxis of freedom and democracy–both discursively and
practically–has been the terrain of contestation between who established and ensured the
dissemination and continuation of this world order and who has been organizing to resist
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it.250 The global grassroots movement against neoliberalism challenges and changes the
state paradigm that has dominated revolutionary thought for more than a century: from
changing the world through the state by parliamentary means to changing the world
without conquering state power.251 Thus, I will explain that the concepts of freedom and
democracy under the neoliberal capitalist system are at once a systemic and anti-systemic
problems.
Neoliberalism, as the economic philosophy of contemporary capitalism, not only
fabricates the system of free trade agreements, finance market speculations, privatization,
and economic reforms, it also constructs a new type of society with a new value system
based on the principles of the market. Belgian psychologist Paul Verhaeghe in his recent
book, What About Me? The Struggle for Identity in a Market-Based Society makes
significant connections between neoliberalism and psychosis, and argues that the selfinterest incubated in such a society, claimed by neoliberalists to encourage innovation,
simply serves to damage morality and reward psychopathy.252 On the other hand,
celebrated Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman succinctly summarizes the paradox of
freedom in contemporary society: “Never have we been so free. Never have we felt so
powerless.”253 What Bauman means is that we are free to question religion, our society,
our government, etc. because this kind of freedom is indeed prompted by indifference.
David Harvey, in his widely celebrated book, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, concludes
that, with the establishment of neoliberal market principles, we have moved away from a
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society marked by democratic governance to a new type of society in which the
conditions for politics have been curtailed severely because of the conservative political
reforms informed by neoliberal thought and theories.254 How does neoliberalism as the
idée-force of current political economy affect our contemporary society? What are these
conservative reforms?
Neoliberal philosophy has been popularized because of its potent message of
economic and political freedom. The mastermind of this philosophy, Milton Friedman, in
his book, Capitalism and Freedom (1962), criticized twentieth- century liberals for
betraying freedom by viewing welfare and equality as either prerequisites or as
alternatives to freedom.255 According to Friedman’s understanding of political freedom,
the area over which political power is exercised should be limited because the neoliberal
economy enables people to cooperate with one another without coercion or central
direction.256 For Friedman, market economies in which consumers are free to choose are
therefore both more efficient and ethically superior to economies with strong government
controls. If the market economy is dispersed, it also is able to disperse and decentralize
governmental power so that the so-called “protective measures” can be lifted and
freedom can be preserved. 257 Tariffs, restrictions on international trade, high tax burdens,
regulations, government price fixing, wage fixing, and a host of other state interventions,
in this view, simply mean to exploit individual consumers. In sum, freedom for
neoliberals is exercised through an individual desire to pursue self-interest and as a
voluntary contribution to free trade.
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In his theorization of freedom, Friedman neglects the significance of non-market
relations for the development of capacities required to exercise self-determination. He
applies the logic of the neoliberal economic system to all spheres of life, such as
education, health, and welfare. Friedman believes in either directly transforming nonmarket activities and goods into commodities that are subject to sale in the market, or
indirectly subjugating them to the norms and meanings of the market. Nevertheless, his
articulation of freedom does not address the crucial questions of whether the conditions
through which the autonomous agency of the individual consumer can be constituted
equally and what is supposed to happen to people who have limited access to education
and/or high-paying jobs due to a legacy of discrimination on the grounds of race and
gender.
In his book, The Road to Serfdom, published first in 1944, Friedman’s mentor,
Friedrich Hayek, warns that government interventions and restrictions over the markets
would lead to the loss of freedom in economic as well as political life, and thus, the state
should concentrate only on tasks that create security-net for neoliberal markets.258 Hayek,
who is known for his sympathy for transitional dictatorship and his closeness to former
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, is the most influential person among neoliberal
thinkers. For Hayek, freedom of the market is essential for the market to expand
endlessly: “Parties in the market should be free to buy and sell at any price, so long as
they can find a partner to the transaction–free to produce, buy and sell anything that can
be produced or sold at all.”259 As much as this concept of freedom sounds like individual
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autonomy and self-determination, it refers only to the consumer’s buying capacity.260 As
long as the consumer has enough money to make purchases, he or she can engage in any
sort of “free” transaction. Nevertheless, given that more than twenty percent of the
world’s people do not have enough money to purchase basic necessities, it follows that
under the rules of the free market, some individuals do not have the right to live. In his
book, Unequal Freedoms, John McMurtry notes:
This measure of consumer freedom entails an unlimited inequality of
freedom. The more money one has, the more freedom one is entitled to,
from none at all to limitless rights to consume. This is the ground of
individual freedom of citizens with its strong claims of equality of
opportunity for all the same time. These contradictions do not detain
market believers, for they know that the market confers on them the
unlimited freedom to choose, to have, and to enjoy consumer goods the
more money they have.261
In this value system, our individual rights to partake in society depend on having
“more” money that grants us rights to “freely” partake in the market system as
consumers. This means that one’s commitment to freedom is connected indirectly to
one’s commitment to capitalism. McMurtry uses the phrase “value imperialism” for the
underlying logic of the neoliberal market philosophy and adds: “Because advocates
believe that its system provides for people’s lives better than any other that can exist–
which is every value program’s master assumption–then it follows that any other value
ground or formation that is other to or resists it must be overridden.”262 Key here is the
technique of transfer from citizen to consumer. What this concept of freedom does is to
Another emphasis given to the concept of freedom by Friedman’s mentor, Friedrich A. von Hayek,
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make individuals and communities subservient to their commodity value. In neoliberal
logic, “free” societies should be exposed to political processes as little as possible, and
much is to be left to the “free” market, where individuals “freely” partake. With that,
democratic society altogether changes its meaning. What Harvey refers to as
“conservative political reforms,” is this shift from the democratic society to a new type of
neoliberal society, where the rulers reinforce counter-revolution through war and fascist
repression, the dead-end reformism of elections, as well as control of grassroots actions
and civil societies with the hand of corporate initiatives.263 In the same vein, Dag Einar
Thorsen and Amund Lie have observed:
…if the democratic process slows down neoliberal reforms, or threatens
individual and commercial liberty, which it sometimes does, then
democracy ought to be side stepped and replaced by the rule of experts or
legal instruments designed for that purpose. The practical implementation
of neoliberal policies will, therefore, lead to a relocation of power from
political to economic processes, from the state to markets and individuals,
and finally from the legislature and executives’ authorities to the
judiciary.264
For Rancière, neoliberalism ties itself to democracy by creating consensus–an
agreement on the order of things and relationships. Moreover, in this consensus there is
only one reality–the reality of the market, therefore, the demand to be equal in social life
is always a consumerist demand because it is eventually a fight for the individual’s rights
to consume what has not been equally distributed.265 More specifically, in Rancière’s
view, consensus should be understood as a universal agreement on the rights of human
subjects who support a type of symmetrical exchange but not the equal distribution of
rights and interests. On the other hand, Rancière’s concept of “dissensus” proposes an
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unexpected opening to counter the consensus of the market. Dissensus for Rancière
represents a disagreement that is not expressed as a demand for equal rights to
consumption, but instead is formulated as a demand to make possible an equal
distribution of power exerted over the order of things.266 Building upon the Aristotelian
idea that politics is based upon the human capacity for speaking and discussing, Rancière
explains that:
Political dissensus is not a discussion between the speaking people who
would confront their interest and values. It is a conflict about who speaks
and who does not speak, about what has to be heard as the voice of pain
and what has to be heard as the argument on justice. And this is also what
class war means: not the conflict between groups which have opposite
economic interests, but the conflict about what an ‘interest’ is, the struggle
between those who set themselves as able to manage social interests and
those who are supposed to be only able to reproduce their life.267
With that discussion, Rancière diverts our understanding of politics to realization
that it encompasses the realm of aesthetics. Thus, consensus politics inevitably represents
a kind of policing of the political space, which is also the aesthetic space–the
organization of the public sphere by whom possesses the ability to “be heard” and “be
seen.” For Rancière, democracy is neither a form of government nor a way of social life
but is politics itself in its true form. In the following pages, in light of Rancière’s
understanding of dissensus, I will analyze the praxis of the contemporary anti-capitalist
social movement and question its potential for the realization of radical democracy.
Neoliberalism’s claim to democracy through the market’s language of freedom
and plurality concomitantly creates the antithesis—depoliticization of democracy. As
explained above, the neoliberal ideology employs and reinforces capitalism using
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concepts of “freedom” and “liberty.” Concomitantly, an era of globalized revolt has been
taking root in the persistent rage against systemic conditions that fortify globalized
capital, which in its determination transcends the traditional boundaries of nationalist
liberation and challenges the dead-end reformism of the representative democracy.
Beginning in the 1990s, a new anti-capitalist movement has emerged to challenge
neoliberal capitalism with the motto: “globalization from below.” Unlike the fragmentary
nature of identity politics, this anti-globalization (or alter-globalization) movement often
advances radical visions and crosses various political lines and geographical boundaries
to form alliances against global capitalism. It advocates for radical change in a plural
sense in which diverse people draw upon shared values and common problems as
opposed to class interests. It lacks a self-organization or political identity and operates
with a vision of revolution that is beyond the classical Marxist discourse of class
contradictions. This grassroots social movement is considered more as a “diverse
manifestation of a new proletariat made up of new and intrinsically plural agents of social
transformation.”268 It is thus very difficult to frame this movement as a whole with the
structural definition or organization of the previous anti-capitalist movements; what is
striking is that its power is embedded precisely in its broad ideological and social
appeal.269
This anti-neoliberalist global movement is rooted in the concept of horizontal
representation of civil resistance across ethnic and racial borders as much as across
national and regional borders. For example, in May Day demonstrations in 2008, British
blue-collar workers carried images of Zapatistas and shouted, “We are all Zapatistas.” In
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Istanbul, after the assassination of Armenian newspaper editor and activist Hrant Dink by
a nationalist, on January 19, 2007, the large crowd attending his funeral shouted,
“Hepimiz Hrant’iz Hepimiz Ermeniyiz” (We are all Hrant, we are all Armenian). Dink’s
funeral turned into an antifascist demonstration, with thousands of protesters wearing
badges and stickers bearing an image created by Turkish artist Evrensel Belgin. The
image, which also appeared in Belgin’s web project, anti-pop, was a black obituary
design with the name Hrant Dink and the date 2007-1915. Dink’s birth date is shown as
the date of his death, and the date of death is shown as the year of the Armenian
genocide. Thus, it could be argued that the writer’s death is converted into a sign for the
end of the process of coming to terms with the Armenian genocide.270 Given the rise of
fascism in Turkey that led to the assassination of Dink, the masses shouting, “We are all
Hrant, we are all Armenian,” demonstrates the new logic for the coalescing of the
multitude against the threat of contemporary representations of power, as it is often
repeated during protests. Hence, these kinds of representations of solidarity are not
formed through a common political identity or ideology but through a common agenda:
the inequality in political representation.271
A crisis affecting previous anti-capitalist movements until the late 1990s can be
understood by considering diverse views on the issues of sovereignty and power; that is,
the position of the state and the strategy for the conquest of this power. Recently, the
widening-gap between the progressive left and autonomist Marxists is prominent vis-àvis their relationship with post-politics and the alter-globalization movement. In 2004,
Armenian Genocide refers to the Ottoman government’s systematic extermination of Armenians in
1915. For detailed information on Armenian Genocide and its denial by the Ottoman and Turkish
authorities see Fatma Müge Göçek, Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective
Violence Against Armenians, 1789-2009 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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three years after the release of their controversial book, Empire, Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri spoke of a conceptual and structural shift in the character of global antisystemic resistance.272 They called the concept of self-determination of the masses
“multitude”—a term that has captured the imagination of activists around the world. In
their discussion of multitude, there is no clear vision for an alternative social formation,
but instead a suggestion that our political task is not only simply to resist these processes
but also to reorganize them and redirect them toward new ends for radicalizing politics.273
Similarly, as vague and abstract as it seems, Hardt and Negri’s oppositional force against
the Empire--the multitude--establishes a subjectivity that is not organized around class
lines or national or ethnic identity.
In their book Multitude, Hardt and Negri focus on the “convergence in Seattle,”
optimistically announcing that “old oppositions between protesting groups seemed
suddenly to melt away.”274 I do not think that it is yet realistic to say so, but Hardt and
Negri’s concept of the multitude aids understanding of today’s diverse movements, which
are local, regional, and global all at the same time.
During the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in 1999, the “Battle of
Seattle”, as it was labeled, was a significant momentum in the global struggle to boost
local, transnational, and global organizations and movements in protest against the
undemocratic sites of global corporate power. Although the corporate mainstream media
cast it as an urban mobilization of random activists, the resistance was in fact organized
by two major networks: People Against Free Trade Agreements (PAFTA), a network of
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labor, trade, and environmental groups that opposed the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), and NO! WTO, a network opposed to the activities of the WTO in
the Third World. Since Seattle, a significant global revolt has been growing. Large
protests take place especially during the meetings of the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), G8 summit, and GATT and its successor, the WTO, in the same
way protests against structural adjustment programs of global financial institutions had
taken place in London (1999), Prague (2000), Genoa (2001), Santiago de Chile (2001),
Okinawa and Washington, D.C. (2001), Québec City (2001), Mar de Plata (2005), and
Istanbul (2009).
Another significant moment of popular uprising involved the Zapatista movement
in Chiapas surfaced on January 1, 1994, and captured the imagination of not only
autonomists/anarchists but of the liberation theology movement, the women’s liberation
movement, gay rights activists, anti-corporatist activists and so forth. Zapatistas rose up
in arms on the day NAFTA was implemented. Zapatismo, the political philosophy of the
Zapatistas, implements a new political subjectivity by struggling to become a legitimate
voice, a reciprocal partner in political dialogue and the exercise of power. The Zapatistas
have continually stated that Zapatismo is not limited to the indigenous people of Chiapas
or Mexico; it is instead a practice and a commitment–a way of building a revolutionary
path that is not invested in any singular subject or identity.275 Zapatismo reveals the
defining features of the revolutionary movements of the past two decades.
Viennese philosopher Gerald Raunig, in his book Art and Revolution, calls the
kind of activism found in the Zapatista movement and its extension, World Social Forum
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(WSF), “transversal activism.”276 With the geometrical term “transversal,” Raunig
proposes that it is not that you discover change when you arrive at a point but that you
change in the moment you speak at a particular place. This type of praxis allows the
spectator to discover herself as a political subject and her potential as subject in the path
from resistance to change. According to Zapatismo, there is no single historical subject
imbued with revolutionary potential; rather, we are all capable of imagining, building,
dreaming, and living revolution. The Zapatistas’ political practice, which I will discuss in
the next chapter, and their poetic language, moving between politics and life, constructs
participants, not supporters, or spectators.
Due to its ambiguous political program and its inclusiveness, what constitutes the
new anti-globalization movement or what should be considered as a part of the
movement has been an open and highly debated question. Perhaps the best example of its
horizontality is found in “The First Intergalactic Encounter against Neoliberalism and for
Humanity,” a Zapatista event held in the Lacandon Jungle of Chiapas in July 1996. The
call for the encuentro (meeting) against neoliberalism through the Internet as well as
through alternative media was made to anarchists, artists, students, union organizers,
workers, environmentalists, human rights activists, academics, gays/lesbians, media
workers, cyberpunks, indigenous peoples, fishermen, natural disaster victims, peasants,
housewives, prostitutes, and extraterrestrials.277 This meeting could be thought of as the
origin of the alter-globalization movement initiated “by all the rebels around the world,”
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as Subcomandante Marcos put it. The goal was simply to provide a network across which
all of the world’s struggles against neoliberalism could connect with one another and take
collective action. People from more than fourty countries gathered in La Realidad, one of
the five caracoles (political centers) of the Zapatistas in the middle of the Lacandon
Jungle. In this “intergalactic” meeting against neoliberalism, the seeds were planted for
the international network called People’s Global Action (PGA).
PGA was founded in February 1998 by a diverse group of people from social
movements as diverse as the Brazil’s Landless Workers’ Movement (MST), Reclaim the
Streets (RTS) in the UK, the Zapatistas in Mexico, radical ecologists from the Ukraine,
Maori activist groups in New Zealand, and squatters from across Europe, all of whom
had gathered in Geneva for the founding conference. The PGA Network was created as a
tool for co-ordination and communication between groups, movements, and individuals
wanting to organize global anti-capitalist resistance and to draw attention to the
possibility of alternative forms of social organization. The PGA and the movements
involved within it were instrumental in initiating and coordinating the global days of
action against the G8 on its Birmingham, England, Summit, held in May of 1998, and the
day of action in financial centers around the world, held on June 18, 1999, now famously
known as the “Carnival Against Capitalism.” The PGA also made the call for the
historical 1999 WTO protests in Seattle.
The international meeting in La Realidad, Chiapas, also culminated with the
founding of the WSF in January 2001, in Porto Alegre, Brazil.278 The WSF has been
organized by a committee of representatives from prominent civil society groups
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throughout the world. The forum provides a space for local and national social
movements to network and strategize for future action, and remains active as a unified
international movement. In 2002, the second forum drew more than fifty thousand
delegates from more than one thousand organizations. From then on, it has been
organized every two years and functions as the backbone of the anti-globalization
movement. Although some Orthodox Marxists criticized the WSF for being detached to
working class, it has been welcomed by Autonomous Marxists who see all kinds diverse
struggles as a part of the anti-capitalist movement as a whole.
Hardt and Negri commented on the monolithic view of struggle as to its inclusive
character in support of their theory multitude: “This shift, however, signals no farewell to
the working class or even a decline of worker struggle but rather increasing multiplicity
of the proletariat and the new physiognomy of struggles.”279The economic and
environmental crises following the global expansion of the neoliberal economic system
created unrest all around the world, and the people have been uniting to fight it. For
Immanuel Wallerstein, such crises present a real historical alternative and a global
transformation.280 Wallerstein believes that the world system crises exist in the global
sphere (structural and economic), in the field of action (anti-systemic movements), and in
the area of reflection (sciences).281 He posits that crises present a rare “circumstance” in
which a historical system has evolved to a point where the cumulative effect of its
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internal contradictions prevents the system from resolving its own dilemmas through
adjustments of “institutional force.”282
In the early 1970s, Wallerstein coined the term “anti-systemic movement” as an
expression that might include movements involving a single group that, historically and
analytically, had been positioned under two very different poles under the categories of
“social” and “national.” The contemporary anti-systemic movement is generally rooted in
one of three ideological branches.283 The Global-Justice Movement–also known as AntiGlobalization Movement or Alter-Globalization Movement–includes green activists,
cyber punks, radical anarchist networks, the labor movement, the women’s liberation
movement, antiwar, and antiracism groups, international solidarity for anti-capitalist
initiatives, and movements for indigenous autonomy and radical participatory
democracy.284 The Post-Washington Consensus Movement includes civil societies that
aim to democratize globalization by making governments and corporations accountable
to people instead of to elites, along with some groups that attract attention to sustainable
development and U.S. unilateralism.285 Third World Nationalism includes religious and
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non-religious nationalist groups that advocate for regional autonomy, that are rhetorical
anti-imperialists, and that are reformists of the interstate system.286
As Wallerstein argues, today’s anti-systemic movements were produced by a
significant shift in the political-ideological sphere, a shift ignited by the 1968 revolution.
Wallerstein explains:
…The second consequence, for the left, was the end of the legitimacy of
the Old Left’s claim to be the prime national political actor on behalf of
the left, to which all other movements had to subordinate themselves. The
so-called forgotten peoples [women, ethnic/racial/religious ‘minorities,’
‘indigenous’ nations, persons of non-heterosexual sexual orientations], as
well as those concerned with ecological or peace issues, asserted their
right to be considered prime actors on an equal level with the historical
subjects of the traditional anti-systemic movements. They rejected
definitively the claim of the traditional movements to control their
political activities and were successful in their new demand for
autonomy.287
The new anti-systemic movements spreading to all corners of the world appear as
a paradigm shift, moving away from the politics of state parties or Marxist-Leninist sects
awaiting their turn to play the role of vanguard. This form of political opposition is based
on the so-called “counter-power” that does not seek to overtake state power or to
constitute a government body or a political party and to de-nationalize the concept of
action in civil society. This way, what is political becomes no longer limited to nationstates, to the ruling class or political parties seeking state power, nor even to the
proletariat seeking to overthrow the bourgeoisie. At present time, anti-systemic
movements are largely organized in horizontal networks and mark their praxis within
anti-statist and anti-parliamentary ideology. The kind of anti-power of “anti-politics”
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seeks not to engage capital on its own terms and reproduce capitalist social relations that
are embedded in the state as well as society. It is this character of creating revolution that
dismantles the meaning of freedom, politics, and even revolution. Revolution is no longer
about aiming to attack contemporary forms of capitalism but is about refusing to recreate
and reproduce it. Holloway, in his latest book, reminds us that: “The revolutions of the
twentieth century failed not because they were too radical but because they were not
nearly radical enough.”288
The protests that raged around the world in 1968 included a large number of
workers, students, and the lower class who were facing increasingly violent state
repression. At present, civil unrest and protests around the world share similar aspects of
the 1968 revolution; hence, the main focus has shifted from the issue of sovereignty and
class struggle to issues of equal representation (voice and visibility) and democracy.289
WSF, Zapatistas, anti-IMF demonstrations in various cities since Seattle 1999, the mass
anti-government demonstrations all around the world, the violent riots in France, in 2005,
and in England, in 2010, Occupy Wall Street, the People’s Revolution in Arab countries,
in 2011, as well as the mass revolts in Greece and Spain, in 2012, and Turkey and Brazil,
in 2013, are responses to the multiple dimensions of the neoliberal systemic crises. In one
way or another, they address the political crisis (related to democracy and civil rights),
energy crisis, climate change, ecological crisis, and food crisis.
In the 1990s, the protests against the WTO, IMF and the G8 summit were held in
wealthy western cities such as London, Seattle, Montréal, Genoa, and Prague, but by
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2011, the occupy protests spread to 951 cities in eighty-two countries, which showed the
horizontality and continuity of the movement against neoliberal globalization. These
protests and revolts do not have a particular common ideology or a program within
themselves or even under the auspice of the larger anti-globalization global movement,
but they are ideological and have a common enemy: neoliberal capitalism and its
oligarchy.290 I believe anthropologist and activist David Graeber explains very well the
character of this movement as related to the new concept of democracy:
It’s distressing that, two years after Seattle, I should have to write this, but
someone obviously should: in North America especially, this is a
movement about reinventing democracy. It is not opposed to organization.
It is about creating new forms of organization. It is not lacking in
ideology. Those new forms of organization are its ideology. It is about
creating and enacting horizontal networks instead of top-down structures
like states, parties or corporations; networks based on principles of
decentralized, non-hierarchical consensus democracy. Ultimately, it
aspires to be much more than that, because ultimately it aspires to reinvent
daily life as whole.291
At the present time, civic movements against the neoliberal globalization consist
of disparate identities and even different political struggles that aim at the core of power:
recreating political subjectivities to reinvent democracy. The protests around the world
during the IMF, the World Bank, and G8 meetings since Seattle 1999, the WSF
gatherings since 2001, the teacher’s uprising in Oaxaca, in 2006, the Arab Spring and the
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Occupy Wall Street Movement that followed in 2011 and spread to more than 2,556
cities across eighty two countries and more than six hundred communities in the United
States the same year, the occupation of government buildings by Indignados in Spain and
massive revolts in Greece that took place in 2012, and the Gezi uprising that wrote
history in Turkey in 2013, all responded to systemic crises and sought for an opening to
an alternative avenue for political representation beyond that of neoliberalism.292
That these movements do not present a clearly unified set of demands indicates a
significant mistrust of the very form of political representation that would respond to
such demand by co-opting it. Another important reason is that the defeat of the
revolutionary Left paved the way to an unexpected critical angle on revolutionary praxis:
the taking into account the network of capitalist social relations in which the state is
embedded. As Holloway argued, in a way, the fall of Soviet Union and the neoliberal
world order not only liberated the market but also liberated revolutionary thought from
the conquest of power.293 To a greater extent, the character of global revolt is marked
more by organized spontaneous events than by organized politics. Hence, on the
revolutionary capacity of the movement Takes Fotopoulos notes:
The fight to build a new anti-systemic movement inspired by the paradigm
for a true (inclusive) democracy, which to be successful has to become an
international movement, is urgent as well as imperative. The anti292
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globalization movement has the potential to develop into such a
movement, if it starts building bases at the local level with the aim to
create a new democratic globalization based on local inclusive
democracies that would reintegrate society with the economy, polity and
Nature in an institutional framework of equal distribution of power in all
its forms.294
As Fotopoulos stresses, the continuity and anti-systemic rigor of the movement depend
on the level of consistent consciousness of participants towards anti-systemic change, and
only “if direct action is an integral part of an anti-systemic movement then the chances
are very high for the creation of a democratic majority for anti-systemic democratic
change, something that has never happened in History.”295
I posit that the communal spirit of resistance among the villagers in India,
inventive student strikes against the raising of school fees in Argentina and Chile, the call
for creative demonstration tactics by alternative radio stations during the five-month
occupation of the government buildings by the peoples of Oaxaca, Mexico, the
occupation of parks and streets through the occupy movement around the world, as well
as the commune tent village in the middle of Istanbul during the Gezi uprising, in Turkey,
are good examples that indicate an anti-systemic consciousness in various geographies in
the world, which constructs itself as the first elements of direct democracy. These are not
merely a few reformist protests; students, workers, small farmers, the unemployed, the
indigenous, and urban dwellers have been fighting against neoliberalism and new forms
of power and spaces of democracy have been built.296 This “movement of movements”–
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as the Zapatistas called it–is diverse and disperse, yet share a common area of collective
aesthetics.
In the beginning of the twentieth century, with the emergence of the antiglobalization (alter-globalization) movement, both political protest and artistic protests
have taken a new form and space. It is in this creative arena that new political
subjectivities are created. Belgian sociologist Geoffrey Pleyers argues that many features
of the anti-globalization movement only become intelligible once the movement is
conceived of “not as a homogeneous movement but as an uneasy convergence of two
tendencies, one centered on subjectivity, the other on reason, and both asserting the will
to be an actor within and in the face of globalization and against neoliberalism.”297
According to Pleyers’observations, activists, by defending the autonomy of their
lived experience, counter the infiltration of neoliberal capitalism into all spheres of their
lives. In their everyday lives and relationships, these activists seek to overcome personal
traits and social relations that have grown out of the logic of the market. They do this by
creating the so-called spaces of experience that are “sufficiently autonomous and
distanced from capitalist society [to] permit actors to live according to their own
principles, to knit different social relations and to express their subjectivity.”298 Pleyers
explains that these are spaces where imagination, and pleasure are embraced and
celebrated as integral to political engagement. They stress horizontality instead of
hierarchies, strong participation instead of delegation and representation, and a rotation of
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tasks instead of specialization.299 Graeber also takes note of the aesthetics of activist
organizations that he observed during anti-globalization protests:
In fact, from the perspective of the activists, it is again process—in this
case, the process of production—that is really the point. There are
brainstorming sessions to come up with themes and visions, organizing
meetings, but above all, the wires and frames lie on the floors of garages
or yards or warehouses or similar quasi-industrial spaces for days,
surrounded by buckets of paint and construction materials, almost never
alone, with small teams in attendance, molding, painting, smoking, eating,
playing music, arguing, wandering in and out. Everything is designed to
be communal, egalitarian, and expressive.300
As I argued earlier, neoliberal ideology perpetuates itself in person to person
exchanges Dimitris Papadopoulos reminds us that: “The pervasive strength of
neoliberalism should perhaps be sought in the combination of more effective strategies or
the accumulation of capital with a transformation of government chiefly supported by a
new understanding of the relations between the individuals which stresses the aspect of
exchange between them.”301 Transversal social encounters in the spaces of activism and
rebellion transcend the immediate reality of existing social relations. While the
regeneration of neoliberal domination revolves around the manipulated ideas of freedom
and democracy, a new political subjectivity in the spaces of resistance reconstruct these
ideas for the actualization of an egalitarian society.
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Rethinking Politics and Art: Aesthetics, Carnival, and Revolution
In a global order under neoliberal rationalities, practices and regimes with new
technological possibilities, economic crises, climate change, ecological destruction,
disastrous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and growing inequalities both within nation
states and between nation states, we are confronting resistance of a new kind that
questions traditional concepts of power and power relations. Also owing to this new
world order, the forms and means of the resistance have been dramatically altered, by
changes in communication technologies, such as social media in addition to other
transformations in social and cultural processes and practices. Resistance to power has
emerged from the most unexpected places, establishing new relationships between
aesthetics and politics with the vision of radical democracy on one hand, new strategies
of disagreement and rebellion on the other. With that, the sphere of aesthetics has become
a key site where new political communities can be produced. This has erased the
boundary between today’s visual and political culture, and it requires a new direction in
art criticism.
It is the dearth of art historical scholarship that has been disappointing, having
inadequately interrogated the sphere of aesthetics of recent movements and uprisings,
which–with their communal, egalitarian, as well as expressive practices–have inspired
many contemporary philosophers to produce a robust body of research on the
contemporary return to revolution.302 For example Art Historian Julia Ramírez Blanco
recently analyzed the Reclaim the Streets protests, of the early 1990s, from the
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perspective that “all political movements develop their own aesthetic strategies.”303 In
fact, “aesthetic strategies” are specific to social and cultural movements in the twentieth
century. In her article, “Reclaim the Streets! From Local to Global Party Protest,” Blanco
introduces the idea that “there is a certain ‘artistic’ or ‘creative turn’ of activism in the
beginning of 1990s with the Reclaim the Street parties.”304 Blanco further explains, “in a
society where mass media plays such an important role in the creation of meaning,
activism becomes spectacular in order to reclaim attention.”305 This is not only a
redundant view of the current aesthetic realm of activism, but it is also redundant view of
aesthetics.
Since the early 1990s, institutional contemporary art has been increasingly
influenced by the art of social movements that is poorly described under the general
labels of “activist art” or “artivism.” To understand contemporary art, especially in regard
to its relationship with neoliberalism, it is essential to understand the visual
representations that occupy directly the sphere of radical politics.
Rebellious actions have always contained the elements of carnival, but since the
Reclaim the Streets protests in London in 1996 (an early movement that stressed its
character as a joyous street party), which tactically influenced other anti-globalization
(alter-globalization) movements, these actions have become so explicitly carnivalesque
that they have often been referred as carnivals against capitalism. The common elements
of the carnivalesque–the erotic, the grotesque, the laughter, the shock, and the
subversion–can be found in the radical art interventions of the 1960s, which introduced
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artistic expressiveness to the political movements. The interventions of the Situationist
International, Fluxus and the San Francisco Diggers dealt with urban space to create new
social experiences. On the other hand, Happenings by performance artists Robert
Whitman, Carolee Schneemann, Jim Dine, Claes Oldenburg and Yayoi Kusama (and
many others in Europe) confronted the conventional categories of art and delineated the
borders of art and daily life through using spontaneous carnivalesque actions as the
negative force for the “society of spectacle.”306 In this decade, these interventions
remained as actions of the artistic avant-garde and did not take form of a massive street
protest. Nevertheless, Raoul Vaneigem, one of the participants of the Situationist
International, anticipated the merging of such carnivalesque art interventions with street
activism decades in advance. Vaneigem wrote:
The Street Party can be read as a situ-esque rehearsal of this assertion; as
an attempt to make Carnival the revolutionary moment. Placing what
‘could be’ in the path of ‘what is’ and celebrating the ‘here and now’ in
the road for rush for ‘there and later,’ it hopes to reenergize the possibility
of radical change.307
As with the interventions of the 1960s, in today’s anti-globalization street protests that
derive from the character of street carnival, the acts themselves become as important as
the revolutionary moment.
The two action groups that were visible catalysts in the Reclaim the Streets
protests, the Pink and Silver bloc and Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army
(C.I.R.C.A) as well as Tute Bianche—the Italian anarchist/activist group active in the
Carnival Against Capital protests across Europe, from 1994 to 200—have clearly derived
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their tactics of confusion and subversion from the Situationist International and other
avant-garde art interventionists of the 1960s.308 Those activist groups make visible a
cultural criticism on issues of gender, bio-politics, and racism while their practical goal is
to confuse the police and avoid violent confrontations in the frontlines.
A good example for such carnivalesque acts in protests would be that of the
Masquerade Project, a New York collective’s intervention organized by L.A. Kauffman,
Mark Leger, and David Crane in the summer of 2001.309 The participants of the project
foresaw that, instead of anarchists with banners in their hands confronting the law, their
version of corporate mainstream media “would feature a much more slippery image–
queer bodies in a carnival together and in contradiction to these strange and oppressive
police officers in their cookie-cutter uniforms.”310 They converted the gas masks that
police wear during demonstrations when they are ready to release chemical gases to
suppress masses into props for drag performances (Figures 3.1).
In the hands of these artist activists, gas masks became carnival masks, while they
transformed the identity of the person who wore them, the masks themselves were
transformed from an object of utility to a queer prop. They made dozens of such masks to
distribute at the September 2001 meetings of the IMF and World Bank protests in
Washington, D.C. On the Internet, they published their manifesto and asked for donations
to pay for the cost of the masks. The activist/artists announced: “We believe our
movement should reflect the world we want to create. And for us, that is a world with
loads of color, sparkle, variety, and individual creativity…We are using bright paints,
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rhinestones, sequins, glitter, and trim to transform the masks we will be giving away into
splendid and sassy creations.”311
Similar to the theatrical attacks of the 1960s, where political performance avantguardists aimed to fuse art and life, the creators of Masquerade Project produced a street
cabaret for hundreds in order to reveal a contrast between life and the forces of
oppression. While the queer activists masked themselves with the symbolism of carnival,
with extravagantly decorated masks, those masks also served the practical purpose of
protecting them from chemical gasses. By giving away the masks for free, the
participants of this project denied the exchange value of the objects that they labored to
produce, all the while showing the world that, on the streets against oppressive forces of
the state, they cared for each other. In other words, they gave the world a glimpse of the
kind of new world they want to build.
Spanish artist Marcel Expósito’s work, Tactical Frivolity + Rhythms of
Resistance (39 min., 2007) captures the praxis of carnivalesque very similarly to that of
the Masquerade Project (Figure 3.2). Expósito together with artist Nuria Vila explore the
key aspects of new activism during anti-globalization protests in Prague with the concept
of “tactical frivolity.”312 The term explains the multiplying frontlines of protest that use
an ironic sense of femininity and kitschy representations of the body in direct
confrontation with the police. Expósito and Vila’s video shows women dressed in
outrageous pink dresses with nine-foot-high fantails. With giant bouffant wings on their
heads and magic wand in their hands, these women try to confuse the police. The video
further shows that music and dance provide this radical redefinition of street protest, not
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only with a powerful tool to practically dissolve or detour police violence but also with
the strongest possible image (and soundtrack) to show how, during street demonstrations,
one can unleash hidden desires as much as rage in the moment of protest itself.
With this video, Expósito builds on his earlier work, Radical Imagination
(Carnivals of Resistance) (61 min., 2004), where he traces the origins of the counterglobalization movement by documenting the occupation of the financial center in
London, one of the main protests that took place on the The Global Action Day in June
18, 1999, which came to be known as “J-18” and “Carnival Against Capital.” The video
opens with series of images from historical paintings and scenes from black and white
movies that ties together ritual, carnival art and performance, then continues with the
interviews of the activists and scenes from the carnivalesque street demonstrations. The
organizers produced nine thousand masks and explained the significance of the masks in
their publication Do or Die:
Those in authority fear the mask for their power partly resides in
identifying, stamping and cataloguing: in knowing who you are. But a
Carnival needs masks, thousands of masks; and our masks are not to
conceal our identity but to reveal it...The masquerade has always been an
essential part of Carnival. Dressing up and disguise, the blurring of
identities and boundaries, transformation, transgression; all are brought
together in the wearing of masks. Masking up releases our commonality,
enables us to act together, to shout as one to those who rule and divide us
‘we are all fools, deviants, outcasts, clowns and criminals.’ Today we shall
give this resistance a face; for by putting on our masks we reveal our
unity; and by raising our voices in the street together, we speak our anger
at the facelessness of power. On the signal follow your color. Let the
Carnival begin...313
Expósito’s video emphasized the role and symbolism of the mask and the
significance of the carnivalesque in activist praxis and, as he says: “the mask expresses
the joy of sequence of reincarnation, of light-hearted relativity and the negation of
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identity and the single meaning, it is an expression of a transferral, metamorphosis,
breaking down frontiers, ridiculing, of new name…”314 One of his interviewees in
Expósito’s video asserts: “…Unless you create a space where people enjoy changing the
world, a space of joy and conviviality, you are not going to change anything … We
wanted to get away from a traditional confrontational protest situation and prefigure our
imagined world in the moment of the joy of the protest itself.”315 Expósito, as an artist
and activist, in those two video works highlights the free and joyous contact among the
people who intend to break the usual hierarchical relationships in the society.
Since the Revolutionary Anarchist Clown Bloc made its appearance in
Philadelphia, in 2000, with their unicycles, squeaky mallets, and big shoes and confused
the police, dressing up in clown costumes or other types of carnival costumes has become
a visual mark of today’s young activist generation (Figure 3.3). This tactic symbolizes the
awareness that when confronted with humor and nonviolence, the hands of the
establishment are tied. A bunch of clowns beaten by police, or people in fantasy costumes
being tear-gassed, disturbs the image of any government.
They’re attempting to invent what many call a ‘new language’ of civil
disobedience, combining elements of street theatre, festival and what can
only be called non-violent warfare–non-violent in the sense adopted by,
say, Black Bloc anarchists, in that it eschews any direct physical harm to
human beings. Ya Basta! for example is famous for its ‘tute bianche’ or
white-overalls tactics: men and women dressed in elaborate forms of
padding, ranging from foam armor to inner tubes to rubber-ducky flotation
devices, helmets and chemical-proof white jumpsuits (their British cousins
are well-clad Wombles). As this mock army pushes its way through police
barricades, all the while protecting each other against injury or arrest, the
ridiculous gear seems to reduce human beings to cartoon characters–
misshapen, ungainly, foolish, and largely indestructible. The effect is only
increased when lines of costumed figures attack police with balloons and
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water pistols or, like the ‘Pink Bloc’ at Prague and elsewhere, dress as
fairies and tickle them with feather dusters.316
Often clowns, giant puppets, effigies, drums, and people in all sorts of circus
characters join the carnival. Effigies, drums, and other musical instruments are usually
passed from one activist to the next because the act is meant to be that of a collective
imagination. Sometimes puppets can be worn as masks or used as gas masks, as well.
Commenting on this visual carnival, Graeber emphasizes the transgressive character of
the circus representation:
In fact, there’s usually no clear line between puppets, costumes, banners
and symbols, and simple props. Everything is designed to overlap and
reinforce each other. Puppets tend to be surrounded by a much larger
‘carnival bloc,’ replete with clowns, stilt-walkers, jugglers, fire-breathers,
unicyclists, Radical Cheerleaders, costumed kick-lines or often, entire
marching bands–such as the Infernal Noise Brigade of the Bay Area or
Hungry March Band in New York—that usually specialize in klezmer or
circus music, in addition to the ubiquitous drums and whistles. The circus
metaphor seems to sit particularly well with anarchists, presumably
because circuses are collections of extreme individuals (one can’t get
much more individualistic than a collection of circus freaks) nonetheless
engaged in a purely cooperative enterprise that also involves transgressing
ordinary boundaries.317
The use of costumes and the mask, fluid identities, the concept of the upside-down world,
the comic violence, transgression, the satire and laughter, and all other subversive acts
that could disturb the submissiveness of everyday life. An influential figure of the 1968
Revolution, Vaneigem noted in his widely celebrated book by the activists The
Revolution of Everyday Life: “Revolutionary movements are carnivals in which the
individual life celebrates its unification with a regenerated society.”318 Nevertheless, the
question is: Could the chaotic, undetermined, and subversive acts during protests and
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revolts of the masses on the streets eventually disturb the organization of time and space,
consensus-based thinking, and value creation processes of the market? I believe that the
declaration of the ACME Collective after the “Battle of Seattle” is pertinent here:
When we smash a window, we aim to destroy the thin veneer of
legitimacy that surrounds private property rights. At the same time we
exorcize that set of violent and destructive social relationships which has
been imbued in almost everything around us. By ‘destroying’ private
property, we convert its limited exchange value into an expanded use
value. A storefront window becomes a vent to let some fresh air into the
oppressive atmosphere of a retail outlet …A dumpster becomes an
obstruction to a phalanx of rioting cops and a source of heat and light. A
building face becomes a message board to record brainstorm ideas for a
better world…The number of broken windows pales in comparison to the
number of broken spells cast by a corporate hegemony to lull us into
forgetfulness of all the violence committed in the name of private property
rights and of all the potential of a society without them. Broken windows
can be boarded up (with yet more waste of our forests) and eventually
replaced, but the shattering of assumptions will hopefully persist for some
time to come.319
The ACME Collective’s declaration not only insists that the meaning of a
building or a dumpster or a window is not fixed in this reading, the statement is made
within the context of a meeting of a global political body (the WTO) whose only
objective is to value capital as expressed through property rights, human beings and the
environment–to reduce the world to exchange value.320 Graeber has a significant take on
this:
The targets–often carefully researched in advance–are corporate facades,
banks and mass retail outlets, government buildings or other symbols of
state power…Consumer capitalism renders us isolated passive spectators,
our only relation to one another our shared fascination with an endless
play of images that are, ultimately, representations of the very sense of
wholeness and community we have thus lost. Property destruction, then, is
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an attempt to ‘break the spell,’ to diver and redefine. It is a direct assault
upon the Spectacle.321
Then I ask: “Is this a revolutionary moment that has the potential of the constant
remaking of communities with an unpredictable and uncontrollable activity, or is it a
transient form of engagement that tones down social critique and sanitizes political
expression by spectacularizing it for popular appeal? In searching for the answer I take
the concept of carnival not as an observed form of interventionist art, but as a
revolutionary principle that creates a breakdown of existing social relations and the
sudden emergence of quite different relations between people. This could also be
paraphrased as unexpected relations of support and solidarity, as theorized by Bakhtin
and referred to by Subcomandante Marcos of the Zapatista movement, and
academics/activists John Holloway, David Graeber, and Gavin Grindon, to name a
few.322
As I argued earlier, the global anti-capitalist movement, which lacks a program
with localized and understood forms of politics–in other words, anti-political politics–
reinvents the political praxis of today’s anti-systemic movement. Precisely under this
creative and subversive practice of this movement, the carnivalesque aesthetics occurs.
This is perhaps best explained by the words of Subcomandante Marcos: “The Revolution,
in general, is no longer imagined according to socialist patterns of realism, that is, as men
and women stoically marching behind a red, waving flag towards a luminous future.
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Rather, it has become a sort of carnival.”323 Here, the carnival both points to the aesthetic
sensibility of the revolution-in-the-making and to the practice of politics as anti-politics.
In his oft-quoted work by the activists and theorists alike, Rabelais and His
World, Bakhtin analyzes the social function of carnivalesque and the role of grotesque
symbolism, imagery, and language in the work of the sixteenth-century century writer
François Rabelais and argues that carnival is an art form because it is a spectacle, but it is
an inverted spectacle.324 Bakhtin sees the carnival as a popular expression of subversion,
a “world turned inside out,” in which people can attack, resist, and invert the systems of
power that structure their everyday existence. Bakhtin focuses on the “carnival spirit”
precisely because of its power to reconfigure established official social relations and
beliefs. In Rabelais, Bakhtin implicitly criticizes the Soviet intellectual and political
circumstances of his times when Stalinization of culture reached its peak. Bakhtin states
on the significance of the carnival: “They offered a completely different, nonofficial,
extra-ecclesiastical and extra-political aspect of the world of man, and of human
relations; they built a second world and a second life outside officialdom…”325 His
criticism against the establish order and his conceptualization of carnival as a vehicle for
the symbolic expression of representations against power make Bakhtin a popular theorist
at present in activist circles.
In light of Bakhtin, carnival could be thought of as the festive organization of a
crowd–sensual and subversive–that is charged with political as well as aesthetic
experience. It also could be thought of as a multitude of shattered unities, a displaced
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spectacle within life, where the new utopian order replaces its sovereign. This kind of
union celebrates people’s freedom, equality, and brotherhood in an exultation of sensory
experience. At this in-between stage of existence, one is transferred to the other, with the
euphoria of change and renewal. Thus, I theorize carnival as the aesthetic process of
regeneration with a collective experience of self-awareness. In this sense, to me, carnival
is the aesthetical dimension of the process of creating radical subjects.
Bakhtin’s emphasis on the collectivist angle of the carnivalesque also gives
anarchists and other activists an anti-hierarchical model that appeals to their
revolutionary aspirations. Bakhtin theorizes that during social events, such as carnivals,
bodies are de-individualized and belong to a collective force.326 Those collective bodies
represent an altogether different social structure, where the emphasis is shifted from the
life of the individual to the life of “the people.” Individual bodies, then, are representative
less of individual subjects and more of a community. While theorizing the relationship
between corporality and subjectivity, Bakhtin shows that social bodies are made from a
process of transgressions: transgressing boundaries between bodies while also
transgressing class boundaries.
Revolutionary subjectivity depends on the disavowal of corporal boundaries as
much as on diminishing social boundaries. I argue that the realization of new political
subjectivities lies within the combinative process of de-individualization that occurs
behind the barricades. Disparate groups that participated in the protests find means to
express their anger and disappointment for the existing system, while experiencing a
social bond that connects them across their racial, class, and identity differences. This
alternative forms of sociability generate egalitarian relationships that strengthen social
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bonds between different classes and social groups that otherwise identify themselves
through an antagonistic relationship with one another.
During the biggest public uprising in the Turkish Republic’s history, the Gezi
uprising, there were some unusual scenes. For example, the anarchists made a wall with
their bodies to ensure the protection of the Muslims who pray, the LGBT groups’ overtly
sexual language composed the subversive slogans, and the football hooligans of Turkey’s
four biggest teams, who would never come together in a single photograph, enjoyed their
brotherhood and posed for cameras in their football clubs’ uniforms. According to
Bakhtin, the “mass body” in the carnivals is rebellious and subversive in spirit and action
because people experience “the utopian realm of community, freedom, equality, and
abundance.”327 The experience of the protesters during the Gezi resistance was summed
up in many national and international media as well as in social media with the
conclusion “nothing will ever be the same again!”328
Influenced by the ideas of Bakhtin, activists often use the term carnival to
describe the character of the movement. In a book compiled of activist accounts from all
over the world on anti-globalization or alter-globalization protests, the activists declare:
“We attempt, through our aesthetic and our fierce commitment to the politics of joy and
desire, to create a space of carnival where all rules are broken and anything is possible.
We seek to dissolve all barriers between art and politics, participants and spectators,
dream and action.”329 Every other year, the World Social Forum opens with a carnivallike march. Since 1999, when the big global organization Reclaim the Streets (RTS) took
place in London and was called “Carnival Against Capital,” phrases such as the “carnival
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of resistance” and “carnival of the oppressed” have become more popular to describe
both the aesthetic and political dimension of the protests. 330 In their book Multitude,
Hardt and Negri also reference Bakhtin’s notion of carnival in their added section titled
“Carnival and Movement,” and acknowledge that the global protests against capitalism
are carnivalesque, “not only in their atmosphere [but] also in their organization.”331
Carnival, after all, makes the rebellion more enjoyable, inclusive, joyful,
irresistible, and continuous. The anti-globalization movement embodies principles such
as diversity, creativity, decentralization, horizontality, egalitarianism, and direct action–
the same principles that are in the heart of the carnival. On the common aspects of
carnival and direct action of today’s activism, the activists comment:
It [carnival] demands interaction and flexibility, face-to-face contact and
collective decision-making, so that a dynamic and direct democracy
develops–a democracy which takes place on the stage of spontaneously
unfolding life, not raised above the audience but at ground level, where
everyone can be involved. There are no leaders, no spectators, no
sidelines, only an entanglement of many players who do their own thing
while feeling part of a greater whole.332
The visual, conceptual and practical aspects of carnival in the alter-globalization
protests are undeniable. Looked from a pragmatic view these acts appear to be only
effective momentarily on the frontlines and their long term effects have been questioned–
especially by sociologists who lump many spontaneous disruptive acts in the protests
under a category of “activist art.”333 Here, my aim is not to question the effectiveness of
interventionist tactics of the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army, the Revolutionary
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Anarchist Clown Bloc, the Tute Bianche or that of the Reclaim the Streets party, but to
further the discussion on carnival aesthetics as a way of creating revolutionary
subjectivity and political communities as experienced in the spaces of rebellion, revolt,
and resistance.
Aesthetics, defined traditionally as the “science of the sensible,” entails the
constitution of specific forms and orders of visibility and speech, which, for Rancière, is
where politics is staged. Rancière borrows his concept of aesthetics from Immanuel Kant
and Friedrich Schiller, and regards it as a form of experience. More bluntly, Rancière
aesthetics involve making visible what we share in common, in the realm of the visual
and the sayable, and politics is the way in which this kind of sharing takes place.334
Carnival is a sphere where social representations, which are never articulated or spoken,
can be erected. As Denis-Constant Martin puts it: “The multiple modes of expression
activated during the celebrations and highly symbolic nature of carnival practices offer
ways and means to escape the censorship of verbal language and the exclusive logics of
politics.”335 Carnival serves a particular space for the unseen to be seen and the unheard
to be heard.
Rancière’s thoughts on the link between aesthetics and politics are concentrated
on the “distribution of the sensible,” that is, the unequal distribution of what we share in
common in a community in terms of common wealth, knowledge, and sensibilities.
According to Rancière, aesthetics does not just imbricate in politics per se but
reconfigures the political systems of power with a specific historical organization of
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social roles and communality that he calls “communities of sense.”336 In Rancière’s
terms, power in the political space corresponds to power over the regime of production
and the distribution of speech and images. This, he calls the “aesthetic of politics”. On the
other hand, the “politics of aesthetics” can be understood as specific “communities of
sense” that constitute object and subject relations as well as representations and
meanings. Thus, Rancière concludes: “The relationship between art and politics is more
precisely a relationship between the aesthetics of politics and politics of aesthetics.”337 In
that regard, I argue that political spaces of dissent aim to establish a difference between
representing what is political and acting politically. The difference lies in the practice of
aesthetics as a mode of communal, perceptual experience that creates civil disobedience
and dissensus (disagreement).
I argue that today’s anti-systemic resistance involves the movement of the
“unseen” and “forgotten” people, not that of a political party, group, or ideology. Many
forms of contemporary political activism–whether on the mountains, on the streets, or on
Internet pages–aim to construct the means for being “seen” and “heard” rather than for
taking power. Struggle for a direct democracy is precisely related to the struggle of the
democratic use of public and virtual space, which also could be understood as the
battlefield on which the conflicting interests of the dominating and the dominated are
contested.338 The struggle for a democracy is thus a struggle for the means to be visible
and audible–a struggle to constitute the means for equal representation. The intersection
of aesthetics and politics is where this struggle takes place. The uprising in Oaxaca,
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Mexico, against the repressive neoliberal regime of Governor Ulises Ruiz Ortiz, also
popularly known as the teachers’ resistance, could be a good example to start such
discussion.
In May 2006, the annual teachers’ strike took an unexpected turn when the state’s
Governor Ruiz refused to increase the education budget and raise teachers’ salaries. The
teachers responded to this hasty refusal by a sit-in protest that’s known as plantones, in
front of public buildings, in the center of town Zócalo. In the early morning of July 14,
the teachers and their supporters were confronted by police in riot uniforms, bullets, tear
gas, helicopters, and death squads. The neighborhood peoples retaliated by bringing to
the planton a collective support in the form of food and first aid. The police were ordered
to extricate the strikers by force. The same day, three hundred different groups–from
students to indigenous communities that came together to form the Popular Assembly of
the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO, in Spanish)–took over the Radio Universidad and began
calling for the immediate resignation of Ruiz. When Ruiz answered this demand with
thousands of fully armed police, what had begun as a sit-in of civil servants became a
full-fledged conflict between the people of Oaxaca and the state authorities.339
In spite of repeated police brutalities, violent conflicts, and random arrests as well
as the disappearance of several people whose whereabouts remain unknown, the APPO
firmly took control of the Zócalo and about fifty blocks around it. In the early days of the
uprising, the APPO called upon all Oaxaqueños to participate in the conflict according to
their skills and savoir-faire. This led to the creation of several artist collectives, ASARO,
Asamblea Revolucionaria de los Artistas de Oaxaca (Revolutionary Assembly of
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Oaxacan Artists) being the largest with thirty-five artist participants. Coatlicue, Revolver,
Arte de Pistola, and Arte Jaguar were the other artist groups that collaborated with the
ASARO behind the barricades. During a six-month occupation of government buildings
around the center of the town of Zócalo, the self-organized public APPO unleashed the
powerful reunion of the collective resistance forces and creativity against the power of
their oppressors within the city, state, and global economy.
There was an immediate representation of the movement with vandalism and an
unconstitutional attack on the democratically elected governor. Those included the
images of burning street barricades, masked people, gas bombs, firecrackers, burning
cars, and raised fists, shown in print media accompanying relevant articles in newspapers.
The street battle between repressive and resistant forces soon became “the battle of
images,” as I would call it, when the artists formed collectives and occupied the walls of
the city with their visual works. The two-dimensional images of rebellion on the walls
confronted the three-dimensional images of the brutality of vehicles transporting the
police, assassins, and paramilitary groups as well as the army in bulletproof vests and
with AR-15 rifles ready to move in any attempt to break the authority of power and
violence. While the clashes with the police continued, the art assemblies were created
spontaneously by the young painters and graphic artists who wanted to put their talent to
work in the service of the cause espoused by the APPO:
We have retaken the form of the assembly because we believe in the
possibility to recover the power of the collective in art and because the
assembly is the form in which the pueblos have a dialogue and hold
decisions based on collective interests. In this way, we respond as well
before the call of the APPO to create an ample front of civil resistance.340
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Given the danger on the streets (the police were still cordoning off the center of
town at the time), the strategy of functioning as an art collective had the advantage of
offering anonymity, greater tactical movements, and speedy coverage when pasting
posters or painting stencils on the city’s walls. Today, these works testify not only to the
specific events that shook Oaxaca in the summer of 2006, they also testify to an
understanding of the larger history of the resistance movements of the Mexican
indigenous peoples going back five hundred years. After the uprising, to capture the
memory of the resistance, art collectives continued to produce posters that now hang on
the walls of cafes, art centers, and cooperatives in Oaxaca.
One of the posters that captured the true image of the protests and became a
historical document for the Oaxaca people, as it memorializes the conflict, is the poster
titled “Oaxaca 2006: Women’s Resistance.” This caption, written in both English and
Spanish, immediately connects the uprising of underpaid government workers to the
women’s resistance in Mexico and beyond (Figure 3.4). Under the text is another caption,
which says “Celebrate People’s History” and a large paragraph (again in both English
and Spanish) that explains what happened during the fall of 2006. The poster contains the
stencil images of four women of different ages in local costumes, marching with pots and
pans in their hands. Other women, depicted by the lithographic print, hold a giant mirror.
Across their reflection in the mirror is written, “we are rapists” as a twisted response to
police’s use of sexual violence and rape as a repressive tactic.
This image literally represents hundreds of women behind the barricades who
shouted, “We are rapists.” The mirror reflects a black-and-white photograph of fully
armed federal police in their protective gear. The women exchange their image with the
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police on the mirror. Their reflection becomes the heavily armed representation of their
oppressor. Here, rape signifies not only its literal meaning but also signifies all that has
been taken by the state from the peoples of Oaxaca.341 This distinct and direct
confrontation defies the logic of the oppressor while using the oppressor’s own language.
Fascist representation that represses the possibility of resistance becomes the
representation of resistance. The occupation of government buildings in Oaxaca, for six
months, was not intended to send a message to the governor; it was a representation of
what belongs to the common people, who should construct and enunciate the real
political existence of the commoners.
The way in which the people of Oaxaca, the teachers, workers, housewives,
students, artists, street sellers, and the homeless defined “representation” in their own
way shows us what it means to make oneself visible to power and what it means to speak
for oneself.342 This is a mass of people shining forth with self-confidence and a feeling
that it is they who represent what is just and right. With that, they defy all conventions
and limitations of the existing legal system, regulating what constitutes a legal political
activity and democratic rights. I claim that creative representations of resistance
aesthetics, as experienced in Oaxaca, are capable of a rupture in the “consensus,” where
there is one reality that is framed by the political powers. This is the outcome of the
fundamental marriage between politics and aesthetics behind the barricades.
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In On the Shores of Politics, Rancière makes the poignant claim that “politics is
the art of suppressing the political.”343 Of course, what Rancière means by politics here is
electoral politics, and the global revolt is precisely against this kind of suppression. As I
explained earlier, at present, new forms of political demand by the excluded and the
outsider today happen in different ways than the previous movements. The strategy of
anti-political politics has been described smartly by the new generation as
“unproportioned creativity against unproportioned suppression.”344 Although this is a
motto used to describe the creative strategies and art of resistance during the Gezi
uprising, it also speaks for similar visual and textual strategies in the uprisings and
protests in Oaxaca and around the world.
I argue that each of the mass revolts, such as that in Oaxaca, particularizes the
global rebellion against the neoliberal world order within its particular local political
vocabulary and sensibility, while being connected to the global struggle for the
constitution of new forms of political participation and direct democracy. The events in
Oaxaca captured the imagination not only of the Mexican people but also of the whole
world. The world still sees the Oaxacan people’s resistance and demands with the
plethora of visual works documented and printed in the books and catalogs, displayed in
exhibitions in Mexico, the United States, Spain, and Cuba and more often on posters and
flyers circulated at the university campuses, at the sit-ins and demonstrations throughout
Mexico. Such visual legacy of the uprising has become one of the catalysts for the larger
anti-globalization movement. The connection of the global movement to the Oaxaca
uprising was quite apparent in the Havana Biennial’s 10th edition, in 2009.
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On the second floor of the convent and lesser basilica of San Francisco de Assisi
(built in 1719), one of the main venues of the biennial, the collective exhibition “Bisagra:
muestra multiple de arte, de re-accion, situaciones plasticas y otros reveberaciones”
(Hinge: multiple exhibitions of art, reaction, plastic situations and other reverberations)
invited the biennial audience to contemplate the aesthetics of street activism (Figure 3.5).
Curated by Patricia Mendoza, director from the Graphic Arts Institute in Oaxaca (IAGO,
in Spanish), “Bisagra” erased the borders between art and street politics.
The images of 2006 Oaxaca mixed with the traditional images of strong cultural
roots, such as those of Emiliano Zapata (Figure 3.6). Those photographs of the Oaxaca
uprising hung side by side with printed images of Zapatista women on batik material as
audiovisual testimonies of Qaxacans played in the room. The artists who were active in
the movement transformed street activism into what they called “audiovisual activism”
and “editorial poetics” to be exhibited further. The exhibition made strong references to
the global solidarity of the many heterogeneous activities–known as the anti-globalization
movement, and what I prefer to call the global anti-capitalist movement–which makes
use of communication networks as well as those of digital communication.
Although it is now common to “exhibit” aesthetic activities in protests by way of
reproducing them in photographs and video recordings, banners and posters, the artistic
space created during the street protests defy the institutionalized meaning and definition
of art. Another important aspect about these impulsive, regenerative, and communal
aesthetics I call “carnival aesthetics” that come to fore in the spaces of rebellion, revolt,
and resistance, is the attempted demolition of current art as a system as well as current
political system. The divide between artist and activist is suppressed. The artist, in his/her
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political activism, ceases to become an artist, which means s/he ceases to participate in
the system of art. This figure leaves his/her superior position in the society as an artist
and denies his/her role as the avant-garde driving force of the society. If, then, there is no
figure of the artist, can we still speak of art? How different is that from the anti-art of the
conceptual artists and Dadaists? In 1970, Theodor W. Adorno, in his book Aesthetic
Theory, noted: “...even the abolition of art is respectful of art because it takes the truth
claim of art seriously.”345 What if the abolition of art takes place in places where, who the
artist is and what art is, is an extraneous discussion?
Contemporaneously, in locations from the Saharan desert to a University campus
in Chile, the Chiapas Mountains to the narrow streets of Oaxaca, from Tahrir square to
Taksim Square, an anti-institutional aesthetic sphere has been visible and already
inscribed in the public consciousness. Perhaps this signals the end of art as a system of
definition, representation, presentation, and consumption. I argued that the carnival of
representation on the streets makes visible the imagined revolution in the real and ordered
political (public) space and that any alternative that comes out of this system also should
ensure the democraticization of everyday life.346
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The Art of Resistance: Aestheticizing the Revolt
The Gezi uprising, of early summer 2013 in Turkey, added to earlier, worldwide
civic unrest, in response to political repression and material inequality. Even as the Gezi
demonstrators inveighed against neoliberal transformations of Turkish society and the
authoritarian interventions of state actors that have enabled these transformations, their
networked heterogeneity was characteristic of the globalized revolt. Like other recent
protest movements, the Gezi uprising became the largest civil protest in the Republic of
Turkey, since its foundation 90 years prior, and manifested an important characteristic of
contemporary global revolts in which globalized modes of communication and public
spectacle were marshaled against the dominant political economy of neoliberalism.
On May 31, 2013, the people of Turkey, cowed by a history of coup d’état and
civil authoritarianism, woke up to a nationwide revolt without knowing that it would be
the biggest civil mass revolt of its history. The resistance was started on May 27 by a few
dozen protestors occupying the Gezi Park in the center of Istanbul in order to protect the
last piece of green space from turning into another superfluous shopping complex in the
city. The protestors often only read their books in the park and planted trees to replace
those ripped out by municipal workers as a way of demonstrating that they claim their
commons. Sometimes they also would read to police as an act of passive protest against
the armed forces of state. They held vigilance day and night to stop the trees from being
cut and construction bulldozers digging. Four days later, at dawn on May 31, police set
protesters’ tents on fire while people were sleeping in them and the police evicted the
park using tear gas and water cannons excessively. That day, the police brutality left
more than two hundred people injured and more than a dozen badly wounded. By dusk,
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thousands of people had gathered in all the regions of the state, in Ankara, Izmir, Mersin,
Adana, Antakya, Izmit, Konya, and Manisa, to protest.
While the mainstream media played the three monkeys in the most heated days of
the protests, the images of police violence upon peaceful environmentalists circulating
through social media burst the bubble of long-standing silence in Turkey. When the state
fiercely refused a few urgent demands made by a few environmentalists and responded to
them with excessive use of force by police, a long-standing time bomb against the state
went off. The protests on the streets and in the parks all around Turkey lasted about three
weeks, and afterwards the resistance entered a passive phase that is still alive today. What
I will discuss here are the ways in which collective shared sensibilities, which could be
identified as the aesthetic sensibilities of the community of people, can ensure the
continuity of the resistance, just as a popular Gezi slogan says: “This is just the
beginning, we carry on the struggle.”
My key point is that police violence as a collective trauma creates a social
bonding between people as well as collective laughter, as in Bakhtin’s theory of carnival.
I will argue that both violence and laughter, experienced collectively, function as triggers
to sensual experiences that allow individuals to transgress the borders of identity,
ethnicity, sexuality, and ideology. The kind of experience created by laughing and
crying–literally because of the inflammation caused by the tear gas--together with
strangers in an environment that could be life threatening, has a transformative effect on
individuals in terms of how they perceive others and even how they perceive the world
around them. I further argue that this kind of collective experience of aesthetics disturbs
common-sense-making mechanisms and enables a true dialogue between people, and
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thus creates channels of community mobilization, collective action, and communal
distribution.
To mask the root causes of the revolt, the national mass media portrayed the
protests as a “clash of civilizations” between secular and religious, or in other words,
Kemalist/nationalists versus Islamists. However, the voices of the participants were quite
heterogeneous. Workers, students, artists, housewives, communists, Kemalists,
anarchists, environmentalists, trade unions, anti-capitalist Muslims, the Kurdish
movement, feminists, LGBT activists, Alevis (a religious minority that is arguably a
branch of Islam), and the most notable and largest group, the middle-class-educated
youth in their early twenties, who have been stigmatized as an apolitical and lost
generation, constituted the profile of Gezi uprising.
What is today Turkey is a true ethnic mosaic of various Anatolian civilizations.
The Greeks, Armenians, Kurds, Roma (Gypsies), Turkmens, Jews, and modern day
Turks (the vast majority) make up this mosaic. In 1923, upon the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire, the nationalist and secularist regime took over and founded the Turkish
Republic. A monolithic national ideology shaped the modernist principles of the founder,
Atatürk (Kemalist), along with the new political elite that defined public space and the
rules by which politics should be conducted. This state regime produced its cultural,
social, and juridical mechanisms to marginalize and penalize those who did not identify
themselves as Turks and adhere to the principles of national ideology. As a result, the
multiplicity of voices and colors of Anatolia has been repressed. Although Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan came to power with his populist propaganda and his promise for democratic
change, in 2002, he thrived on the political mechanism that undermines democracy. He
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then held himself in power long enough to become an elected despot. Gezi uprising, with
its multiplicity of voices, cracked the political as well as social code that had held
together the mechanism of systematic repression of those who rejected or resisted the
state system. One of the main pillars of this system had been the Turkish army, which
functioned as the guardian of the Kemalist ideology and secularism. The military coups
in 1971 and 1980 not only repressed the Leftist sect and religious sect, they created an
environment of fear that would continue generation after generation.
Revolution, or mass revolt, in Turkey, does not constitute the same culture as that
of the Latin American countries that experienced military coups around the same
historical period. In Turkey, the masses have been apoliticized, and staying silent in the
most unthinkable condition has become the norm. For example, just before the onset of
the Gezi events, thirty miners died because of neglect in working conditions, an event to
attributed by Prime Minister Erdoğan simply to “fate.” No mass protests ensued. Erdoğan
then compared abortion to the bombing by the Turkish army of thirty-five Kurdish
civilians in Uludere (Roboski, in Kurdish), and there were no mass protests. In addition, a
few days before the Gezi uprising, fifty-two people (mostly Alevi) died in Reyhanlı in the
bloodiest terrorist attack in Turkey, after which Erdoğan responded with a muted voice
and there were no mass protests. A few people were tear-gassed by police for protecting
the trees, and the whole country rose up. Nothing is, of course, that simple. The sudden
burst of the revolt only showed that dissent against the Turkish government and the social
unrest was a result of a long process of forced neoliberal processes and conservative
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politics.347 The Gezi uprising sparked not only a nationwide resistance but created a
nationwide culture of revolt.
Although the prime minister and his puppet media insisted on dragging the events
to a safe zone of environmental resistance by repeated announcements that the Gezi
uprising is about “a handful of çapulcu (looters, plunderers) creating a mess over a few
trees, the issue, even his supporters knew, went far beyond that.”348 Erdoğan preferred
first to ignore and insult the protestors, but when this tactic enraged more people and the
plazas got more crowded, he chose to terrorize them. The Gezi uprising was the result of
the swift and heavy-handed neoliberal restructuring of the economic as well as social
makeup of Turkey by Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma
Partisi, AKP) since coming to power in 2002. With AKP’s neoliberal program and
conservative Islamic agenda, middle class and lower class religious conservatives who
had been excluded from of secular modernization processes since the foundation of
Turkish Republic in 1923 suddenly benefited from the drastic privatization campaign as
well as from the dismantling of the military–the insurance of the secular republic. Those
who did not agree with the AKP’s conservative orientation and its neoliberal program
found themselves on the edges of society, being increasingly impoverished and facing the
consequences of state repression. In addition, the privatization of public space, abolition
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of public services, and an increase in authoritarian politics crippled the social life in the
urban environment.
Since the early 1990s, after the onset of drastic neoliberalization of the economy,
the popular segments of the society entered into the post-modernization of culture
(especially with immigration from rural Turkey to the economic centers), which created a
new system of values. Those values included a new lifestyle—new kinds of music,
architecture, and fashion--that eventually constituted a new post-modern Turkish identity
that had decolonized from Western influences. Eventually, populist politics, popular
culture, and the culture industry together created an “entrepreneurial culture that is the
hallmark of reactionary neo-conservatism.”349 The cultural politics of the new political
elite of Erdoğan’s AKP party that came in power flourished in this environment. What
looked like a progressive development in culture, for the processes of democraticization,
eventually turned into an instrument of fascism.350 Erdoğan and his pro-Islam
conservative party seized the opportunity very well. His government, while boasting of
its role in the fall of military tutelage, behaved in even more authoritarian and
antidemocratic ways than the Kemalist elite’s statist modernization projects did, and at
any cost.
As argued earlier, neoliberal ideology is marked by liberalization of the markets
and privatization of public assets. In this system, while a strong hold on the state’s
economy is a great obstacle to be overcome, the authoritarian hand of the state is essential
for systematic privatization and stabilization of the economy in the face of inflation or
crisis in the financial markets. The state, for neoliberal economy, is also an essential
349
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instrument to marginalize, repress, and penalize those who resist. Thus, neoliberalism
weakened the state in order to liberate the market and strengthen the state as its
watchdog. Consequently, authoritarian statism accompanied the restructuring of the local
economy through neoliberal reforms. In turn, not only the promotion of competitiveness
and conceptualization of extreme individualism in society but also repression of personal
and collective freedom have become characteristics of neoliberal states. Pierre
Rosanvallon, French intellectual and historian, describes this new phenomenon, which
replaced the ideological totalitarianism of the past century, as an “elected despotism”;
other intellectuals prefer the term “neoliberal authoritarianism.”351 In the case of Turkey,
the rise of authoritarianism as a dominant state form has become the political feature of
neoliberal transformation since the 1980 coup d’état.
While neoliberal policies have become part and parcel of the Turkish economic
administration since the 1980 coup, the AKP amplified the processes to an unprecedented
level.352 Almost every remnant of the state, from bridges and power plants to the tobacco
monopoly (TEKEL, a parastatal company), state-owned banks and factories, have been
sold for pennies. The telecommunication, banking, energy, and manufacturing sectors
have been privatized. This enormous privatization campaign of the AKP in the past
decade has been used mostly to patch up budget deficits that soared after the 2001
economic crisis. And dissent, in any form, has been repressed with the record number of
arrests made against students, activists, academicians, writers, journalists, and lawyers in
the same decade.
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But the clear difference between the neoliberal regime of the AKP and its
predecessors has been the outlandish construction boom and planned urban restructuring
through the privatization of the public sphere, which constituted the backbone of the AKP
reign. For example, in Istanbul Karaköy, the Tophane and Salıpazarı coastal lines have
been restricted to public access as part of Erdoğan’s ostentatious project Canal Istanbul
that is estimated to create a grand investment market endangering the city’s already
debilitated ecological balance. The giant Turkish Mass Housing Administration (Toplu
Konut Idaresi, TOKI) has been operated under the direct control of the prime ministry
since 2003.353 TOKI and local municipalities, mostly under the AKP’s control, have
acted out as local agents of neoliberal urban restructuring.
With the Disaster Risk Management and Urban Transformation Act (2012),
Erdoğan’s government centralized urban planning, and thus, TOKI and the Ministry of
Environment and Forestry (T.C. Çevre ve Orman Bakanlığı) seized the single-handed
power to confiscate property, agree to terms, demolish, and rebuild. With that law, TOKI
could act like a private enterprise and lead unprecedented gentrification projects that
replace the poor and ethnically diverse communities with middle class and upper middle
class neighborhoods. In the highly volatile atmosphere of global financial markets, the
AKP placed betsoin the construction sector, attracting local and global capital flows. The
immense profit mechanism generated by the neoliberal urban development has provided
the AKP with unprecedented economic power that has greatly enhanced its political clout
in the country.

TOKI’s public housing projects that are mainly in Istanbul, Ankara, and a few other large cities on land
and capital owned by public, are measured to have contructed two million apartment buildings.
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The rise of the real estate enterprises, gentrification in the name of urban
clearance as well as rescaling and connecting all neighborhoods to the reproduction of
urban capital are the most visible outcomes of neoliberal globalization, which has
transformed the urban culture and affected people’s daily lives. Many campaigns and
collaborations with NGOs, activists, and academicians have taken place, and numerous
artistic platforms, projects, and interventions have been realized–especially in regards to
the urban projects in Istanbul’s historical districts that had been housing the Roma and
Kurds who immigrated from eastern and southeastern Turkey because of the
consequences of the battles between Kurdish freedom fighters and the Turkish army since
1983.354 The Taksim urban renewal project, which includes building an Ottoman-style
urban museum and shopping mall in Gezi Park, was a part of the mega-project toward the
complete gentrification of the Beyoğlu district–the historical and central and thus most
profit-generating area of Istanbul. Demolishing Gezi Park reflects almost all of the
characteristics of the shady urban politics of the AKP, which I briefly explained above.
Erdoğan’s insistence of this project at all costs should be understood within this context.
Thus, I argue that within the backdrop of these realities, the Gezi resistance was at once a
public outcry for true democracy, opposing to the neoliberal urbanization, and resistance
to the violence of the authoritarian state–all of which were outcomes of the neoliberal
globalization.
For those in power, reorganizing urban structure and urban life not only generates
enormous accumulation of capital in the face of the financial market crisis, but, most
importantly, it is a way to dominate and control restive populations. The reason that
Protests by the Istanbul Chamber of Architects (Istanbul Mimarlar Odası) and Istanbul Branch of the
Turkish Chamber of City Planners against urban destruction and gentrification projects are such examples,
as well as artist platforms such as Sulukle Platform.
354
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contemporary resistance movements are mostly urban-based uprisings is to reclaim the
common right to the urban public space and the right to decide how to use the public
space. Regarding the “right to the city,” Harvey, in his most recent book, Rebel Cities
explains, “It is, moreover, a collective rather than an individual right, since reinventing
the city inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power over the processes of
urbanization.”355 Harvey further states that in the heart of the multitude of diverse urban
struggles, there is one collective aim: “…their right to change the world, to change life
and to reinvent the city more after their heart’s desire.”356 As much a romantic political
idea as it seems, what Harvey means is to claim the power over the process of
urbanization entails claiming the power of self-determination over life and the social
relations in the city. As I discussed earlier, we are in a radically different phase of anticapitalist struggle. Urban public spaces are the site of both political dominance and
political resistance.
The first couple of images of the peaceful protesters being wounded by the police
attack in Gezi Park marked the sensory momentum in people’s minds and ignited a mass
protest at the somatic level. The psychological effect of the image of a woman in red,
being gassed by police aiming at her face, was picked up by other people who have been
suffocated in many other ways (Figure 3.7).357 And after this point, the choir of voices
screamed together: “We can’t take it anymore! We need air!” Erdoğan’s recent law that
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restricts alcohol consumption, his comments on abortion, his public speech about how
many children a woman should bear, his censorship on Internet and his threats of banning
social media altogether were a few of the many recent intrusions of Erdoğan to public life
that stripped people of their dignity and interfered their daily life decisions. His
commentary on social life was especially insulting to women; thus, it was not surprising
that fifty-one percent of the protestors were women.358
During the Gezi uprising, people started to call Erdoğan “dictator,” and the signs
and banners especially emphasized that they were fighting for a democratic life.
Certainly, the protestors did not mean an electoral democracy but freedom for selfrepresentation (a more localized governance), freedom of expression, and freedom to
conduct their personal lives without infringement from the state. Thus, it is not an
exaggeration to state that Gezi was a war of two different ideologies of democracy: the
one that turned the electoral democracy into authoritarianism and the one that seeks
democracy beyond the ballot box and in places where repression of false democracy
takes its toll–the everyday lives of the ordinary people.
It is the police and social media, to name just two of the institutions, that played a
key role during Gezi uprising. The police violence was the major trigger for people to act
upon the authoritarianism of Erdoğan and the social media, as well as the walls of the
streets, provided the space for communication, mediation, organization of opposition, and
at the same time, a platform for a series of creative outbursts.
Immediately after the first police attack on the protestors who had been camping
in Gezi Park for three days, in the main plazas of Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Hatay, and
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Eskisehir, the physical protests were accompanied by visual protests in virtual space and
in public spaces. When Taksim Square resembled a war zone with gas bombs covering
the crowds in a vast area, several TOMAs, (Toplumsal Olaylara Müdahale AracıIntervention Vehicle to Social Events), burning vehicles, and hundreds of injured people,
the mainstream Turkish TV channels were continuing their scheduled shows.
The prestigious news channel CNN Türk showed a two-hour documentary of
penguins in Antarctica and repeated it again afterwards on the most violent nights of the
uprising. Immediately after, the altered images of the penguin documentary on CNN Türk
circulated on social media networks, with penguins in Antarctica as militant rebels with a
humorous caption “Antarctica is Resisting! Penguins: The problem is not the melting
ice!” (Figure 3.8). On the following day, the visual and textual reaction to the brutality of
the police intervention and negligence of the media was rather amusing. The graffiti of
penguins representing Gezi protestors appeared everywhere in the city, from blank walls
to billboards, from bus-stop advertisements to pavements to declaring a visual war on
censorship and neglect of the mainstream media. Perhaps that was the moment the visual
resistance started to assume the character of the carnivalesque laughter. From that
moment on, there was a limitless creativity that turned the uprising into a visual revolt as
well.
The media of this visual carnival was so diverse that wherever we looked, we
were bombarded with photographs, graffiti, paintings, cartoons, murals, dance and music
performances, photo installations, live art performances, Internet memes, and altered
pinup images. Even the traditional art of miniature was one of the media used for
unprecedented creative explosion. There was not a day without a theatrical, musical, or
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dance performance taking place at the squares. The walls, pavements, and billboards of
the cities turned into canvases for amazing creative activities. In this particular case, art
was not struggling to make new connections among citizens of the city; art was the
struggle. The Gezi uprising is not only the biggest grassroots political resistance in the
history of modern Turkey but is also the biggest aesthetic rebellion, with a giant artistic
boom not only of street aesthetics but also of countless painting, graphic, and
photography works that have been in view after the street clashes were over.
Street graffiti that is updated daily, bowdlerized humor, political cartoons,
creative use of twitter and other social networks, and swearing and inflammatory
language through these networks to criticize those in authority, added to the visual
carnival (Figure 3.9). The carnival started with the first day of occupation of Gezi Park—
with people walking around in clown costumes, all sorts of drummers playing, people
chanting, dancing and drinking in the park, and with the chapuller penguins (çapulcu
penguenler, in Turkish) appearing on the walls in the city (Figure 3.10). People did yoga
on one corner, prayed on the other, and danced halay (a traditional folk dance) on the
other. The Turkish Airline workers added another element to the carnival of resistance.
Two dozen of them performed an usual flight demonstration, with a comic twist: “Your
life jacket is the fellow protestor next to you. In case of emergency, physical aid as well
as morale and motivation will be provided to you by your life jacket. In such cases, grab
your life jacket, pull it toward you and hug it tightly. Afterwards, laugh and cry
together.”359
As I explained earlier in this chapter, according to Bakhtin’s theory, one of the
most subversive elements of the carnivalesque spirit is the carnivalesque laughter.
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Bakhtin talks about the upside down world perspective of medieval humor that mocks the
grotesque elements of authority and crowns the town idiot as king. For Bakhtin, this
foolish humor creates a common humane bond between people and also acts as a social
force that allows an unusual perspective to enter a sociopolitical discourse, while
enjoying impunity, and thus brings about cultural transformation. In the context of
today’s global revolt against the system, Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and laughter has
been a great influence to the urban uprisings around the world because it is understood as
a temporal crack in the patterns of domination. Although, it is only temporal–and thus is
subject to harsh criticism–I believe that the reason Bakhtin’s view of carnival is
important today because a collective laughter acknowledges the possibility of a subtle
shift in the individual’s world view and social consciousness that would be continuous.
John Holloway interprets this as a crack in the capitalist relations and explains it: “This is
a time too in which laughter breaks through the seriousness of the business of domination
and submission, not individual laughter but a collective laughter that opens towards
another world.”360
During the most active days of the Gezi uprising, the graffiti on the city walls,
satirical magazines, caricatures and posters circulating in social media moment by
moment not only enhanced the carnivalesque spirit but also provided people with an
astonishing resilience and morale (Figure 3.11). People literally were crying because of
the tear gas and the wit on the street’s walls, at the same time. After a while, tear gas
completely lost its ability to disperse crowds; on the contrary, slogans such as “this gas is
fabulous,” “do you have it in strawberry flavor,” and “we are gassed, it is not possible to
stop” were written on the walls, and people were chanting at police to gas them so that
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they could get going. The humorous spirit helped the protestors to pass the threshold of
fear that for decades was the most powerful weapon of oppression of the state in Turkey.
“Laughter is a revolutionary act” has become one of the slogans of the Gezi spirit;
the slogan was borrowed from the young radical revolutionaries of the 1960s. The image
of the selfie taken by two young people in front of a large group of police (as a tribute to
the selfie taken during the Oscar ceremony that became the most seen photograph in
history) is a good example of this spirit (Figure 3.12). The young people, when taken into
police custody, often smiled at the cameras with a gesture of victory. A smiling person,
hands cuffed, being dragged by a dozen police and knowing that mistreatment and even
torture is waiting at the police station, has proved to be the most subversive act against
the extreme act of police violence. Another image, popularly posted on social media with
a caption, “This is why we will win,” was that of a boy laughing at a wall of a dozen
heavily armed police lined up with their bulletproof shields (Figure 3.13).
During the two-week occupation of Gezi Park a commune emerged. Leaving their
quotidian existence behind, people experienced a harmonious and autonomous society in
the absence of the state. It was an experiment of communal organization and life. Free
stores, called “revolutionary markets,” libraries, public bathrooms and showers, a medical
clinic tent (where even minor surgeries were performed), media production zones,
discussion platforms, cultural events, a podium for music and art performances, a Gezi
museum (where photographs, posters, and other objects of resistance were being
exhibited), and food tents were established and run with mutual aid. It was a large
utopian (even surreal) camp where money did not exist, and horizontal dimensions of
collective organization determined life. People abandoned the logic of capitalism and
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created the world they dreamed of living. It was truly inspirational, not only for the
people of Turkey but also for the people of the world who seek social transformation.
However utopian this experience was, the collective power, which raised its visibility in
this urban space of conflict, created its own heterotrophic and democratic existence. It
was in the instant when the public re-dwelled and reclaimed urban space, collectively and
embracing their differences, that the meaning of public space was re-formed.
A critical Turkish journal called Express dedicated its June 2013 issue to the Gezi
uprising. In the editorial article, it writes; it happened exactly as Alan Badiou formulated,
as an “event.”361 Badiou argues that: “An event is a rare and unpredictable immanent
break from the prevailing language and established knowledge of the situation. That is
why it cannot be foreseen, or easily recognized.”362 Badiou, who came for a conference
and visited certain neighborhood forums right after the Gezi Park occupation asked very
prompt questions on the democratic character of Gezi:
Is the action being guided by the Idea of popular emancipation and
equality? Or by a desire to create a solidly established middle class that
will be the mainstay of a Western-style ‘democracy,’ that is, completely
subject to the authority of Capital? Do they want a democracy in its
genuine political meaning, namely, a real power of the people imposing its
rule on landlords and the wealthy, or ‘democracy’ in its current Western
meaning: consensus around the most ruthless capitalism, provided that a
middle class can benefit from it and live and speak as it wishes, since the
essential mechanism of business, imperialism, and the destruction of the
world won’t be tampered with? This choice will determine whether the
current uprising is just a modernization of Turkish capitalism and its
integration into the world market, or whether it is truly oriented toward a
creative politics of emancipation, giving new impetus to the universal
history of Communism.363
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I believe Ali Rıza Taşkale’s response is perhaps the best the Turkish people could
come by to answer those questions for now: “What we could and should learn from Gezi
uprising is that the people of Turkey aren’t powerless, indifferent, depoliticized, they
have a choice. The event is not far away. Central, then, to Gezi revolt is the idea of event,
which enables an opening to the virtual within the actual.”364
On the dawn of June 16, the police, under orders from Erdoğan, cracked down on
protestors in Gezi Park by throwing gas bombs into the tents while people were sleeping
in them. After a few hours of attacks with water cannon and gas canisters directly
pointing at the tents, people ran away in panic, the park was emptied, and Taksim Square
was cleaned out of the debris of barricades. Very early the following morning, the police
did the same thing to the occupiers of the parks in Izmir, Ankara Eskisehir, and Hatay,
and Erdoğan declared his victory over chapullers (looters).
Instead of rejecting and opposing being called “looters,” protesters embraced it.
Giving a name to people that cannot be reduced to one single identity resulted a feeling of
belonging to a pluralistic identity of multitude. Plural identities were not eroded but coexisted under the name “looters.” Being a looter enabled communication regardless of
identitarian prejudice. Identities are not eroded but in a way unified under another
identity given by the Prime Minister. In that sense, the Gezi uprising did succeed in
demolishing the power of the identitarian fiction.365 As Costas Douzinas points out
regarding this identification: “the relatively neutral term ‘crowd’ is accompanied by a
number of negatively charged words which express fear and contempt towards a social
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category that acts outside accepted and tolerable norms.”366 This relentlessly subverts the
conscious-making mechanism of socially accepted identity of a political group, while
overturning the logic of a tyrant who goes by using degrading adjectives for the
oppositional public just for the sake of exercising his power on them.
A few days after the violent eviction of the Gezi Park and demolition of the
commune, a completely different dynamic took over the streets just when the people had
lost all hope of continuing the resistance. A photograph of a man standing still in the
middle of Taksim Square, once again made eyes turn to the center of Istanbul. Erdem
Gündüz, a performance artist, stood for eleven hours until AKP and Erdoğan alarmed the
mayor, Hüseyin Avni Mutlu who until then had said the police would not intervene in
such a peaceful protest. After the arrest of Gündüz “for standing,” his performance was
picked up all over Turkey and later around the world by young and old people from all
walks of life, in solidarity with the Gezi uprising (Figure 3.14). For more than a week, in
social media and mainstream media, the standing performances of ordinary people in
parks, avenues, plazas, and sidewalks were shown. Sometimes, people spontaneously
organized a collective stand-up performance in their neighborhood at a spot culturally or
politically significant to them. The street resistance transformed into passive civil
resistance all over the country. People in the major cities of Europe and the United States
also performed this passive resistance of standing still in solidarity with Gezi uprising.
It was understood that, although the Gezi protestors were not just emotionally
exhausted but physically injured as well, “the Gezi spirit” was alive with full force.
Consequently, people started gathering in their local parks all over the country to discuss
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the new phase of the movement.367 The neighborhood assemblies were organized and the
parks of the major cities of Turkey have been transformed into democratic platforms
where everybody can speak and be listened to. The meetings were organized through
social media with a certain theme to be discussed and held every day in the evening in the
parks of large and small neighborhoods. Just like the protests, there were diverse groups
of people of all ages and ideologies. Even the groups, which are historically antagonistic
to each other–those that could never tolerate each other’s existence in public spaces, such
as the football hooligans and gays, the Kemalists and Kurds, the Sunnis and Alevis–
listened to one another and acknowledged each other’s views in a democratic way. The
platforms not only made the resistance discursively tangible, they were successful in
solidifying the momentum created by the protests.
In late August, another spontaneous civil disobedience across the nation began
when a 64-year-old retired engineer, Hüseyin Çetinel, living in Taksim-Beyoğlu district,
started the most colorful protest in the city. One night, Çetinel decided to paint a large
staircase in front of his house to give the citizens something colorful to look at instead of
gray, crumbling concrete (Figure 3.15). However, his unintended activism was picked up
by LGBT groups, and after images of the rainbow-colored stairs circulated on social
media, the historic staircase immediately became the site of contestations between the
government and the Istanbulites. When municipal officials sent workers after nightfall to
repaint the stairs gray, a quiet warfare broke loose.
The color of Turkish politics has been gray for a much longer time than the
AKP’s reign, literally and metaphorically. The landmark of Ankara, the capital of Turkey
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since 1923, is its massive modernist, gray buildings.368 The colorful tones of the
Anatolian ethnicities also have been painted to gray by monolithic politics and the
intolerant attitude of the nationalist state since its foundation. After thousands of calls on
Twitter to repaint the stairs again, Istanbulites of all colors united against the state of
gray, not only in Istanbul but in many cities all over the country. The repainting of the
rainbow stairs seemed to Istanbulites to be yet another sign of intolerance and a lack of
respect for their right to claim public space. Within three days, proud people posted
hundreds of photographs on social networks of the colorful stairs, walls, pavements, and
cobblestone pathways in their neighborhoods (Figure 3.16).
By the end of the week, some people took their children to see the newfound
colors of the city’s streets; some took bridal pictures in front of the staircase and some
just hung out there with friends. With that, not only big squares and parks but narrow
streets and alleys became a space for public gatherings and a colorful unification of those
who refused to be grayed out. It was the moment for ordinary people to voice their
resistance by means of color, and this time, the rainbow colors were not the symbol of
LGBT activism but were a carnivalesque symbol of unification of the people of all
backgrounds who stubbornly said no to the authoritarian state.
Another incredible example of the aesthetics of resistance came from an 85-yearold woman living alone in the city of Elazığ. Nadire Kaya protested the police barricades
in front of her house in both humorous and practical ways. She hung her vegetables to
dry on the iron bars of the police barricade (Figure 3.17). Her answer to the alternative
In May 2011, a Turkish nurse named ŞuleYüksel Yılmaz won a memoir contest organized by the
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media personnel who came to interview her was this: “I am poor. I live in a small house
without balcony. Where would I dry my peppers?” Kaya then added, “But, I made the
police barricade beautiful, didn’t I?” Drying vegetables at the end of the summer to be
used later in the winter is a well-known, cultural practice in Turkey. An 85-year-old
woman made her poverty visible by aestheticizing what she thought was ugly in front of
her house. This simple act of passive resistance turned upside down the symbolic and
practical meaning of a police barricade. Unfortunately, those barricades are now a part of
mundane life in the cities of Turkey, and one cannot escape those ugly iron barriers.
Kaya’s act is a good example of how ordinary people make their dissent visible via
simple aesthetic statements.
Kaya, like Çetinel, wanted to determine what she would see in front of her house,
instead of the ugly sight of the demonstration of power. The citizens of the city reclaim
the spaces that belong to them by aestheticizing their surroundings with their sensibilities.
Kaya’s act also showed that the commonly established meanings and significance of
things should be questioned and even undermined, even through a small act of
subversion. Perhaps the aestheticization of daily life as seen in the examples of rainbow
stairs and bell peppers on police barricades is the antidote to hegemonic-sense-making
mechanisms and the grayness of our collective thinking.
Consensus in a given society has a strong grip on social life. It operates with a
fixation on the same, repeated ideological concepts that have been fed to the mind by
various visual, textual, and oral sources. This process blocks the avenues in an
individual’s mind to reach awareness that there are multiple perspectives and alternative
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possibilities for ideas, events, and ways of life.369 Historical fascism has showed us that
fascism is not outside of collective thought; on the contrary, it is a radical outcome of
thinking together but in singular form, and thus creates a culture of consent.370 As
opposed to the experience of the mind–the thought process–the sensible experience of
violence creates a memory of trauma on the body, and in the case of a mass uprising, on
the collective body.
The impact of traumatic bodily experience is thus both heterogeneous and
singular at once. It is heterogeneous because every individual has a different
physiological and psychological reaction to traumatic experiences; it is singular because
fear in the face of direct confrontation with life-threatening violence is a universal human
experience. This is when ordinary thought process is broken, and collective thought, with
its entire ideological anchor loses its firm grip. In this case, the fabric of sensory
experience of the masses–the aesthetical experience–is not controlled by a political
mechanism but is reconfigured spontaneously by the masses within the vehemence of the
moment. Thus, in such instances, a very difficult kind of political solidarity can be
witnessed among different classes in society.
Months after the streets have become quiet in Turkey, the death of Berkin Elvan,
after being in a coma for 269 days, tapped the collective memory of the people who
participated in Gezi and prompted them to, once again, remember the vulnerability of life
in the face of state terror. A14-year-old boy was shot in the head by a tear gas canister
pointed directly toward him. His struggle for life for nine months became inspiration for
continuous resistance. When his death was announced on March 10, 2014, enraged
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people flocked to the streets in cities, towns, and villages all over Turkey. People who
went to the child’s funeral went there knowing that it could be them the next time who
would be severely injured or dead. Nevertheless, within an hour, the news of the two
deaths and the number of heavily wounded circulated in social media. People who
participated in the funeral procession overcame the fear of death and put themselves in a
dangerous position, knowingly acting on their conscience, not logic.
One may think that the police force also formed a collective body during the
protests. However, there are significant differences that completely disturb the sensory
experience of a police collective. The police trained to minimize their sensory experience
and to become machines themselves. All of the rituals of their training are about
sterilization from human-to-human contact. Their contacts with other bodies are through
sterile police instruments such as handcuffs, the baton, the gun, the shield, and the belt,
etc. We also can add to the mechanization process the ritual of watching or participating
together in the physical and mental torture of the detained individual who is in the
“privacy” of a detention facility or a special interrogation room at a police station. Even
in the face of fear, the police are not drawn into human contact like the protestors; their
bodily contact with each other is through the contact of the armors, shields, gas masks,
helmets, weapons, and bulletproof vests in the ritualistic manner in which they are
trained. Within the fascist aesthetics of collectivism, whether it be in the form of soldiers
marching in a divine order through the avenues of a city, police forming an impeccable
barricade on a street corner, or planned neo-Nazi demonstrations, no possibility of
subversion is retained.
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To talk about the aesthetic of the masses as a subversive act, the key is to
recognize the rituals of the bonding process. Fascist aesthetics of collectivism are
choreographed and well-thought performances that turn people into things (also the
multiplication or replication of things) around an all-powerful, hypnotic leader figure.371
On the other hand, the rituals of collectivism and commons are generated spontaneously
within the moment of creative fervor and joyful exaltation in community festivals,
carnivals, celebrations and collective resistance, and in the case of other collective
sensory experiences, such as a massive mourning.
More than one million people attended a Kurdish and Alevi boy’s funeral
procession, which was one of the most crowded funerals in the history of Turkey. The
Gezi spirit once again was evoked during this funeral with a rage toward Erdoğan’s
despotism and his unending provocations condemning the child and his family as
terrorists and ordering his riot police to attack the people protesting upon news of the
child’s death the day before funeral. The collective rage made more people attend the
Alevi-Kurdish funeral (that ethnic group is the most marginalized in Turkey) despite the
expected heavy-handed police intervention. As in the tradition after the passing of a
martyr, in which people usually walk with carnations in their hands, this time they
walked with a loaf of bread, symbolizing the violent attack of the police on the boy who
had left home to buy bread.
The tradition of demonstrating oneness by pinning the martyr’s black and white
photograph on the clothing over one’s heart, this time, changed to wearing facemasks
bearing the cartoon image of Berkin’s face (Figure 3.18). In this gathering, Berkin’s mask
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substituted for the usual mask of the protestors–the Gay Fawkes mask, popularized by the
comic book series and film adaptation “V for Vendetta” and prevalently used during the
Gezi protests, just like other protests around the world. The traditional symbolism of
similar funerals changed within the spontaneity and context of the event, while the rituals
of social bonding were repeated. Thousands of people became invisible under Belkin’s
image.
Protest is in itself a ritualistic performance: the gathering of the masses, the
slogans, songs and dances, the building of barricades, and finally the confrontation with
police forces. According to sociologist William Turner, rituals are the “social glue” that
holds a given society together in spite of social and class conflicts and competing social
norms and values.372 One of the rituals of bonding during the Gezi uprising was a
traditional dance called halay. In this dance, a large group of people holds hands and
dance together in a circular fashion. While rhythmically moving together, not only the
hands but also the entire body of a person touches the body of the others. Although in
different styles and tunes, halay is practiced in all regions in Turkey. During weddings, it
is a joyful celebration, and after one’s passing, it becomes an act of mourning. It is a
dance of coming together, emphasizing the brotherhood and enacting the oneness of the
community. In the southeast and east of Turkey, where the majority of population is
Kurds, halay has become a political symbol of unity and liberation from oppression. The
painting by an anonymous artist with the caption “Dancing halay is an ideological act”
was one of the most popular images circulated through social media that depicted a group
of young people dancing halay in front of the burning barricades (Figure 3.19).
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During the occupation of the parks in major cities, people danced halay to the
tunes of drums or the recorded folk songs. In some of those instances, Turkish people
danced to the Kurdish songs of liberation, holding hands with Kurds. Now, many people
have stories of seeing a boy with the Kurdish rebels’ flag rescuing another person holding
a Turkish flag (or vice versa) in the most heated moments of the clash with police. What I
argue is that collective grieving–as much as collective joy, as in Bakhtin’s theory–
strengthens social bonds between different classes and ethnic and religious groups that
otherwise identify themselves through an antagonistic relationship with one another.
During the Gezi uprising, oppositional communities engaged in the same civil war
resisted police attacks together in the daytime and danced together in the nighttime. From
these intimate bodily encounters and social bonds emerged a dialogical relationship
between Kurdish and Turkish people. They talked and discussed the battles with police,
the state violence, and the singular view of the Turkish media. Through these dialogues,
many Turks had to come to grips with the fact that their perceptions of war in Kurdistan
were mediated by the same media and through the same state channels of oppression that
now are silencing them. This kind of coming-together with the enemy inspired an
unthought-of reconciliation and a revolutionary union. For the first time in Turkey, after
thirty years of active war in Eastern Turkey between Kurdish rebels and the Turkish
army, people in the West–far away from witnessing the reality of the war and having
learned about it through mediated sources–had second thoughts about it. After some
thirty five years of state propaganda, visual and textual bombardment, and systematic
brainwashing about the Kurdish people, the idea that the Kurds, who were merely
seeking freedom and justice, constituted the evil party in the war lost its credibility. As
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Hardt and Negri emphasize, “participants experienced the power of creating new political
affects through being together.”373
Another unimaginable development was the record number of participants in this
year’s gay pride march. More than fifty thousand people were adorned in rainbow colors
in the face of an excessively homophobic Turkish society. Friends in the parade told me
that the majority of the people were straight and were in solidarity with the LGBT
crowds. The LGBT organization had an office in the liberated zone of Taksim and
provided a crucial infrastructural support to the Gezi uprising; they also had succeeded in
smashing patriarchal and homophobic manifestations during the Gezi protests. There are
numerous interesting stories about the interactions between the homophobic groups and
the LGBT activists. One of them is about Çarşı Beşiktaş (a football team support group
that played a key role in the uprising) that entered the LGBT office to apologize for their
homophobic and sexist slogans and behaviors. They explained that this was what they
had been taught by society, and now they understood the ill outcomes of it. In Turkey,
especially during the AKP governance, women and LGBTQ people, have been subjected
to violence more and are less and less tolerated in public space. Erdoğan’s idea of
reimagining the society contributes to this environment of discrimination, as he and his
male cabinet often make homophobic and misogynist comments. Yet, at Gezi, women
and queer people were present, perhaps more than ever, in making public space truly
public.374
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I am aware that such a statement might look like a romantic reading of the
resistance. However, in the context of Turkey, one must witness such a thing to know that
it is fact. The people of Turkey, with diverse religious, ethnic, sexual, and ideological
backgrounds, experienced an unprecedented togetherness in the history of Turkey. The
egalitarian life of the commune and this togetherness has become known as “the Gezi
spirit.” Sociologist Meyda Yeğenoğlu, in her article “Smells Like Gezi Spirit,” talks
about Talal Asad’s distinction between “democratic sensibility as an ethos” and
“democracy as the political system of the state” to understand the nature of Gezi spirit.
Yeğenoğlu comments:
By remaining indifferent to democracy as a political system that is
instituted in a top-down fashion, they are now accomplishing a
carnivalesque displacement of existing enmities. But, as Asad’s analysis
reminds us, it will become clear in the coming period whether the
democratic sensibility that flourished in the park will have the power to
permeate and determine the state’s politics or whether the state’s
sovereign politics of democracy will undermine the democratic sensibility
that has emerged through the protests.375
Many Gezi protesters I talked to, and many of who have been interviewed or
whose opinions have been published, have expressed that what they experienced in Gezi
changed them and their perspective of the world around them. For example, their vision
of homosexuals and of the Kurdish movement has been greatly subverted because they
have realized that what they have been told by the media is a perverted version of the
truth and must be questioned. 376 The revolutionary carnival is precisely this: It is not
simply a letting off of repressed energies in a brief period and returning to normal life the
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day after. The everyday of the individual is never the same after. This is also emphasized
in the popular slogan during Gezi: “Nothing will be the same Again!”377
The Gezi uprising should be thought of as a part of many local movements against
neoliberal urban transformation and mega real estate projects–small and large
hydroelectric, nuclear and thermal power plants–as well as part of the wave of antiglobalization demonstrations, the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement.378 Gezi
spontaneously created democratic encounters for diverse and rival subjects—socialist
revolutionaries, Kemalist nationalists, Kurdish militants, LGBT activists,
environmentalists, football fanatics and feminists—and their struggles.
During the occupation of Gezi Park, which lasted two weeks, one could literally
see the much talked about “Gezi spirit” on the façade of the Atatürk Cultural Center
(Atatürk Kültür Merkezi) that faces Taksim Square (Figure 3.20).This building is one of
the most prominent architectural symbols of Kemalist modernization. First a giant banner
established the main slogan of Gezi, “Do not bend your neck!” Soon, others followed
with pictures of Che Guevara and the leaders of the 1960s leftist movement who were
hung after the coup d’état of March 12, 1971. One noticed, with awe and inspiration that,
on the walls of the most controversial building in Turkey, the representation of Atatürk
and the representations of the nationalist party along with those of Kurdish party and
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communist party came together–something that Turkish politics had not been able to
achieve since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.
This democratic togetherness–a carnival of representation–was the first thing
Erdoğan ordered his police to destroy when the heavy-handed police intervention started
the eviction of the park after sixteen days of occupation. Hence, it is the plurality of
representations that people saw, the possibility of true democracy they envisioned, the
solidarity of disparate voices they heard, and the egalitarian life they experienced, that
will be permanently held in the collective imagination as a glimpse of a possible future
society worth fighting for. C’est Une Révolte, Pas (Encore) Une Revolution! This is a
revolt, not [yet] a revolution!” is the famous phrase that King Louis XVI said to his
advisers during the outbreak of the French Revolution. If this significant bottom-up
pressure were to bring a radical change in Turkey, we cannot foresee it at this moment.
Yet, the path is wide open for new possibilities. Gezi showed that a new politics is in its
awakening.
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CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICS AND POETICS OF SELF-REPRESENTATION: THE
ART OF THE ZAPATISTA MOVEMENT
Since the nineteenth century, popular struggles around the world have emerged to
resist the ways capitalism establishes culture as a great representation, a pattern of order,
and an identity system. In the late 1960s and the 1970s, indigenous movements arose in
response to development projects imposed by states and multilateral corporations. Since
then, culture has been instrumentalized not only for power groups to use to support
unequal social distributions but also to inspire local popular movements in their struggle
for autonomy and resources.
The recent Zapatista movement emerged as a solution to a contemporary problem
that has confronted the anti-capitalist movement: how to link up a diverse array of
linguistically and culturally distinct peoples, and their struggles. For the Zapatistas,
culture and political resistance are inseparable, as political resistance has become their
world vision. Their everyday life is organized around the struggle for political and
cultural self-determination. They struggle to keep the social system they have been
building since 1994: self-governance with a direct representational system and communal
land as the basis for economic and cultural production. Their struggle continues under the
direst of socioeconomic conditions because the practice of the social and political system
they have created is not separate from their daily lives. For the Zapatistas the art of the
possible consists in extending it to all aspects of life: it is the art of creating possible from
the impossible.
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Zapatista Movement in Chiapas and Zapatismo
As noted in an article in We are Everywhere, a publication produced by a
collective of international activists who are on the frontlines of the anti-systemic global
movement, the date January 1, 1994, marked the beginning of the global rebellion: “a
rebellion which is in constant flux, which swaps ideas and tactics across the oceans,
shares strategies between cultures and continents, gathers in swarms and dissolves, only
to swarm elsewhere.”379 On this day, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejercito
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional or EZLN) rose up in arms and took over government
buildings in six cities of the state of Chiapas, Mexico, and called the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) a “death sentence.”380 The NAFTA accord, involves
Mexico, the United States, and Canada, removes most barriers to trade and investment
among those countries and implements neoliberal economic processes in the Americas.
From the early 1980s onwards, in Mexico, just as in Chile, Argentina, South Africa,
Turkey, and Southeast Asia, the structural adjustment program of neoliberal reforms
began to take its toll. NAFTA was designed to drive large numbers of farm workers off
the land, increase rural misery, and result in surplus labor.381 In Mexico, like everywhere
else, deprivation has dramatic effects, especially on people living in rural communities.
As Chomsky observes:
In the past decade of economic reform [referring to the 1980s] the number
of people living in extreme poverty in rural areas increased by almost a
third. Half the total population lacks resources to meet basic needs, a
dramatic increase since 1980. Following International Monetary Fund
(IMF)-World Bank prescriptions, agricultural production was shifted to
export and animal feeds, benefiting agribusiness, foreign consumers, and
affluent sectors in Mexico while malnutrition became a major health
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problem, agricultural employment declined, productive lands were
abandoned, and Mexico began to import massive amounts of food. Real
wages in manufacturing fell sharply. Labor’s share in gross domestic
product, which had risen until the mid-1970s, has since declined by well
over a third. These are standard concomitants of neoliberal reforms.382
For the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Mexico
presented an exemplary story of neoliberal success, a result of the government quickly
privatizing most state assets. Around this time, the Institutional Revolutionary Party of
Mexico (Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI)–the party that governed Mexico for
more than seventy years (1929-2000) had lost its class-transcending hegemony in the
wake of the Tlatelolco massacre, of 1968, and economic reforms of the 1970s that had
left the urban middle class in discontent. The PRI viewed neoliberalism as an opportunity
to restore its political and hegemonic power by reorienting the social relations of
production to favor a particular class.383 Adam Morton articulates it this way:
“Neoliberalism in Mexico did not involve the dismantling, or retreat of the state, but the
rearrangement of social relations into a new hierarchy.”384 This new set of relationships
also allowed the Mexican state to complete the process of class formation that had not
been settled since the Mexican Revolution. Hence, for the peasant and working classes of
Mexico, just as anywhere else in the world, neoliberalism brought increasing poverty and
exclusion. 385
In Mexico, the 1990s marked a decade of guerrilla insurrection, which included
operations conducted by the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) in states with significant
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indigenous populations, such as Oaxaca, Michoacán, Puebla, and Tabasco, and, in
Chiapas and other places, by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). Despite
the efforts of the Mexican government to prove otherwise, the Zapatista rebellion turned
into an uprising that included several different indigenous peoples who were interrelated
through cultural practices. In their battle against neoliberalism, which they call “global
decomposition” and “the Fourth World War,” the Zapatistas initially emerged in response
to the “bad government of Mexico” on the day of the ratification of NAFTA.386 Since
then, they have built their long-term struggle on the consciousness of anti-neoliberal and
anti-capitalist thinking; all the while, they have constructed their own democratic system
in the Lacandon Jungle.
The Zapatistas, with all of their national and international support, did not try to
begin a national insurrection to challenge the government, as did revolutionaries of the
past. Their understanding of power is not that of the old revolutionary movements.
Marcos comments: “If we asked for an independent Mayan state, we would immediately
be recognized by the UN, the IMF and the World Bank. They’d say to us, look, we
recognize you, we will finance you, we will give you weapons and soldiers, and whatever
you want, because it is what suits us.”387 The Zapatista movement is significant because it
resists corruption by the existing political system. Moreover, by rejecting any attempt to
take national power, they establish themselves as a struggle of “non-power,” a notion
difficult to classify in the contemporary vocabulary of political science.388 Their fight for
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equal representation and autonomy rejects and challenges the legitimacy of the state as
the authority of political representation in favor of autonomous Marxist principles of
participatory (direct) democracy.389
The ideology that ties the Zapatista movement to the Italian labor movement and
autonomist Marxism are embedded in the concept of new internationalism, which is not
bound to a party or grounded in any specific socialist model. Not only do the Zapatistas
bring fresh perspectives into the modern concept of democracy, which traditionally was
strictly defined within bounded national spaces and rooted in national sovereignty, they
aim to strengthen civic society. Most importantly, for the anti-globalization (alterglobalization) movement, what the Zapatistas set in motion has been a worldwide
discussion about the current state of class struggle and a worldwide mobilization aimed at
finding new and more effective ways of interlinking opposition to capitalism and
elaboration of an alternative system.390 The Zapatistas did not create a Marxist guerilla
movement to spark a revolution of the proletariat, but they did influence a civic,
democratic movement.391
As mentioned in the Chapter 3, Zapatismo, the self-coined ideology of the
Zapatistas, does not have the character of a systematic philosophy. It dismantles
preconceived notions of how social change should occur. It borrows from both the radical
389
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and anti-capitalist protests of the 1960s and the spontaneous peasant revolutions of the
nineteenth century; yet it calls for a participatory democracy exercised by indigenous
villagers across Mexico, before as well as after the conquest. The notion of autonomy,
with localized direct and understood forms of structure and of power within non-power,
reinvents the concept of Zapatismo. Marcos, on every occasion possible, underlines the
path of Zapatismo as “a form of rupture in the continuation of domination” in its political,
social, and cultural trajectory.392 Moving along this path, Zapatistas not only have
challenged the paradigms of traditional revolutionary strategies but also those of
neocolonial thinking that, for five hundred years, had not allowed alternative local
politics to develop.393
As I argued previously, the Zapatistas directly and indirectly have played a role in
developing the concepts for new radical politics and shaping the emergence of the antiglobalization (alter-globalization) movement. They also visibly influenced the indigenous
movements in the Americas, local movements across North America and Europe, and
elsewhere.394 The Zapatista movement is also significant in practical terms as well as
ideological terms. In Mexico, peasants and indigenous groups, completely independent of
EZLN have been taking up its battle cry by occupying municipal government buildings,
blockading banks, and demanding their right to land. Students and workers all over
Mexico have been inspired not just to support those indigenous peasants, but also to
launch their own struggles against domination and exploitation. Mexican factories that
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once could repress militant workers with impunity are now subject to observation and
sanction by workers from the United States and Canada, who increasingly have been
intervening to constrain repression, just as indigenous militants and human rights activists
have intervened to help the Zapatistas.
The Zapatista movement and Zapatismo have been received in different ways by
autonomist Marxists (those in academia and in activist circles), who embrace the
movement as giving momentum to a worldwide struggle, and by the “ultra-left,” who
identify it as a limited indigenous struggle with a nationalist framework.395 Although both
tendencies define themselves in autonomous class-struggle terms, they have different
theoretical approaches to the Zapatista movement.
The general criticism, based on what seems like a contradictory ideological
stance, can be summed up in five viewpoints: (a) Zapatistas do not seek to abolish the
nation state; thus, they are reformists. (b) Zapatistas use national symbols–the national
anthem and the Mexican flag–and have national demands so they can only constitute a
national movement. (c) Zapatistas claim to negate power but they use power. (d)
Zapatistas are not proletariat so they do not constitute a revolutionary class. (e) Zapatistas
are not revolutionary because they have neither a revolutionary program nor an
internationalist agenda.
“Ultra-left” is a term that generated by the 1920s in Germany, which describes a breed of
antiauthoritarian Marxism (it is also associated with left sectarianism). For more on the criticism of “ultraLeft,” see “Unmasking the Zapatistas,” Wildcat 18 (1996): 30-35 and Pedro Pitarch, “The Zapatistas and
the Art of Ventriloquism,” Journal of Human Rights 3/3, (2004): 291-312. And for more on autonomist
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In fact, the Zapatistas are reformists and revolutionaries as well as nationalists and
internationalists at the same time. That is to say, they seek specific democratic
transformations in Mexico on the one hand and build a radical logic of change that calls
for global transformation on the other–a challenge to more traditional Marxist thought. In
short, the character of the movement should be understood neither solely in terms of
traditional Marxist philosophy nor by focusing on indigenous folklore. Instead, they
should be understood through a dialogical perspective that analyzes both knowledge
systems.
For Zapatismo neoliberalism is the new world conquest, a battle for the conquest
of the markets. Thus, fighting against neoliberalism is a continuation of the indigenous
fight for land rights, self-determination, and autonomy. The Zapatistas build their vision
of the “other politics” by constructing a visual and oral world, which is hard to articulate
in the traditional Marxist vocabulary and imagination of revolution. Therefore, not only it
is essential to understand their philosophy that oscillates between autonomist Marxism
and Mayan rebellion, but it is essential to understand their unique representation of
language, visual symbols, humor and stories that presents the idea of revolution with
another sensibility. This deserves attention because the Zapatistas have captured the
imagination and of a large creative audience around the world that is engaged with another vision “to form another world.”396
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Interplay of the Visible and the Invisible: Creating Radical Subjectivity
Zapatistas are pioneers of a social movement that uses social media, which has
helped make their aspirations for a future revolution and their practice of direct
democracy an inspiration and example for others.397 The Zapatistas First Intercontinental
Encuentro for Humanity against Neoliberalism, held in 1996, provided a model of form
and expression to those who animate protests globally. In 1999, as I mentioned
previously, many activists, who were present at this meeting, set out to create the “June
18 Carnival Against Capitalism” in London, and the Seattle showdown with the WTO–
two events that represent an important turning point of the anti-globalization movement.
Zapatistas have not only challenged modern Mexico’s notion of the political
subject but they also have created an alternative practice of being a political subject.
“People the color of the earth,” as they call themselves, say, “we chose words to be heard
and symbols to be seen.”398 On the Zapatista rebellion, Naomi Klein wrote: “Yet the
paradox of Marcos and the Zapatistas is that, despite the masks, the non-selves, the
mystery, their struggle is about the opposite of anonymity–it is about the right to be
seen.”399 This paradox of being visible without being seen is a critique of the current
representation system but it also allows for the creation of a collective subjectivity where
the individual subject, the “I,” dissolves into a plural third person subjectivity: the “we.”
Thomas Nail explains this in his take on the visibility of political subjects:
Political parties and states, no less than the capitalist market, require some
form of identity to represent: a citizen, a voter, a consumer, etc. Even
minorities are compelled to display identities to be represented. If they
want to be counted by the state, they must show their faces. But if the
397
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political problem of our time is to become not simply the problem of who
is represented by parties, states, and capital, but the unraveling/undoing of
the apparatus of representation itself, a new strategy is called for: the
mask. By wearing masks and costumes, global social movements reject
the traditional presupposition that political minorities are seeking a party
to represent them precisely by refusing to allow visible signs of
participants’ specific identities to be identified.400
When the Zapatistas took up arms in 1994, it was a revolt against their
invisibility. 401 At every opportunity, Zapatistas have stated that they mask themselves to
be seen and to represent all those unseen. They have declared: “We cover our face, so
that we can be seen, our struggle is the struggle of those without faces.”402 Wearing black
balaclava masks precisely serves their critique of the way in which they have been denied
a subject position within the Mexican nation (Figure 4.1).403 In the opening ceremony of
the First Intercontinental Meeting for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism (the first
encuentro), held July 27, 1996, Subcomandanta Anna Maria remarked:
…This is what we are. The Zapatista National Liberation Army. The voice
that arms itself to be heard. The face that hides itself to be seen. The name
that hides itself to be named. The red star that calls out to humanity and
the world to be heard, to be seen, to be named. The tomorrow that is
harvested in the past. Behind our black mask. Behind our armed voice.
Behind our unnamable name. Behind what you see of us. Behind this, we
are you. Behind this, we are the same simple and ordinary men and
women that are repeated in all races, painted in all colors, speak in all
languages and live in all places. The same forgotten men and women. The
same excluded. The same untolerated. The same persecuted. The same as
you. Behind this, we are you. Behind our masks is the face of all excluded
women. Of all the forgotten native people. Of all the persecuted
homosexuals. Of all the despised youth. Of all the beaten migrants. Of all
Thomas Nail, “Political Theory of the Mask,” accessed December 12, 2013,
http://mysite.du.edu/~tnail2/Thomas_Nail/Research._files/political%20theory%20of%20the%20mask%20
%C2%AB%20the%20medes.pdf
401
Klein, “The Unknown.”
402
Holloway, Change the World Without Taking Power, 98. Marcos also said that: “We cover our faces in
order to show the world the true face of Mexico.” Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, Our Word is Our
Weapon: Selected Writings (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002), 265.
403
Neil Harvey, “Review of The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy,” Foreign
Affairs (1999), accessed February 15, 2012,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54737/kennethmaxwell/the-chiapas-rebellion-the-struggle-for-landand-democracy
400

231

those imprisoned for their words and thoughts. Of all the humiliated
workers. Of all those dead from neglect. Of all the simple and ordinary
men and women who don’t count, who aren’t seen, who are nameless,
who have no tomorrow.404
Perhaps this is the aspect of Zapatismo that is the most inspiring. Zapatismo is not
only philosophically significant for being the representation of the oppressed it also has a
symbolic significance. The Zapatista mask plays a symbolical role in constructing radical
subjectivity “immanent not to a consciousness who represents an “I” to itself, but to the
political event of Zapatismo Itself.”405 Many diverse groups around the world struggling
and resisting against the neoliberal system gather around the universality of the mask and
what it represents.406 Zapatista masks, along with Guy Fawkes masks, have been the
symbols of “critique of party, state, and capitalist (mis)representation, and as an
experiment in direct democracy.407 This is precisely why we have seen Zapatistas’ ski
masks as much as Guy Fawkes masks at almost every anti-globalization (alterglobalization) protests, and lately at occupy movements around the globe.408
For Mihalis Mentinis, the Zapatistas’ use of the mask is central to their success as
a social movement. The anonymity provided by these masks is the means through which
the Zapatistas are able to construct and perform a transformative collective subjectivity
“by hiding that part of the body most clearly connected to one’s identity by no longer
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existing as individuals… By transcending the individual identity, they become a
revolutionary collective force, a force more powerful than the individual entities.”409
The Zapatistas’ ability to produce a surprising array of visual images,
declarations, communiqués, letters, metaphorical stories, and news bulletins has provided
political activists, thinkers, radical academics, anarchists, and students an almost
unprecedented breath of material for discussion. Such information and analyses were
downloaded and transformed and circulated as pamphlets, leaflets, newspaper articles,
teach-ins, lectures, and letters to the editor, as well as into many Internet blogs and
discussion sites. Through this entire communication network, one image has become
iconic and has been circulated repeatedly as the symbol not only of the Zapatista
movement but of the anti-globalization movement: the image of Subcomandante Marcos,
one of the leaders of the EZLN and spokesperson for the Zapatistas.410
Taken by different photographers between 1994 and 1996, Marcos is often shown
smoking his pipe under his balaclava (a black ski mask), and wearing a khaki hat
featuring three faded red stars. On his right shoulder is resting an assault rifle that
overlaps an ammunitions belt or bandolier, which, since 1910, has often signified armed
opposition to the federal government and foreign capital. (Figure 4.2). He wears two
watches, one on each wrist, and the old hat, which he says he has been wearing since he
arrived in the Lacandon Jungle in 1983. This perfectly constructed image of a charismatic
and mysterious leader captured the imagination of the young generation almost as much
as Alberto Korda’s iconic photograph of Che Guevara captured the Cuban Revolution
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generation.411 As an icon, the Marcos image, or very similar ones, have been sold in
tourist shops and craft markets, on the Internet, and even in museum shops in the form of
posters, postcards, T-shirts, buttons, key chains, refrigerator magnets, and hand-made
dolls.412
From the beginning of the rebellion, the image-making strategies of
Subcomandante Marcos often caused him to be called the “masked clown.”413 Other
times, he was said to be in competition with former president Carlos Salinas to be the TV
persona of the day. Nevertheless, I argue that the way the Zapatistas can be “seen” behind
this persona, who is their spokesperson, is precisely about their take on their visibility and
representation. Marcos is the face of the Zapatistas as well as of all oppressed people in
the world. Ironically and intentionally, no one has seen the face behind the ski mask.
What is appealing to today’s young rebels and activists is not what a “face”
represents; it is the anonymity of this “persona” who makes him an icon. Marcos could be
the representation of anybody. Although the image of Marcos alone does not represent
the complete social imagery of the Mayan rebels of Chiapas, it embodies important
aspects of the cosmological and ideological imagery of the Zapatista movement. In a
communiqué commemorating the death of Emiliano Zapata, on April 10, 1995, Marcos
deployed the image of Votán-Zapata within the context of the five hundred year
indigenous resistance:
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…United with Votán, Guardian and Heart of the People, Zapata rose up
again to struggle for democracy, liberty and justice for all Mexicans. Even
though he has indigenous blood, Votán-Zapata does not struggle just for
the indigenous. He struggles also for those who are not indigenous but
who live in the same misery, without rights, without justice in their jobs,
without democracy for their decisions, and without freedom for their
thoughts and words. Votán-Zapata is all who march under our flag. VotánZapata is the one who walks in the heart of each and every one of the true
men and women. All of us are one in Votán-Zapata and he is one with all
of us.414
Votán represents the third day on the Tzeltal Mayan calendar. It is also a mythical
symbol that embraces “the heart of the people” and corresponds to the man sent by God
to distribute land among the indigenous.415 In this messianic call, Marcos’s role is not just
that of a spokesperson and military commander of EZLN, but is also that of “a quasimythical persona who incarnates the past, present, and future of the Maya world.”416
Born to a middle-class mestizo family, the Subcomandante was reborn as “Marcos” and
baptized as a Tzeltal man in the Lacandon jungle, transforming his role from that of an
intellectual bandit to that of a messianic guerrilla.
In Zapatista communities, Marcos’s portrait can be seen in the offices of buen
gobierno, positioned above the place where representatives sit. It also takes its place in
churches next to the icons of Christ and the saints. In the Marcos’ image Votán –the
guardian of Tzotzil and god of Tzeltal–merges with Emiliano Zapata to symbolize the
power inherent in the multitude as one and in one as the multitude.417 This is best
explained in Marcos’ words: “With this name we name the nameless. With this flag
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covering our face we have a new face, all of us. With this name we name the unnamable:
Votán-Zapata. guardian and the heart of the people.”418In the age of World Wide Web
reproduction, in the social imaginary of the world’s radical youth, the hybrid cultural and
political practices that combine modern and non-modern forms have a lot of resonance.
The figure of Votán not only talks to indigenous Mayans but also engages the
imagination of young urban Mexicans who do not have an interest in the oral traditions of
young Zapatistas. After a communiqué featuring the image was issued following an April
1995 meeting, Votán-Zapata and the ubiquitous ski masks often appeared as
representations in the articles of La Guillotina, an anarchist student publication of the
National Autonomous University of Mexico in Mexico City (UNAM), with the motto
“demand the impossible.” 419 Soon after another communiqué was released on Mayday of
1995, a popular slogan “Todos Somos Marcos” (We are all Marcos) was first heard in
Mexico City, where more than one million supporters marched.420 Marcos responded in a
further communiqué that his mask is a mirror:
Marcos is gay in San Francisco, black in South Africa, an Asian in
Europe, a Chicano in San Ysidro, an anarchist in Spain, a Palestinian in
Israel, a Mayan Indian in the streets of San Cristobal, a Jew in Germany, a
Gypsy in Poland, a Mohawk in Quebec, a pacifist in Bosnia, a single
woman on the Metro at 10 p.m., a peasant without land, a gang member in
the slums, an unemployed worker, an unhappy student and, of course, a
Zapatista in the mountains.421
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The hybrid image of Votán-Zapata, which represents the rebirth of oppressed
people everywhere, is at the core of Zapatista social imaginary. Representing Marxist
aesthetics, Marcos typically opens a communiqué by quoting a poet, such as Paul Éluard,
and finishes with an indigenous folk tale. Thus, his dual-subject position defies any
redundant identity discourse and strategically represents him as both a revolutionary
intellectual and a faceless rebel. In his communiqués, letters, and videos, Marcos
represents an icon, not a person.
In May 2014, Marcos appeared for the last time in the caracol (cultural and
political center) of La Realidad, on the occasion of the memorial procession of José Luis
Solís López (known as Compañero Galeano), a teacher in the Zapatista's “Little School”,
who had been assassinated by paramilitaries.422 He explained why his character had been
created:
And so began a complex maneuver of distraction, a terrible and marvelous
magic trick, a malicious move from the indigenous heart that we are, with
indigenous wisdom challenging one of the bastions of modernity: the
media. And so began the construction of the character named ‘Marcos. ‘I
ask that you follow me in this reasoning: Suppose that there is another
way to neutralize a criminal. For example, creating their murder weapon,
making them think that it is effective, enjoining them to build, on the basis
of this effectiveness, their entire plan, so that in the moment that they
prepare to shoot, the “weapon” goes back to being what it always was: an
illusion.423
In his final communiqué (also broadcast through Radio Zapatista), Marcos
explained that the “hologram” was no longer necessary and that the cult of the individual
had to be destroyed for the sake of the collective:
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Those who loved and hated SupMarcos now know that they have loved
and hated a hologram. Their love and hate have been useless, sterile,
hollow, empty…There will not be, then, museums or metal plaques where
I was born and raised. There will not be someone who lives off of having
been Subcomandante Marcos. No one will inherit his name or his job.
There will not be all-paid trips abroad to give lectures. There will not be
transport to or care in fancy hospitals. There will not be widows or heirs.
There will not be funerals, honors, statues, museums, prizes, or anything
else that the system does to promote the cult of the individual and devalue
the collective. This figure was created and now its creators, the Zapatistas,
are destroying it.424
Therefore, the character of Marcos dies, only to be resurrected as Subcomandante
Galeano. The Subcomandante ended his farewell with these final words: “My name is
Galeano, insurgent Subcomandante Galeano. Is anyone else called Galeano?” The crowd
answered: “We are all Galeano.”425Marcos is now only a visual representation on the
murals, in the photographs and postcards, and in the collective memory of those who
followed the movement.
The Zapatista rebellion has at its heart the confrontation between the indigenous
traditions of self-organization and the Guevarist-inspired model of guerilla warfare
against the state. Considering the initial ties of EZLN with the Forces of National
Liberation (Las Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional or FLN)–a leftist guerilla group that
formed a coalition with liberation theologians in Chiapas in the 1980s–a third component
can be added.426 It is typical to see images of Che Guevara, Zapata, and Marcos next to
each other on murals in autonomous communities, where they represent a trinity of
revolutionary symbols: Che Guevara, the military commander of Marxism; Zapata, the
symbol of the agrarian revolution; and Marcos, the symbol representing the anonymity of
424
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the current Zapatista movement (Figure 4.3). The Zapatistas intentionally revived these
icons of Mexican popular culture that have a special place in the hearts of Mexicans.
Historian Anne Rubenstein notes that the Zapatistas have managed to wrench Mexico’s
collective memory and popular culture from the grasp of the PRI.427 In doing so, the
Zapatistas constructed their image on a double-edged sword: attracting national and
international public attention, while risking popularization in a way that could reduce the
movement to a co-modified rebellion in popular culture.
The Zapatista Virgin of Guadalupe is another icon that not only embodies the
representation of the most revered religious symbol in Mexican culture, it also
popularizes the Zapatista rebellion. Known as the Virgin of Guadalupe or Our Lady of
Guadalupe in Mexico, the Virgin Mary depicted in the image of an indigenous woman is
perhaps the single most prominent symbol of Mexican identity and culture. In the
nineteenth century, with the dissemination of popular religion in Mexico, the expansion
of the devotional cult of Guadalupe especially contributed to non-clerical aesthetic
manifestations as well as to practices of popular devotion. In the Zapatistas’ imagery, the
popular icon Guadalupe–the Virgin as a celestial being standing on a crescent with her
blue mantel–is converted into the Zapatista Virgin of Guadalupe. In this image,
Guadalupe’s nose and mouth are covered with the red Zapatista paliacate (a bandana that
looks like an anarchist prop but is also a popular tourist item in Chiapas), and she wears a
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cross-cartilage—the symbol of Emiliano Zapata at the time of the Mexican Revolution
1910-1920--while carrying a rifle on her back (Figure 4.4).428
This image is repeated on posters, postcards, handmade toys, and other souvenir
items bought and sold through the Zapatista corporate and other Zapatista organizations
in the city of San Cristobal de las Casas and elsewhere. Although often adorning murals
and tourist items, in some instances, the image takes the form of an oil-on-canvas
painting, one of which today adorns the entrance wall of a restaurant-café and corporate
in San Cristobal, which is a common place for gatherings of Zapatista sympathizer
intellectuals, civil society members, and activists (Figure 4.4). On the Internet, the image
is sold in other media as well. In addition, of course, a large mural of the Zapatista Virgin
of Guadalupe adorns the façade of the Clinica Guadalupana in Oventik.429 In this image,
Guadalupe holds a red star in her hand–the symbol of communism as well as of the
Zapatista movement (Figure 4.5).
Another visually enticing painting of Guadalupe as a Zapatista guerilla can be
seen on a mural covering the west wall of the community chapel in San Pedro Polhó
(Figure 4.6). This autonomous municipality, a sixty-mile climb from Oventik, is largely a
refugee center for some nine thousand Zapatistas. This mural and others covering the
chapel’s outside walls were created by Gustavo Chávez Pavon and a team of international
and Zapatista volunteers in 2002. From the outside, the place looks like a little Catholic
chapel with a typical colonial façade; however, inside, there is a large Mayan altar
adorned with offerings and decorations made of cornhusks. Candles are placed on the
For a detailed analysis of the origins of Zapatista soldier imagery, see David Craven’s analysis of
Rivera’s painting “the Zapatista Landscape.” David Craven, Diego Rivera: As Epic Modernist (New York:
G.K. Hall, 1997).
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floor in the shape of a square, which, in Mayan cosmology, symbolizes the four corners
of the earth.
On the same western wall of the chapel next to Guadalupe is the depiction of a
young Zapatista woman whose nose and mouth are covered with the same Zapatista
paliacate that covers the Guadalupe. She wears a cross-cartridge belt and carries a rifle
on her shoulder. In her left hand, raised into the air, is a white dove that contrasts with the
rifle on her shoulder. This already synthesized image (an indigenous woman as the Virgin
Mary) is manufactured in yet another way to promote indigenous values in the space of
colonial repression, this time in the twenty-first century revolution of the Zapatistas.
Here the Zapatista Virgin of Guadalupe does not cover the wall alone but is paired
with the image of an EZLN woman, which, in turn, strengthens the Guadalupe’s
representation not only as the patron saint of the movement but as the symbolic
personification of women guerrillas. In fact, in Zapatista communities the image of the
Guadalupe Zapatista is much more popular than the infamous image of Subcomandante
Marcos.
After many interviews I conducted with Zapatista women, I have concluded that
Zapatistas subvert the conventional, established meaning that the Guadalupe has in
Mexican culture: the Guadalupe is not represented as a Zapatista woman, but a Zapatista
woman is represented as the Guadalupe. By representing themselves in her image,
Zapatista women embody the role of Guadalupe as a conflation of peasant, warrior of the
revolution, and mother of earth, land, and patria (the beloved Mexico).
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Visual and Political Representation of An-Other Democracy
Zapatismo is not a romantic revival of a typical indigenous struggle nor is it a new
political organization of Mexican peasants in Chiapas. Rather, it is a newly constructed
political process that has interwoven tradition and radical change on the one hand, and
attachment to the land and the struggle of wage labor on the other. Their slogans,
“Everything for everybody, nothing for us,” and “To fight for a world which fits all the
worlds,” are eloquent expressions of the intended realization of the interests of entirely
oppressed and exploited classes, not just of the indigenous. Anthropologist George
Collier explains: “The movements from peasant to indigenous concerns, from class to
identity, and from individual human rights to indigenous collective rights have all been
apparent within the Zapatista movement itself.”430 The Zapatista movement is significant
precisely because it aims at making particular reformist demands locally and waging a
larger political battle for more revolutionary changes in society worldwide.
The amalgamation of the old ways of indigenous struggle for land still under the
influence of Mayan cosmology and the new radical activism that operates under the
autonomous Marxist system of knowledge, not only signals an alternative scope for
radical politics, it also captures the imagination of Mexican youth and young activists
who are connected to anti-capitalist movements around the world.431 As I will show in
the following pages, this dual character of the movement is especially prominent in the
visual representations of the Zapatistas.
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In the social memory of indigenous Mexicans, the struggle for land symbolizes a
common resistance and constitutes a foundation for a strong social bond that connects
villages and communities. While land rights and democracy constitute the core agenda of
their political struggle, the image of Zapata marks the core of this struggle as the
personification of the new Zapatista movement.432 Since the Mexican Revolution (19101920), Emiliano Zapata’s dignified persona, with cross-cartridges and riding on a white
horse, embodies the ideological symbolism and myths of the Zapatistas. Although the
horse was introduced in South America by Spaniards, its meaning as a symbol of
victorious strength has been appropriated by the Zapatistas, and combined with the
crossed cartridge belts to symbolize the eternal existence of the hero and ongoing
resistance. The image evokes the historical past of indigenous rebellion, and is set against
the stigmatization of identity and erasure of Zapatista culture.
In 1910, under the command of Zapata and Pancho Villa, rural peoples rose up in
arms for “land, freedom, and justice.” During the combative phase of the Mexican
Revolution, these slogans also generated unique visual symbols. Zapata and Villa almost
immediately became icons of the revolution, and with their horses and cartridge belts
they represented a dignified image of the peasants. Zapata’s representation as a symbol of
liberty and justice grew and spread during the revolution through popular songs
(corridos), stories, and photographs.433 The body of the rebellion was the peasant, and the
representation of the peasant was Zapata. In the reconstructive phase of the revolution
(1920-1940), this expressive dimension of Zapata’s agrarian revolution became the
432
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greatest inspiration for the industrial proletariat, and later, for some of the progressive
artists who became the revolutionary vanguard.434
That the new Zapatista uprising began on the day the NAFTA agreement was
ratified was no coincidence. The movement coalesced in the Lacandon jungle after ten
years of military as well as ideological preparation. In order for the NAFTA agreement to
be signed by all parties, in 1992, Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution had to be
eliminated. This article ensured the reform of collective ejido landholdings for which
Zapata and his peasant revolutionaries fought during the Mexican Revolution.435 The
main aim of the reform was to incorporate the strategic location of Chiapas and its rich
resources into the international market. As Noam Chomsky noted in his book, Profit over
People, the president of Mexico’s leading environmental organization, Homero Aridjis,
sees the NAFTA agreement as the third conquest that Mexico has suffered and concludes
“The first was by arms, the second was spiritual, third is economic.” 436 The reversal of
the land reform meant taking the common land (ejido) away from the indigenous
communities and giving it to rich farm owners (haciendistas). This action not only
condemned the indigenous communities to extreme poverty, but also destroyed the
conditions of their communal social life that depended on communal decision-making
processes–an indigenous democracy of direct representation, and, in Zapatistas’ words,
“an opportunity to practice a different life.”437 The spokesperson of the movement,
Subcomandante Marcos, explained: “The moment the agrarian land distribution is closed,
the Indigenous farmer loses his means of production, but he also loses his history and
434
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culture.”438 For this reason, the Zapatistas wage their struggle for autonomy on the
cultural front.
The representation of the resistance of the landless peasant against state
repression repeats itself not only as a means of political rebellion but in the visual (as
much as oral) language of this rebellion. In a photograph taken in black and white, as in
the Zapata image, Subcommandante Marcos and Subcommandante Tacho are seen on
horses as they lead EZLN soldiers (Figure 4.7). This image can be interpreted as an
apparent reference to the image of Zapata and Villa leading peasant cadres in the
Mexican Revolution. No doubt, the image evokes the successes achieved by dignified
peasant rebels during the Mexican Revolution. When revolutionary peasants occupied
Mexico City, in December 1914, the workers of Europe were drowning in their own
blood, and the Russian Revolution was still three years away. The peasants of Morelos
and Puebla and the mestizo middle classes constructed not only a revolutionary army but
they also produced, in the Ayala Plan, a coherent political program that asserted their
needs against those of capital.
The photograph shows EZLN soldiers marching to one of the meetings that were
held in August and September of 2005, where plans for the Sixth Declaration of the
Lacandon Jungle were prepared. Arrival at those gatherings from the jungle or from other
remote places often involved a march, not just of the EZLN but also of Zapatista peasants
and indigenous groups from elsewhere, along with the civil society activists and NGOs
who joined them. One of the commanders on the horse carries a large Mexican flag,
which often adorned the reunions. The Zapatistas’ use of national symbols, such as the
Samuel Blixen and Carlos Fazio, “Interview with Marcos about Neo-liberalism, the National State and
Democracy,” Brecha, October 12, 1995 (Author’s translation), accessed September 25, 2011,
http://chasque.apc.org/brecha
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flag and the national anthem, has generated criticism for binding them within the politics
of national struggle.
Since 1994, through their declarations and other forms of communication, the
Zapatistas have been situating their struggle in the trinity of democracy, liberty, and
justice for the patria (Mexico). In Mayan languages the land (tierra) and homeland
(patria) are the same word and the Zapatistas use it interchangeably not to highlight their
nationalism but to emphasize their ties to the land. The word patria, when used in place
of tierra, also cosmologically connects the Mayan past, present, and future. The
autonomous lands of Zapatistas is the experimental land for radical democracy, and it
implies both the Mayan relationship to land that does not constitute any institutions or
individuals reclaiming it as a property or ruling it.
As many indigenous peoples around the world, the Tzeltals, Tzotzils, Chols,
Mams, Zoques, and Tojolabals in Zapatista communities believe that the land was passed
to them as a gift from their ancestors and not only it is absolutely vital for the
continuation of their existence it constitutes their identity as Mayan people. Therefore,
land is both and ideological and cosmological link to their Mayan past and it is in the
core of their responsibility to both nature and society. As Gustavo Esteva explains: “Their
cosmic attitude before nature, in which they feel themselves immerse, prevents
conceiving the possibility of appropriating it in an excluding way: how to ‘own’ your
mother?”439 Zapatistas, within a common territory, they allocate land to their members
without transforming them to private properties.
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The Zapatistas’ main demand is to establish an organic link to the Mexican
Nation (the homeland–the whole) by means of political representation and ownership of
their communal land. Massimo Angelis explains: “The Zapatistas refer to this organic
unity as “nation.” Marx calls it Res Publica, or true democracy, or communism, but they
all mean the same thing: people recognizing each other as human beings and therefore
governing themselves.”440 The Zapatistas often emphasize the indigenous sense of
“place” and “belonging” when they use the concept of “nation,” more than they use the
term “nation” to signify a particular identity or ethnic characteristics. Hence, the
Zapatistas national rhetoric constantly oscillates between the particular (e.g., being
included as a part of the Mexican Nation as indigenous peoples seeking autonomy for
two hundred years) and the universal (e.g., the larger movement against neoliberalism).
As explained in their words:
And then we also said we wanted democracy, liberty and justice for all
Mexicans although we were concentrated on the Indian peoples. Because
it so happened that we, the EZLN, were almost all only indigenous from
here in Chiapas, but we did not want to struggle just for own good, or just
for the good of the indigenous of Chiapas, or just for the good of the
Indian peoples of Mexico. We wanted to fight along with everyone who
was humble and simple like ourselves and who was in great need and who
suffered from exploitation and thievery by the rich and their bad
governments here, in our Mexico, and in other countries in the world.441
In 2007, a group of international artists from the United States and Canada, with
the name Red de Solidaridad con Mexico (network of solidarity with Mexico), painted a
mural on an exterior wall of the secondary school in Oventik, Chiapas. The mural
features a Zapatista woman, a man, and a child, holding banners inscribed with the words
Libertad (liberty), Tierra (land), and Equalidad (equality). Another, more infamous,
De Angelis, “Zapatista’s Voice.”
Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, CIDECI website, (2009) accessed July12, 2011,
http://www.cedoz.org/site/index.php .
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Zapatista motto is written across the sky in the image: “Nuestra Palabra es Nuestra
Arma” (our word is our weapon) (Figure 4.8). For Zapatistas, it is very important that
their indigenous cosmovision, as well as their autonomous views for building a bottomup revolution, are visible and understood by larger populations beyond Mexico.442
In this mural you see Zapatistas walking along with snails, Caracoles in Spanish,
which is where their cultural and political centers take their name from. In the Zapatista
communities I encountered more than hundred murals and many of them include this
symbol of caracol. In those images, the snail usually also masks his face with a typical
red Zapatista handkerchief. The ancient Maya ancestors used a conch shell as a horn to
summon people to gather in one place as a community. Zapatistas say that their ancestors
lived when the life moved at a much slower pace than today, much like the slow-moving
caracol. The caracol symbol connects the Zapatista present with a conception of the
Maya past as a direct historical trajectory and represents the ideals of an autonomous
Zapatista government on two levels. It represents both the opposition to the division of
time after industrial capitalism and its imposed way of life on the colonized people and it
also represents the communal spirit of small community government in the face of
globalization.
Outside the entrance to each caracol as well as to all autonomous municipalities,
the visitor is stunned by a large metal board that announces the main idea of the buen
gobierno: “You are in the Zapatista territory in rebellion. Here the people govern and the
government obeys.” On another metal board, a Mayan saying becomes the slogan:
In 2013 Zapatistas created “the Zapatista little school” and invited people of all ages and political
directions to come and experience the Zapatista way of life the first hand. In the two little schools
organized in 2013 and 2014 thousands of people around the world became Zapatista’s students and learnt
about Zapatistas’ vision of revolution and experiments of direct democracy. It was also their way of
sending the message to the world that their struggle is alive and still strong.
442
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“Command by obeying.” These mottos, essentially derived from the Mayan way of
decentralized communal life, aptly summarize the Zapatistas understanding of power and
their concept of radical democracy. For Zapatistas power is not delegated in rulers
“autonomizing” themselves from the ruled for the period of their mandate. The position
of the delegate of buen gobierno (good government) is assumed as a duty, a service, not
as a power and they do not have an income for it. When their system of participatory
democracy in the form of buen gobiernos is being criticized for being disorganized and
slow Zapatistas has an answer: and however it moves, just like a snail (Figure 4.9).
Zapatistas seek to present to the world a new approach to the problem of state
hegemony and power. As Luis Lorenzano said: “The Zapatistas are not guerrillas with a
particular social base; they are the social base themselves”443 Lorenzano further explains:
“By engaging in this process, the indigenous community has become the “polis,” a
community not just of land, language and culture, but a political community, with
deliberate legislative capabilities.”444 Rebel communities in highland Chiapas now reach
up to one thousand in number, each with three hundred to four hundred people. These
villages are connected to thirty-two autonomous municipalities. In August 2003,
alternatives to the official county government, called juntas de buen gobierno (juntas of
good government), were formed. Delegates from each village included in the juntas are
chosen based on the Mayan practice of participatory democracy.445 Indeed, in many ways
their successful creation of new political spaces already has led to the demotion of the
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Zapatista Army to a largely symbolic role. The need for such an organization is explained
in the Sixth Declaration:
And we saw that the military being above and the democratic below, was
not good, because what is democratic should not be decided militarily, it
should be the reverse: the democratic-political governing above, and the
military obeying below. Or, perhaps, it would be better with nothing
below, just completely level, without any military, and that is why the
Zapatistas are soldiers so that there will not be any soldiers. Fine, what we
then did about this problem was to begin separating the political-military
from the autonomous and democratic aspects of organization in the
Zapatista communities. And so, actions and decisions which had
previously been made and taken by EZLN were being passed, little by
little, to the democratically elected authorities in the villages.446
This type of governance involves direct representation instead of elections, and
consensus seeking instead of voting. The juntas periodically come together in assembly
halls that are almost as common as churches. These meetings are often very long, lasting
for two or three days until a consensus is reached. The ability to reach consensus is aided
by the vitality of the traditional decision-making process. The juntas have been asserting
administrative control over all within the territorial boundaries of their county, Zapatistas
and non-Zapatistas alike. In other words, they have been implementing the San Andrés
Accords, agreements designed to provide indigenous peoples throughout Mexico with
control over their lands and territory, as well as the right to self-government. The San
Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Cultures were signed by government
representatives, but since then the government has refused to implement it. It is now clear
that the government was using the peace talks to buy time to further militarize eastern
Chiapas. Nevertheless, the continuation of the Zapatista struggle for democratic
representation in their autonomous lands has had enormous appeal, not only throughout
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Mexico but in many other countries, and has promoted the organization of creative and
viable alternatives outside of the state.
In the autonomous lands of the Zapatistas, one of the most visually notable
characteristics is the prevalence of murals. Almost all community buildings (i.e., schools,
clinics, offices of the juntas, assembly halls, corporative) in the seven caracols, and those
of other larger communities are covered with colorful murals. Activist artist Miranda
Bergman notes: “The painting of murals in any community in the world is an
empowering process. It breaks down apathy, low self-esteem, and hopelessness, while
transforming a space.”447 Murals in the United States, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Cuba, and
Palestine (among other nations) have been painted to inspire communities in their fight
against repression. Zapatista murals serve even larger goals.
The community murals in autonomous Zapatista territories, created with national
and international solidarity groups, is way of clarifying the principles of their political
vision and practice that is at times contradictory combination of various ideologies and
methods, drawing from the old and the new, focusing at once on the local, the national,
and the global. Zapatistas have not only inspired people to seek an alternative way of
thinking or imagining social change, they have also shared their solid experiences, such
as the discussion of alternative approaches in light of diverse situations and the mistakes
that were committed in certain circumstances.448 Sociologist Abigail Andrews explains
that inspiring reflexivity among the activists around the world is the lasting legacy for the
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Zapatistas because for many of them Zapatismo entails the interrogation of their own
position of power at home.449
Zapatista murals function in part as a conscious image-making strategy of the
movement, helping to boost the revolutionary spirit and solidarity of the Zapatista
communities and their supporters.450 When the mainstream or alternative media covers
the “intergalactic” gatherings of thousands of people around the world in Oventik, the
murals are always shown in the background. During these gatherings, especially the most
recent, known as dignia rabia (dignified rage), participants from around the world
painted murals on the walls of new buildings (i.e., halls added to the secondary school)
(Figure 4.10) in a ritualistic way, in order to show solidarity. The journal of the
Zapatistas, called Rebeldia, has been printed for the past eight years and circulates
nationally through solidarity organizations. It is common to see an image of a Zapatista
mural accompanying an article even if it is not always on the cover.
The websites of Zapatista solidarity groups around the world also include the
images of these murals to show “the Zapatista world.” Often, these groups use the same
images in their posters with themes based on “solidarity with Zapatistas.” At present,
visiting the murals is a major tourist activity in San Cristobal de las Casas. There are even
guided tours to Oventik to see the caracol and the murals. Usually, there are only a few
administrative people in the caracols, and the tourists take photographs of the murals and
purchase souvenirs from the cooperative.451 In this way, the Zapatista murals, although
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their physical life is only semi-permanent, circulate and become permanent and
accessible in photographs and other small tokens. For Zapatista communities, the murals
function as a historical document:
The murals are very important for us, because it is through murals that we
manifest our way of being, our culture, and our resistance as indigenous
people, that for many years has been attempted to be erased from the map
of our land, but now with the help of brothers and sisters, we will no
longer be able to disappear. They will never be able to erase the
knowledge of our people.452
The educational role of the murals is also notable. In places such as the Zapatista
communities in Chiapas, where there exist high levels of marginalization and illiteracy,
public murals play an important role in providing education, consciousness raising and
self-awareness, especially among the youth. The large-scale murals are effective in
relaying information about the historical events that led the people to their current social
and political position, and they preserve the memory of leaders who fought for social
justice.
In Oventik, as well as in other caracols, with names such as La Realidad,
Garruccha, Moises Gandhi, Roberto Barrios, Primero de Enero, and Morelia, the
buildings of primary, secondary, and high schools are covered with colorful murals.453
The schools as well as the clinic in Oventik were built by the collective effort of
volunteers from communities from all over Mexico, as well as volunteers sent by
international organizations in Europe. Inside the classrooms, there is usually a board and
representatives of the buen gobierno and the people who work the cooperatives to sell souvenirs to tourists,
Oventik (the biggest caracole) looks deserted apart from the galactic gatherings when thousands flock to
Oventik. However, there is a large village next to the caracole where outsiders are not allowed to enter.
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a mural from ceiling to the floor; thus, when the students are looking at a teacher, they
also see the mural. The themes of these murals can be listed: the importance of literacy
and education, the history of solidarity, indigenous struggles for land, and struggles for
gender equality. In one of the classrooms at the secondary school in Oventik, there is a
wall-to-wall dream-like image of a young girl holding a book (Figure 4.11). One side of
the book cover portrays the brutality of colonization, and the other depicts the determined
resistance of the Zapatistas. The girl’s hands and face are surrealistically framed by long,
blue hair that flows horizontally across the wall like ocean waves. This same image, by
Mexican muralist Gustavo Chávez Pavon, is repeated on the façade of the primary school
(the building that welcomes the visitors on the highway just outside of the caracol of
Oventik) and is currently the icon of a literacy campaign launched by the Zapatistas.454
The muralists provide a mechanism that helps to articulate the overall vision of
the people in a community. For example, the designs of murals in Zapatista communities
typically are created by piecing together ideas that will further a communal message. It
usually originates from a proposal by the artist or activist group, is drafted and modified
through consensus, and evolves according to who participates in the actual collaboration.
In most cases, the designs and images are chosen through community assemblies,
consistent with the indigenous custom of collective decision-making. The communities
decide how many community members will work on the mural and what will be depicted.
The roles of the artists and volunteers are not to impose ideas for content or to
appropriate the community’s voice in the creation of the mural, but instead to contribute
to the process of creative expression. They occasionally produce an initial sketch, prepare
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the wall or surface, and later guide the participants through the development of the work.
In my interview with Gustavo Chávez Pavon, who has executed a large number of
Zapatista murals in the Zapatista caracols and other parts of Mexico, as well as in
Scotland, Denmark, Chile, and Palestine, he said:
As in all acts in our lives, the ways of relating to each other, and the ways
we make our dreams and put them together, are part of creating our
cultural values. And to put them up on the walls, as with these murals, is
not an easy job. It is not a one-person job either, or a job for just a specific
group of people. It is a job for a whole society that could impact on other
people, who, in return want to contribute to community. In this way a
dynamic and enriching relationship of collective creation takes place,
which can lead to many other dreams and possibilities.455
Between 1997 and 2005, an international artist collective, called “L.I.P la
Gárgola” (including the young Mexican painters Luiz Urbina Valdez, Gildardo Nombe
Pano and Gustavo Chávez Pavon) has painted a large number of murals that exist in the
communities now. The initial group, from 1997, included artists from Mexico, Argentina,
and Uruguay. Then, in 2000 and 2002, many other volunteer artists from the United
States and Canada joined the group in Chiapas. In August 2005, while meetings for the
launch of “the Other Campaign” and the Sixth Declaration were continuing, L.I.P la
Gárgola and the Babylon Collective (a Minneapolis-based political art collective)
organized La Caravana de las Artistas en Resistencia (the caravan of artists in
resistance). The artists, mainly from the United States and Mexico, traveled to Chiapas
and painted many murals in different caracols during a three-month period. While some
of these murals repeat earlier themes, including portraits of Che Guevara, Zapata, and
Marcos, along with the typical symbols of corn and snails, a new group of solidarity
murals emerged, starting with this mural cycle. Later, in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2010, Red
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de Solidaridad con Mexico (network of solidarity with Mexico), continued to paint
murals to show their solidarity with the Zapatistas.
Visual images of solidarity with Zapatistas also take the form of the posters and
postcards sold in the Zapatista cooperatives in Oventik, as well as various venues in San
Cristobal de las Casas that sell the products of the cooperatives to the tourists. One of
those posters, the Solidaridad Chiapas poster, is the work of an anonymous artist (Figure
4.12). The bottom of the image reads, “Los Zapatistas no estan solos” (the Zapatistas are
not alone). During a street march in January 2011, the image was carried as a banner to
represent solidarity with the movement. In the Zapatista cooperatives, this image, among
other works of other artist/activists, was available for the tourists to take with them to
their own countries in exchange for a small donation. Featuring a typical representation
of Zapatista aesthetics that mixes folkloric and dreamlike sensibilities with a realistic
representation of the world, the poster calls for solidarity with the Zapatista movement in
Chiapas. In the middle are peasants in a colorful village in colorful costumes–a common
visual language with a naïve painting style that is used as visual material to be sold to
tourists sympathetic to the Zapatistas. This part of the image is borrowed from a painting
by Beatrix Aurora, who is a Chilean artist/activist based in Chiapas. Her paintings
portraying Zapatista communities are reproduced on many postcards and posters to be
sold to help fund the movement. Aurora’s utopian image of an ideal co-operative and
happy society is disturbed by the photomontage of two black and white images. The
colorful and peaceful life of the village is shown surrounded by a photograph of two
hands stopping bullets, which provides stark contrast between mundane and peaceful
elements of peasant life along with the shocking, tragic, and violent events that also
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reflect the daily life of the Zapatistas. The realism of the hands and the riffles disturbs the
pleasant depiction of the rural world in the middle of the work; hence, it serves as a
reminder of the reality–constant military and paramilitary danger–that surrounds the
autonomous communities.
The plethora of images, by known and unknown artists, that circulate in tourist
shops and online, as well as the Zapatista’s sophisticated use of World Wide Web and
international media, ensured that the world would be watching as the Mexican state
continued its military and economic repression of the region.456 Through to the twentiethyear celebrations in 2009, and on every occasion, Zapatistas chose perform their struggle
in front of the cameras. For some analysts, the Zapatista rebellion was a public
performance version of a declaration of war. A well-known analyst of Zapatistas, Andrés
Oppenheimer, notes:
As Zapatista military leader Sub-commander Marcos himself would
concede to me later, his military strategy consisted of surrounding San
Cristobal with elite troops armed with AK-47 rifles, Uzi submachine guns,
grenade launchers, and night vision devices, which he placed in the four
major access roads to the city, while allowing lesser-armed rebel foot
soldiers–some of them only armed with sticks, machetes, and hand-carved
wooden toy guns–to march toward the center of town and take the
municipal palace…The television cameras would focus on the…ragtag
army of landless Mayans mostly armed with toy guns…it worked exactly
as planned.457
For the past two decades, as the Mexican government deployed more troops in the
region and paramilitary activities took hundreds of innocent lives, international sympathy
and support has remained crucial for the survival of the Zapatista communities and other
municipalities sympathetic to the movement. Hence, creating a good public image is not
456
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enough to build international support. To provide for the continuation of the movement
and the survival of the autonomous communities, the Zapatistas have constituted “a new
concept of solidarity that involves a reconfiguration of the relationship between the local,
the national and the global.”458
Since the founding convention of the Zapatista Front of National Liberation
(Frente Zapatista de Liberación Nacional or FZLN) in Mexico City, in September 1997, a
political wing of the Zapatistas that is separated from the EZLN army, and the Zapatistas
and their supporters, have reiterated their calls for new forms of politics, which has
facilitated the emergence of Zapatista solidarity groups around the world, from Bristol in
the U.K. to Adelaide, Australia, from Toronto, Canada, to Nicosia, Cyprus.459
Nevertheless, except for occasional aid in the form of food, clothing, and medicine from
international organizations, and some volunteers who help to build school, hospitals,
community centers etc., the Zapatistas have received no economic support. Thus, the
most significant aspect of the transnational solidarity network surrounding the Zapatistas
is that it is less material and more political than most movements.
In fact, an army of volunteer translators and web junkies have been ensuring that
anyone can engage directly with the communiqués, stories, and letters of the Zapatistas.
For this reason, Manuel Castells called the Zapatistas “the first informational guerilla
movement.”460 By the time NAFTA went into effect, the Zapatistas, through both image
and word, were known by the people around the world who are engaged in any type of
activist politics. The civic supporters of the Zapatista movement in Europe have been
Thomas Olesen, “Globalizing the Zapatistas: From Third World Solidarity to Global Solidarity?” Third
World Quarterly 25/1 (2004): 256.
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successfully using the Internet to build a campaign for pressuring their own governments
to prevent Mexico’s federal army from taking further military action against the
Zapatistas, who have had to endure military planes start circling over the Zapatista
villages in Chiapas.461 Zapatista communiqués published on the Internet as well as their
encuentros thus far have ensured an intercontinental network of communication and
solidarity.
The three Intercontinental Encounters for “Humanity against Neoliberalism”–first
in Chiapas (1996) then in Spain (1997)–were organized to ensure that their struggle
reached beyond Mexico. The first “intergalactic” encuentro, as mentioned before, took
place in the Lacandon Jungle in 1996, with a meeting of more than three thousand
activists and civil society representatives from around the world. In the second encuentro,
in Barcelona a year later, thousands of people gathered from fifty countries–groups as
diverse as campesinos occupying land in Brazil, refugees from Western Saharan camps in
Southern Algeria, workers from Britain, First Nation activists from Canada, those
running a pirate university for workers in Turkey, environmental campaigners from
Colombia, academicians from South Africa, and anarchists from Poland. It was at these
first two meetings that the inspiration for the global anti-capitalist coordinating network
and solidarity organization, called People’s Global Action against free trade and the
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WTO, was sparked, directly connecting the Zapatista movement to the larger antineoliberalist global movement.462
In 1999, less than a month before the famous Battle of Seattle, a third encuentro
was held in the Amazon capital city of Belem, Brazil. This encuentro, was called for by a
wide array of Zapatista solidarity organizations, anarchist collectives, black
consciousness/power and indigenous rights groups, the Workers Party (PT), state-level
chapters of the Movement of the Landless (MST), and the Unified Trade Union
Federation (CUT), among many others, and constituted the base for creating the World
Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2001.
In January 2006, the Zapatistas launched a new political initiative called La otra
campaña (the other campaign) to build a common front with other local movements in
Mexico against the neoliberal world order. Throughout the campaign, which lasted
several months and encompassed all thirty-one states in Mexico, Zapatistas traveled, met,
and established solidarity with a diverse number of groups and organizations, including
trade union organizers, indigenous leaders, intellectuals, factory workers, women’s rights
activists, gays, lesbians, advocates for human rights, students, teachers, environmental
activists, fishermen, natural disaster victims, peasants, housewives, and prostitutes. In
their search for the creation of a common anti-neoliberalist front, the Zapatistas not only
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sought to join forces with workers and peasants, as well as organizations on the Left, but
also with the “humble people,” as they articulated it.463
A mural on the side of a barn next to the secondary school in Oventik, which was
painted by volunteers from the Zapatista communities, shows a group of diverse people
marching with banners and a flag representing sex workers, campesinos,
environmentalists, the sin fronteras society, and students (Figure 4.13). The mural next to
it is inscribed with the famous Zapatismo motto, “un mundo donde quedan muchos
mundos” (a world that fits many worlds), and announces the Zapatistas’ vision for a
world that is horizontal, inclusive and hopeful. This Zapatismo concept of “a world that
fits many worlds” has a double meaning, one that generates out from the Zapatismo
vision of revolutionary subjects in the plural (all the oppressed people), and one that calls
for a micro revolution in your own life and in your own home.
Klein reminds us that, from the beginning, the legacy of Zapatismo has been:
“…a global call to revolution that tells you not to wait for the revolution, only to start
where you stand, to fight with your own weapon. It could be a video camera, words,
ideas, ‘hope’–all of these Marcos has written ‘are also weapons.’”464 Here, “hope” stands
out as an unusual weapon for the continuation of a revolutionary movement. Rosario
Ibarra de Piedra, the founder of Mexico’s human rights movement, declares that:
“Hope…the Zapatistas represent hope, and we must preserve hope at all costs.”465 The
preservation of hope in an era of hopelessness is the most enduring legacy of the
Zapatistas. Nevertheless, “hope” for Zapatistas is something beyond a utopian category, it
Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, “Words of Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos: Meeting with
Political Organizations of the Left,” Tzeltal Selva Region, trans., Irlandesa, August 6, 2005, accessed
February 12, 2010, http://www.zcommunications.org/the-other-campaign-by-subcomandante-marcos-1-2
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is the ground upon which the politics of everyday life stands. In their ethnographical
analysis of Zapatistas, the authors of Uprising of Hope, Duncan Earle and Jeanne
Simonelli, note: “Without the overlay of the world of everyday life, the autonomous
movement might seem to be no more than impractical rhetoric, a utopian dream.”466
Hope, for Zapatistas, is the social force that allows the actualization of another world,
another way.
Zapatismo is a way of life–a life of community defined by egalitarian
relationships and organized around direct democracy in the middle of the capitalist world.
What they have created is not separate from their daily lives. This what José Gomez
Molina who was my host and compañero during my visit to the Lacandon jungle, meant
when he said to me: “You comrades think about and write about the revolution, we live
the revolution.”467 The Zapatistas’visual world is the expression of their vision of what
they call the “other politics,”is hard to articulate in the traditional Marxist vocabulary and
imagination of revolution. Hence, as I argued here, their visual legacy is important to
map the visible but disregarded ground of aesthetics in recent social movements.
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Author’s interview with José Gomez Molina in Pueblo Libre, Lacandona, Chiapas-Mexico, December
12, 2013.
262

CONCLUSION
In today’s world, daily life is shaped by economic, social, and environmental
crises. In a global order under the neoliberal capitalist system that has fostered new
technological advancement, climate change, ecological destruction, and armed conflicts,
we are confronting challenges of a new kind that question traditional conceptions of
power. Activists create new possibilities for alternative politics, artists seek new visual
languages, and intellectuals strive to capture and influence the constantly shifting terrain
of social conscience. The search is for new ways to make systemic change possible. Art
and culture are in the middle of this search, perhaps more so than in previous decades.
This dissertation demonstrates that there is no single, valid category of political
art in the artistic field. Art is, and has always been, politics in and of itself. Politics has
always been embedded in the production, exhibition, reception, and theorization of art.
Even the very definition of art, as a privileged human activity compared to other forms of
labor, is political.468 Art, by its current definition, cannot exist out of its system of
identification, categorization, and presentation. As Jacques Rancière notes: “What the
term ‘art’ designates in its singularity is the framing of a space of presentation by which
the things of art are identified as such.”469 In the neoliberal world the work of art is not
designated as “art” according to the criteria of technical perfection or a standard of
virtuosity, but by the ways in which it is presented and perceived in the intellectual and
institutional realm. The way in which institutional art has been implicated in reproducing
power patterns is not something new or unusual. But this pattern has merely become
more pronounced with the thriving of post-1989 neoliberalism, in terms of the character
468
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of the institutional art world as a quasi-corporation; it certainly relates to the new society
of neoliberal culture that recreates itself with the values of the corporate world and postdemocracy politics.470 What is called, and exhibited as “political art” is used as a safety
valve to show that politics is happening elsewhere, all the while ignoring everything else
that challenges its own system of manipulation and exploitation, such as exploitation in
art labor.
Thus, for radical art to be sponsored by corporations that produce war weapons,
multinational banks that are puppets for neoliberal onslaught, philanthropists and
businessmen whose inclination is towards social engineering, or state organizations that
use artistic space for city branding—is indeed a common contradiction of institutional art
in the neoliberal world. Having said that, dismissing all art in this system—art in the
current system of biennials and museums or socially engaged art in public spaces—as
being submissive and subservient is also a political act. This kind of perspective analyzes
art’s capacity in relation to its own institutional, ideological, and economical structures at
best. Yet, to disregard art’s autonomy once and for all also disregards art’s emancipatory
potential—the aesthetic experience. Rancière’s notes on autonomy and aesthetic
experience are significant:
First, the autonomy staged by the aesthetic regime of art is not that of the
work of art but that of a mode of experience. Second, the ‘aesthetic
experience’ is one of heterogeneity such that, for the subject of that
experience, it is also the dismissal of certain autonomy. Third, the object
of that experience is “aesthetic” insofar as it is not, or at least not only,
art.”471
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In Rancière’s view, art is at once a heteronomous and autonomous aesthetic
activity, and thus it has the capacity to create the conditions for an experience that could
interrupt the relationship between art and its use-value, art and established forms of the
visible and audible, art and the habitual practices in daily life.472 Therefore, denying art’s
emancipatory capacity is also a political act that not only confines art to its spectacular
potential but it also blocks the avenues that art could open to emancipate itself from such
confinement.
My aim in analyzing the festival aspects of art biennials, in the first chapters of
this dissertation, was to underline the loopholes in the existing literature on the subject. In
those chapters, I criticize two views that are prominent in art criticism. The first is the
globalist view that sees neoliberalism as an even and uncontestable process that affects
all corners of the world and renders all relations between art and its local/global
structures evenly and in a static and predictable form. The second is the critical view that
sees contemporary art as a homogenous and subservient entity that reflects and
reproduces neoliberal directives and processes, and thus, implicitly, cripples art’s
inherent potential for emancipation.
The aesthetic dimension of the recent political protests, revolts and uprisings not
only challenges and reformulates what is acceptable as politics in the society but also
problematizes what is acceptable in society as art. As early as 1964, Arthur Danto, in his
infamous article, “The Artworld,” proclaimed the death of art and wrote:
What in the end makes the difference between a Brillo box and a work of
art consisting of a Brillo box is a certain theory of art. It is theory that
Rancière explains this as art’s capacity to disrupt the “distribution of the sensible”—the politics that
constitutes the aesthetic regime, which is the making sense mechanism in the society, in other words, the
order of the sensuous productions. See Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the
Sensible.
472
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takes it up into the world of art, and keeps it from collapsing into the real
object, which it is [in a sense of is other than that of artistic identification]
It could have not been art fifty years ago...It is the role of artistic theories,
these days as always, to make the artworld and art, possible. It would, I
should think, never have occurred to the painters of Lascaux that they were
producing art [writer’s emphasis] on these walls. Not unless there were
Neolithic aestheticians.473
Danto was fascinated by historical change and he argued that the reasons and conditions
that made Andy Warhol’s Brillo boxes acceptable as art, in 1964, had a particular
historicity and particular roles in the art world and art canon in that historical moment.
Warhol’s Brillo boxes and Marcel Duchamp’s ready-mades demonstrated to Danto that
the grand narrative of progression for art by itself had ended at this particular moment of
capitalism. I agree with scholars and critics that art, as an autonomous activity, has been
dead for a long time. I argue that, at present, all types of art and aesthetic practices exist
at the same time as a political activity; therefore, we can no longer theorize and
categorize “political art” as such, and this requires a new understanding of current
political and aesthetical practices.
I insist that the relationship of contemporary art and neoliberalism, as well as art
and politics today, should be analyzed with a multidimensional perspective that
acknowledges bottom-up and top-to-bottom political developments, inside-outside
relationships in the art world, and global and local social dynamics from a point of
complex and dialectical contestations and the contemporaneity of the meaning and
practice of art. My particular aim is to contest the institutional theory of art that
categorizes some art objects, practices, and forms as “political art “or “socially engaged
art,” or condones them for not being as such. I challenge this view by showing that some
artistic and aesthetic activities, such as those seen in the spaces of communal political
473
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resistance and various types of collaborative art, defy any categorization framed by the
art historical canon. Those practices invert common thought patterns, challenge
established social and economic exchanges, and change what is accepted as aesthetics in
art. I reveal that this flux of change occurs because politics is challenged and pushed
forward by a rich array of new aesthetic praxis, and aesthetics is challenged and pushed
forward by the new conviction, direction, and practice of new politics that arise from the
complex and contemporaneous interrelationships of art, politics, economics, and culture
in the neoliberal world.
For example, the movement without leaders that lacks localized direct and
understood forms of structure and anti-political politics reinvent the political theory and
practice of today’s movements for democracy, including but not limited to the antiglobalization (alter-globalization) movement, teacher’s revolt in Oaxaca, the peasant
movement of Zapatistas in Chiapas Mexico, the Occupy movements around the world,
and lately the Gezi uprising in Turkey. The aesthetic activities visible in those
movements, uprisings and revolts have both challenged and constituted the character of
the movement. Thus far, those activities, described as “visual disobedience” and
“carnivals of resistance” by the activists, have mostly attracted the attention of
sociologists and anthropologists, who have not situated them in the field of aesthetics, but
in the field of tactical activism.474
I am not concerned with whether such activities should or should not be
recognized as “art” and be inserted into the art historical discourse and canon. Rather, I
emphasize that such activities pronounce the political sphere in the aesthetical sphere in
474
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such a way that they challenge the critical theories that have been prominent since the
1960s, those which conceptualize aesthetics and politics as different but, at times,
overlapping spheres.
Broadly, this dissertation addresses the following dialectical question: Is
neoliberal globalization the ultimate victory of capitalist modes of production, or could
this be a new opportunity to break away from existing capitalist relations? Specifically, it
argues that, at present, aesthetic practices of dissent stem from and constitute the struggle
of the economically exploited, the politically underrepresented, and the culturally
invisible to become visible to power. I propose a rethinking of what political power and
aesthetic visibility mean for the new art of politics and the new politics of art in the
current era of the neoliberalized world and globalized revolts.
To do this, I have benefited greatly from Rancière’s theories, among others, on
aesthetics and radical politics. For Rancière, political action has the potential to dismantle
the uneven relationship between those who can and those who cannot command words
and images. It is when the housewives, prostitutes, or students, for examples, reconfigure
their struggle as a struggle concerning the common, which is to say, to question who is
able or unable to speak and demonstrate about or on behalf of the common. Both for
Rancière and for anti-globalization campaigns and struggles, politics does not constitute
the exercise of power but is a political relationship that allows one to think about the
possibility of a new political subjectivity. But ultimately, Rancière’s theory shows us
that, in the spheres where art and politics interact with each other, that which looks like
resistance may not yield to constituent power, and that which does not appear as
resistance to power may contain fundamental nodes of emancipation.
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In addition to paying close attention to Rancière’s theory of aesthetics and
politics, I also account for complex neoimperialist relations–and their new forms of
knowledge production–to dismantle the logic that sees neoliberal globalization as an
inevitable form of capitalist expansion. In doing this, I locate my argument between the
discourses of colonialism and neocolonialism, imperialism and empire, nationalism and
transnationalism, and globalism and localism, all simultaneously. I also emphasize a very
important aspect of neoliberalism that has been largely ignored. While neoliberalism
gives concrete form to the privatization and expansion of the corporate system by various
institutions, it restores class power and undermines democratic impulses. At the same
time, it also produces a situation in which, for the first time, the people, both in the
northern and southern hemispheres, have gathered around a common agenda for creating
alternative systems of democracy.
I use the term “neoliberal globalization” to emphasize that any discussion
concerning the conjuncture of culture and politics within the framework of globalization
should be rooted in concrete historical developments that have occurred as a result of the
restructuring of the world economy in the wake of the Washington Consensus.475 Such a
view offers us much more than a picture of either the global economy or global culture; it
helps us understand the entanglement of various social processes: the reorganization of
the world order has not merely been about an economic, political, or technological
transformation, but about a significant change in the very axial principles of society.
My aim has been to broaden the larger field of art history by bringing into play
local receptions of international biennials and alternative artistic formations inside and
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outside the art institutions. I opt to redefine the conventional, static, and undifferentiated
understandings about the conditions and modalities of contemporary art, especially in
respect to neoliberal economic and political programs. I demonstrate that while neoliberal
globalization reorders differences by controlling them through aesthetic conformism,
institutionalized framework, and corporate sponsorship, the artistic experiences–born of
local and idiosyncratic events and politics–participate in the urgent needs and struggles of
human beings globally. I conclude that contrary to many convictions on the dynamics of
art and globalization, in the contested relationship of contemporary art and culture to
neoliberal globalization, neither the processes of domination nor the strategies of
resistance are fixed and predictable.
Recently, Slovene philosopher Slavoj Žižek invoked Walter Benjamin’s dictum
that “it is not enough to ask how a certain theory (or art) declares itself with regard to
social struggles; one should also ask how it effectively functions in these very
struggles.”476 Through the theorizing and researching process of this dissertation, I
mainly had one troubling thought on my mind. Rancière puts it in better words than can I:
“What landscape can one describe as the meeting place between artistic practice and
political practice?”477 In this dissertation, I describe this landscape and argue that what
has been happening at the crossroads of artistic representation and political engagement is
different and more diverse now than in the time of aestheticized politics in the early
twentieth century or politicized aesthetics in the late twentieth century.
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FIGURE 1.1. Yinka Shonibare, Gallantry and Criminal Conversation, Installation, 2002.
Source: http://accessibleartny.com/index.php/2009/09/yinka-shonibare-mbe-at-thebrooklyn-art-museum, accessed July 11, 2007.

FIGURE 1.2. Alfredo Márquez and Ángel Valdez, Black Box, Mixed Media, 2001.
Source: www.revistaaufera.com, accessed January 18, 2009.
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FIGURE 1.3. Burak Delier, Untitled, photography, 2004. Source:
https://burakdelier.wordpress.com/works/afis-3/, accessed December 2, 2009.

FIGURE 1.4. Richard Serra, Stop Bush, lithograph, 2004. Source:
http://www.robertbermangalleryarchive.com, accessed January 31, 2009.
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FIGURE 1.5. István Szentandrássy’s paintings in the “Paradise Lost” exhibition at the
52nd Venice Biennial. Photograph taken by the author at the Venice Biennale in Venice,
Italy, July 11, 2007.

FIGURE 1.6. Tania Bruguera, Tatlin’s Whisper #6, installation with stage, podium,
loudspeaker, video camera, microphones, and color video, with sound, 2009. Photograph
taken by the author at the Havana Biennial, Cuba, March 12, 2009.
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FIGURE 2.1. Protest against the 9th Istanbul Biennial by a group known as “Grup
Gunizi.” Photograph taken by the author in Istanbul, Turkey, September 10, 2005.

FIGURE 2.2. Burak Delier, Parkalynch, Mixed Media, 2007. Source:
Burakdelier.worldpress.com, accessed September 13, 2007.
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FIGURE 2.3. Protest against the 1980 Turkish coup d’état killings, held on the 29th
anniversary of the coup d’etat, September 12, 2009. Photograph taken by the author in
Istanbul, Turkey, September 12, 2009.

FIGURE 2.4. Poster mocking the 11th Istanbul Biennial. Photograph taken by the author
in Istanbul, Turkey, September 5, 2009.
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FIGURE 2.5. Protest against the 11th Istanbul Biennial. Photograph taken by the author
in Istanbul, Turkey, September 12, 2009.

FIGURE 2.6. One of the graffitied signs on the floors of the venues at the 11th Istanbul
Biennial. Photograph taken by the author in Istanbul, Turkey, September 15, 2009.
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FIGURE 2.7. Burak Delier, Guard, photography, 2005. Source,
https://burakdelier.wordpress.com/works/guard-2005/, accessed December 2, 2009.

FIGURE 2.8. Anonymous, Hata, Silkscreen poster, 2009. Photograph taken by the author
in Istanbul, Turkey, September 15, 2009.
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FIGURE 2.9. A boy holding a sign showing the caption, which mocks 12th Istanbul
Biennial: “Mom, are police human?” Source: www. internetajans.com, accessed July 12,
2013.

FIGURES 3.1. Photographs showing the masks used for the performance Masquerade
Project during the 2001 IMF and World Bank protests in Washington D.C., 2001.
Source: http://realchangenews.org/art-and-activism, accessed March 12, 2008.
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FIGURE 3.2. Marcelo Expósito, Tactical Frivolity: Rhymes of Resistance, video still,
2007. Source:www.apexart.org/radicalimagination/php, accessed January 17, 2010.

FIGURE 3.3. Anti-globalization demonstrations in Seattle, 1999.
Source:www.democracyuprising.com/2004/Seattle1999/anti-globalization-movement,
accessed April 11, 2010.
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FIGURE 3.4 Anonymous, Oaxaca 2006: Women’s Resistance, silkscreen poster, 2006.
Photograph taken by the author in Oaxaca, Mexico, March 12, 2009.

FIGURE 3.5. A general view of the Bisagra exhibition on the Teacher’s Uprising in
Oaxaca in 2006 at the 10th Havana Biennial. Photograph taken by the author in Havana
Cuba, March 12, 2009.
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FIGURE 3.6 Woodblock print on cloth by ASARO showing Emiliano Zapata with a gas
mask in the Bisagra exhibition at the 10th Havana Biennial. Photograph taken by the
author in Havana, Cuba, March 12, 2009.

FIGURE 3.7. Young people in Kordon-Izmir taking pictures with the iconic image of the
Gezi uprising “the woman in red.” Caption reads “souvenir of resistance.” Source:
http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/7/4405412/ceyda-sungur-lady-in-red-photo-becomessymbol-of-turkey-protests, accessed June 10, 2013.

281

FIGURE 3.8. An image that circulated on social media mocking the TV channel CNN
Türk that broadcast a documentary of the penguins for two hours instead of reporting the
Gezi uprising. Caption reads: “Antarctica is Resisting! Penguins: The Problem is Not the
Melting Ice!” Source: http://gezidirenisikulturu.tumblr.com/post/52551131613, accessed
July 2, 2013.

FIGURE 3.9. Street graffiti in Istanbul making use of video surveillance cameras to mock
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the Gezi uprising. Photograph taken by the
author in Istanbul, Turkey, July 10, 2014.
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FIGURE 3.10. Street graffiti in Istanbul during Gezi uprising that shows a Penguin as a
protestor–a humorous commentary about the TV channel CNN Turk that broadcast
penguins instead of the Gezi uprising. Source http://direnisteyiz.net/fotograflar/stencil/,
accessed July 10, 2013.

FIGURE 3.11. A poster with a satirical image of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
as a Sultan, hung at a bus stop in Istanbul. Caption reads “This public does not bow to
you.” Photograph taken by the author in Istanbul, Turkey, July 11, 2013.
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FIGURE 3.12. A popular image that circulated on social media during Gezi uprising that
mocks the excessive police force in Istanbul. Source:www.anatolianpress.com, accessed
July 24, 2013.

FIGURE 3.13. A popular image circulated on social media during Gezi uprising that
mocks the excessive police force in Istanbul. Source: www.anatolianpress.com, accessed
July 24, 2013.

284

FIGURE 3.14. The performance/protest of Erdem Gündüz (standing man) in Taksim
Square to protest the young men killed by the police during Gezi uprising. Source:
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-protesters-civil-disobedience-act-in-taksimends-in-custody. June 17, 2013.

FIGURE 3.15 A view of the public enjoying the first rainbow stairs painted by Hüseyin
Çetinel in Istanbul. Source: www.thelede.blogs.nytimes.com, accessed September 7,
2013.
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FIGURE 3.16. Images of rainbow stairs in various parts of Turkey. Source:
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=447, accessed September 7,
2013.

FIGURE 3.17. An image of Nadire Kaya’s display of discontent with the excessive
police force in front of her house in Elazig, Turkey, 2013. Source: www.cnnturk.com,
accessed September 10, 2013.
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FIGURE 3.18. An image of a boy holding a mask of Belkin Elvan, who was shot-dead by
the police during Gezi revolt, at the largest funeral procession in Istanbul. Source:
www.anatolianpress.com, accessed March 10, 2014.

FIGURE 3.19. A popular image circulated on social media during Gezi uprising showing
a halay dance. Caption reads “Halay is an ideological act.” Source:
www.everywheretaksim.net, accessed June 24, 2013.
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FIGURE 3.20. The façade of Ataturk Cultural Center in Taksim Square during the
occupation of Gezi Park. Source: http://cdni.wired.co.uk/1240x826/g_j/IMG_5036.jpeg,
accessed June 6, 2015.

FIGURE 4.1 Zapatista man wearing a paliacate. Photograph taken by Gustavo Chávez
Pavon in Oventik, Chiapas-Mexico, December 12, 2009.
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FIGURE 4.2 Photograph of Subcomandante Marcos of the Zapatistas. Source:
www.taringa.net, accessed March 15, 2010.

FIGURE 4.3. Mural on the wall of a middle-school building of the Zapatistas in caracol
Roberto Barrios. Photograph taken by the author in Roberto Barrios, Chiapas-Mexico,
December 12, 2009.

289

FIGURE 4.4. Anonymous, Guadalupe as Zapatista Guerilla, oil on canvas. Photograph
taken by the author in San Cristobal de Las Casas, December 4, 2009.

FIGURE 4.5. Mural on the outside wall of the Clinica Guadalupe, Oventik, Chiapas.
Photograph taken by the author in Oventik, Chiapas-Mexico, January 5, 2010.
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FIGURE 4.6. Mural on the outside wall of the chapel in the village of San Pedro Polhó.
Photograph taken by the author in San Pedro Polhó, Chiapas-Mexico, January 30, 2012.

FIGURE 4.7. Photograph of Subcomandate Marcos and Subcomandante Tacho leading
the Zapatista Army of National Liberation. Source: www.revistaamatauta.org, accessed
August 22, 2010.
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FIGURE 4.8. Mural by the solidarity group Red de Solidaridad in caracol Oventik
executed in 2007. Photograph taken by the author in Oventik, Chiapas-Mexico, January
22, 2012.

FIGURE 4.9. Community mural in caracol Oventik. Caption reads “Slowly But I
Advance.” Photograph taken by the author in Oventik, Chiapas-Mexico, January 22,
2012.
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FIGURE 4.10. Photograph of the young Zapatistas and the artists painting murals on the
walls of the seondary school in caracol Oventik. Photograph taken by the author in
Oventik, Chiapas-Mexico, January 22, 2012.

FIGURE 4.11. Mural by Gustavo Chávez Pavón in one of the classrooms of the
secondary school in caracol Oventik, executed in 2002. Photograph taken by the author
in Oventik, Chiapas-Mexico, January 22, 2012.

293

FIGURE 4.12 Anonymous, Solidaridad Chiapas, poster, 2010. Photograph taken by the
author in San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas-Mexico, January 10, 2009.

FIGURE 4.13. Mural by the solidarity group Red de Solidaridad in caracol Oventik,
executed in 2009. Photograph taken by the author in Oventik, Chiapas-Mexico, January
22, 2012.
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Appendix I
An open letter disseminated to the public as a leaflet by anarchist resistance groups
in Taksim Square and Beyoglu District in Istanbul on September 9, 2009
An open letter to the curators, artists, participants of the 11th International Istanbul
Biennial and to all artists and art-lovers.
September 9, 2009
We have to stop pretending that the popularity of politically engaged art within the
museums, and markets over the last few years has anything to do with really changing the
world. We have to stop pretending that taking risks in the space of art, pushing
boundaries of form, and disobeying the conventions of culture, making art about politics
makes any difference. We have to stop pretending that art is a free space, autonomous
from webs of capital and power.
It’s time for the artist to become invisible. To dissolve back into life.
We have read the conceptual framework of the 11th International Istanbul Biennial with
great interest and a grin on our faces. We have long understood that the Istanbul Biennial
aims at being one of the most politically engaged transnational art events.And what a
coincidence! This year the Biennial is quoting comrade Brecht, dropping notions such as
neolibreal hegemony, and riding high against global capitalism. We kindly appreciate the
stance but we recognize that art should have never existed as a separate category from
life. Therefore we are writing you to stop collaborating with arm dealers such as the Koç
Holding which white wash themselves in warm waters of the global art scene and invite
you to the life, the life of resistance.
The curators wonder whether Brecht’s question ‘What Keeps Mankind Alive’ is equally
urgent today for us living under the neoliberal hegemony. We add the question: ‘What
Keeps Mankind Not-Alive?’ We acknowledge the urgency in these times when we do not
get free healthcare and education, our right to our cities our squares and streets are taken
by corporations, our land, our seeds and water are stolen, we are driven into precarity and
a life without security, when we are killed crossing their borders and left alone to live an
uncertain future with their potential crises. But we fight. And we resist in the streets not
in corporate spaces reserved for tolerated institutional critique so as to help them clear
their conscience. We fought when they wanted to kick us out of our neighborhoods, from
our houses in Sulukule, Gülensu and Ayazma, we also fought against those who would
smear the land with cyanide to search for gold in Bergama and the Kaz Mountains, those
who aggrieved hazelnut producers in Giresun and cotton producers in Cukurova, those
who blackened the lives of jeans sandblasting workers with the silicosis disease, making
them work for 12 hours a day in unhealthy conditions in workshops, those who turned the
docks into a death camp at Tuzla by not providing the workers safe working conditions,
those who endanger the lives of the people in the region in Sinop and Akkuyu by wishing

296

to construct nuclear power plants, and those who caused workers in Desa and Yorsan to
be fired for registering with trade unions. And our fight and hope keep us alive.
The curators also point out that the one of the crucial questions of this Biennial is “how to
’set pleasure free,’ how to regain revolutionary role of enjoyment”. We set pleasure free
in the streets, in our streets. We were in Prague, Hong Kong, Athens, Seattle,
Heilegendamm, Genoa, Chiapas and Oaxaca, Washington, Gaza and Istanbul….
Revolutionary role of enjoyment is out there and we cherish it everywhere because we
need to survive and we know that we are changing the world with our words, with our
acts, with our laughter. And our life itself is the source of all sorts of pleasure.
And we are in İstanbul and preparing ourselves to welcome 13.000 delegates of the IMF
and the World Bank as we do wherever they go. We declared that we are not hospitable.
We will take it to the streets in the carnival of resistance (1-8 October) and shut their
meetings down down.
Join the resistance and the insurgence of imagination! Evacuate corporate spaces, liberate
your works. Let’s prepare works and visuals (poster, sticker, stencil etc.) for the streets of
the resistance days. Let’s produce together, not within the white cube, but in the streets
and squares during the resistance week! Creativity belongs to each and every of us and
can’t be sponsored.
Long live global insurrection!
Direnistanbul Commissariat of Culture
Direnistanbul Popular Propaganda Network
Beğenal Rascal Army Choir
Direnistanbul Committees of Proletkult.
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Appendix II
Manifesto disseminated to the public as a leaflet by anarchist resistance groups in
Tophane Antrepo in Istanbul during the opening of the Istanbul Biennial on
September 12, 2009
A Contribution to the Critique of the Political Biennial: Zaaaaaaaart!
September 12, 2009
At the night of September 11, we were also at the Antrepo for the opening of the 11th
International Istanbul Biennial. We were there, however, not for adding our words to the
absurd cacophony of “radical” statements which were floating in the air like over
repeated tongue twisters but to “zaaart” this spectacle. There is only one answer to your
statements like “socialism or barbarism” echoing in the saloon filled with your sponsors,
bodyguards, ministers with fake smiles and old wine smells—catering was so poor
indeed; if two peanuts are enough to be sponsor, then we are willing to do it next time!—
and it is: “zaaart!”. The rest is empty words.
Last night was yet another example of the age of cynicism in which statements do not
make much sense and the fact that we live in an in a conceptual emptiness that swallows
and empties every word. What is enthusiastically clapping the speeches of the CEO of the
Koc Holding and the Minister of Culture, right after shouting out “every bourgeois is a
criminal”, if not a symptom of cynicism?
Fortunately, we don’t need this game to remember the dreams of liberty that you were
whispering to our ears last night. Don’t worry, we also remember things. For instance, we
remember the appreciative advice letter written by the deceased father of Koc Holding,
which granted us this exceptional night, to the generals of the 12 September, right after
the military coup d’état. Maybe you would like to use it for your next spectacle?
Thirty years ago, they dampened us; they hurt us bad in this country. Today we were
mourning but tomorrow we will continue from where we left off. 13.000 robbers under
the name of the IMF and the WB will be in Istanbul on 6-7 October. In those days, we
will dampen them; the streets of Istanbul will be shut down for them. Let the carnival of
our resistance be their nightmare!Our shadow is enough!
Direnistanbul Commissariat of Culture
Direnistanbul Popular Propaganda Network
Beğenal Rascal Army Choir
Direnistanbul Committees of Proletkult
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Appendix III
Letter sent to the Whitney Biennale in late February 2012 by OWS Arts & Labor
committee in New York

Dear Whitney Museum of American Art,
We are Arts & Labor, a working group founded in conjunction with the New York
General Assembly for OccupyWallStreet. We are artists and interns, writers and
educators, art handlers and designers, administrators, curators, assistants, and students
dedicated to exposing and rectifying economic inequalities and exploitative working
conditions in our fields through direct action and educational initiatives. We are writing
to call for an end to the Whitney Biennial in 2014.
Biennials were born in the nineteenth century, in an era when many nations were young
and wished to showcase their greatest cultural products and achievements. The Whitney
annuals grew out of this, championed by the patron and sculptor Gertrude Vanderbilt
Whitney, in a period when American art had little critical or financial support.
Much has changed since the founding of the Whitney Studio in 1914 and the advent of
the current biennial format in 1973. The absorption of contemporary art into museums,
the rise of a speculative art market, and the need for artists to obtain advanced degrees to
participate in the current system have changed how art is produced and exhibited.
We object to the biennial in its current form because it upholds a system that benefits
collectors, trustees, and corporations at the expense of art workers. The biennial
perpetuates the myth that art functions like other professional careers and that selection
and participation in the exhibition, for which artists themselves are not compensated, will
secure a sustainable vocation. This fallacy encourages many young artists to incur debt
from which they will never be free and supports a culture industry and financial and
cultural institutions that profit from their labors and financial servitude.
The Whitney Museum, with its system of wealthy trustees and ties to the real estate
industry perpetuates a model in which culture enhances the city and benefits the 1% of
our society while driving others into financial distress. This is embodied both in the
biennial’s sponsorship – represented most egregiously in its sponsorship by Sotheby’s,
which has locked out its unionized art handlers – and the museum’s imminent move to
the Meat Packing District, a neighborhood where artists once lived and worked which is
now a gentrified tourist destination that serves the interests of the real estate industry.
We therefore call upon the Whitney in its centennial year to end the biennial and to
support the interests of art workers over the capital interests of its trustees and corporate
sponsors. As the Declaration of the Occupation of New York City states, “We come to
you at a time when corporations, which place profit over people, self-interest over justice
and oppression over equality, run our governments.” Art institutions have come to mirror
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that ethos. We therefore call upon the Whitney to terminate its collusion with this system
of injustice and use its resources to imagine sustainable models of creativity and culture
that are accessible not just to Americans but to people around the globe.
Sincerely, Arts & Labor
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